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ABSTRACT
In a bid to revitalise the country's flagging oil industry, oil 
policy in Ecuador during the late 1970's was directed towards 
stimulating foreign investment in exploration and development 
work. The transition to a democratic civilian government in 
August 1979 appeared to signal a change in the direction of oil 
policy, with the Roldos administration seeking to give fresh 
impetus to the state-led development of the oil industry.
Although the need for some degree of foreign collaboration was 
accepted, the main burden of finding new oil reserves was to be 
assumed by the state oil company, CEPE. Foreign oil companies 
were merely to supplement CEPE's own efforts, with their 
exploration work confined to areas of high cost and high risk. 
The least risky and least costly areas were reserved for CEPE. 
State control over the CEPE-Texaco consortium was also to be 
progressively strengthened, with the state oil company assuming 
complete operational control from Texaco by 1985. To implement 
both policy objectives, steps were to be taken to restructure 
and capitalise the country's previously neglected state oil 
company.
In the event, no steps were taken to restructure and capitalise 
CEPE and plans to strengthen the company's influence in the 
operations of the consortium were dropped. By 1983, CEPE's 
financial position had deteriorated to such an extent that it was 
barely able to supplement, let alone spearhead, the search for 
new oil reserves.
The thesis examines why the attempt to give fresh stimulus to the 
state-led development of the oil industry failed. This will 
essentially involve a detailed analysis of government policy 
towards CEPE and the reasons for the collapse in the state 
company's investment capacity. The thesis looks at the role, if 
any, that international conditions played in shaping government 
oil policy and the investment capacity of CEPE. Events in the
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domestic political arena are also the subject of analysis. The 
thesis will suggest that the reasons for the failure of the 
government's oil strategy may have less to do with international 
conditions than with the nature of the relationship between the 
state and CEPE, the priorities of the political elites and 
Texaco's continued presence in Ecuador.
The thesis also looks at the subsequent shift in policy towards 
an external (that is, foreign) solution to the country's oil 
crisis. Although there has never been a state monopoly of the 
upstream sector in Ecuador, the process of attracting companies 
to the exploration play proved difficult. This reflected not only 
domestic political factors, but also a reluctance on the part of 
oil companies to invest in Ecuador. This reluctance was shaped by 
factors specific to Ecuador (contractual terms, geology and the 
country's previous history of acrimonious relations with oil 
companies) and by international conditions (the decline in world 
oil prices, changes in company investment strategy and the 
increasing number of exploration opportunities elsewhere in the 
world).
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EQTES Qg EIJAfCIAl DATA
Oil prices per barrel have been expressed in nominal US dollar 
terms. All other financial data has been presented in dollar 
terms at constant 1972 prices. Ecuadorian currency (sucres: S/) 
was converted into US dollars using the following exchange rates:
1972-81 S/25 to the dollar; 1982 S/30; 1983 S/44.12; and 1984
S/62.3. US dollars were then expressed in constant 1972 price 
terms using the GUP implicit price deflators contained in the 
1986 US Department of Commerce 'Statistical Abstract of the 
United States.'
Information on the state oil company's income and expenditure 
during the period has been taken from 'Estadisticas 
Presupuestarias, 1972-87' published in July 1988 by CEPE's 
Economic and Budget Department. (A summary of the report is 
contained in Appendix 5). Information on the distribution of the 
country's oil income throughout the public sector has been based 
on a Ministry of Finance report 'Estadistica de Ingresos 
Petroleros', published in June 1984. Public sector oil income, it 
should be noted, essentially covers the income generated from 
crude and fuel oil exports, royalties, oil income tax, domestic 
oil price increases and superficiary rights. The most important 
source of oil income not available for distribution to the public 
sector is the revenue generated from the sale of oil products on 
the domestic market.
Both sources provide data on the income CEPE receives from 
crude and fuel oil exports and domestic oil price rises. The 
figures presented did, in some instances, differ. In analysing 
the reasons for CEPE's financial crisis, the manner in which a 
large part of the country's oil wealth (including that generated 
by CEPE) is distributed throughout the public sector forms a 
central part of the thesis. For this reason, information on 
CEPE's share of crude and fuel oil export income and the revenue 
generated from domestic oil prices has been based on Ministry of 
Finance data.
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INTRODUCTION
From the mid-1970's onwards, a succession of oil-importing 
countries in Latin America (for instance, Brazil and Argentina) 
either abandoned long-established state monopoly policies or 
revised their oil regulations in a bid to secure foreign
collaboration in the search for new oil reserves. A similar,
though less clearly defined process was underway in the oil
exporting country of Ecuador, with official oil policy in the 
second half of the 1970‘s directed towards stimulating foreign 
investment in exploration and development work.
However, the transition to a civilian government headed by Jaime 
Roldos appeared to mark a radical change in direction. The Roldos 
government, and the centre and centre-left groups that dominated 
Congress, sought to give fresh impetus to the state-led 
development of the country's upstream sector. The main burden of 
exploration was to be assumed by CEPE, with foreign companies 
merely supplementing CEPE's own work. The most prospective areas 
were to be reserved exclusively for the state, with foreign
exploration activity confined to areas of high cost and high 
risk. State control over the Texaco-CEPE consortium was also to 
be progressively increased, with CEPE assuming complete 
operational control by 1985. To ensure that CEPE was properly 
equipped to undertake the priority tasks assigned to it, steps
were to be taken to transform CEPE from an historically
undercapitalised and bureaucratic appendage of the state, into
an efficient and well-financed instrument of state oil policy.
In the event, CEPE proved unable to fulfill the objectives 
assigned to it. Not only were plans to replace Texaco as operator 
dropped, but by 1983 it was clear that CEPE was scarcely in a 
position to supplement let alone spearhead the search for new oil 
reserves. Oil policy subsequently moved sharply in favour of
attracting extensive foreign oil capital. The fundamental 
question that the thesis will address is why the attempt to
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strengthen CEPE and give fresh impetus to the state-led 
development of the oil industry failed. The reasons are complex.
Despite the petrodollar 'windfall* of 1979-80, the international 
climate proved to be highly unfavourable to a country heavily 
dependent on the continued inflow of oil revenue and foreign 
credit. Monetarist ideology and interest rates were in the
ascendancy, OPEC in retreat and prices and demand for the
country's oil and non-oil commodity exports in decline. By the 
end of 1982, the final pillar of the economy collapsed when
commercial bank lending to Ecuador was abruptly halted.
International conditions may not have appeared conducive to the 
adoption of an expansive and costly exploration campaign by the 
state oil company. It is, however, important to determine 
precisely how the changes in the international situation may have 
shaped the direction of government oil policy, particularly 
towards CEPE. To what extent, for instance, did external
developments increase the reluctance or ability of the state to 
provide CEPE with the resources necessary to carry out its
priority objectives? More specfically, to what extent was CEPE's 
investment capacity affected by the slump in oil prices, rising 
interest rates and the curtailment of commercial bank lending?
The experiences of other state oil companies in the region 
provides another line of approach, in which international
conditions remain a critical, but indirect, influence on the
finances of a state oil company. A number of writers, most
notably Alfred Saulniers, have suggested that the most important 
factor influencing the performance of a state oil company is the 
nature of its relationship with the state. 1 Aside from their 
entrepreneurial activities, state oil companies in Latin America 
have traditionally been required to carry out a multiplicity of 
functions, covering a broad mix of political, macroeconomic and 
social objectives. To ensure compliance with these 'external' 
goals, governments have sought to design adequate control and 
monitoring systems and created various mechanisms to appropriate
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part of the income generated by the company's activities. This 
has then been used to finance the state's macroeconomic and 
political objectives. The state has also sought to impose non- 
market based pricing mechanisms, which have forced the companies 
to sell oil products to domestic consumers at prices which are 
insufficient to cover costs.
Under these circumstances, the government-imposed environment 
within which a company is required to operate becomes the crucial 
element in determining the extent to which it develops into an 
efficient, well-capitalised company. The evidence suggests that 
the more successful state oil companies exist in those countries 
where a suitable balance has been established between the 
government's need to coordinate and control the conq>any, and thus 
ensure compliance with government-imposed objectives, and the 
need to allow the company to pursue its entrepreneurial goals 
without undue government interference.
Such a balance can generally be said to have existed in Brazil 
and Venezuela. Both Petrobr&s and Petrov6n have been largely 
autonomous public enterprises, which have been allowed to operate 
along competitive, economic-orientated lines. Nevertheless, both 
companies found their resources under mounting pressure from the 
state in the early 1980's. In Brazil, Petrobr&s was required to 
prop up flagging sectors of the economy: to help farmers, the 
company was forced to reduce the price of its fertilizer 
products, while to protect charcoal producers from the effects 
of a depressed market, the company was also farced to purchase 
large stocks of charcoal that were surplus to its needs.2
Management at Petrov6n similarly found its power and autonomy 
undermined during this period, as the cash-straitened COPEI 
government systematically interfered with the company's funds 
and the appointment of senior personnel. Government interference 
even extended to the confiscation of $6 bn from the company's 
offshore dollar accounts. By 1982, Petrovdn's financial 
independence was under severe threat.
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Both examples illustrate how international conditions served to 
shift the balance that had previously existed between the needs 
of the state and those of the state oil company in favour of the 
former. Do the experiences of PetrobrAs and Petrov6n provide a 
possible explanation for CEPE's decapitalisation? Specifically, 
to what extent did the international crisis serve to alter the 
traditional relationship that had existed between the Ecuadorian 
state and CEPE?
It is clear, however, that even before the economic crisis of 
the 1980's governments have used their state oil companies to 
raise badly needed revenue, in some instances excessively so. The 
most notable example of this is the Argentine state oil company 
Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF). Historically, the 
company has been heavily undercapitalised and its efficient 
development hampered by the imposition of a highly bureaucratic 
structure of centralised control. As Carl Solberg has shown, the 
company's financial problems were a direct consequence of the 
fact that successive governments preferred to milk YPF's revenue 
rather than to raise finance through other, more politically 
unpopular, methods.3 As a result, around 70% of the company's 
gross sales income was transferred to the national government, 
provincial governments and a string of state agencies including 
the national Highway Council and the Provincial Road Fund.'* To 
add to the company's financial difficulties, the state has forced 
YPF to sell oil products on the domestic market at prices that 
were insufficient to cover its refining and marketing costs.
The experiences of CEPE during the 1970's and early 1980's will 
be shown to closely resemble those of YPF. This suggests, 
therefore, that the fundamental reason for CEPE's financial and 
other problems lie in the nature of its relationship with the 
state. If this is the case, then the decapitalisation of CEPE and 
the failure to give fresh impetus to the state-led development of 
the oil industry cannot simply be explained in terms of a 
particular moment in time or a particular set of (abnormal) 
circumstances. All governments, military and civilian,
-  15 -
progressive and conservative, have ignored CEPE's needs and 
interfered with its finances.
As the thesis will show, the Roldos and Hurtado governments were 
no exception: both subordinated CEPE's needs to the attainment 
of wider political and economic objectives and effectively 
narrowed the options available for revitalising the oil industry. 
The pursuit of these objectives not only distracted attention 
from the urgent need to reform and capitalise CEPE, but resulted 
in the state and Congress systematically siphoning CEPE's funds. 
This raises further questions, which the thesis will address. Did 
the secondary importance attached to CEPE reflect the pressing 
nature of these 'other' priorities, or did it reflect a lack of 
genuine commitment to the state oil company and the priority 
objectives assigned to CEPE? It may, perhaps, be significant in 
this respect that one of the most damaging political decisions 
taken against CEPE occurred just three months after the 
government took office, in the midst of OPEC's second oil price 
offensive.
More general questions also need to be addessed. For instance, 
are there particular problems facing policy-makers seeking to 
'turn' a company round after a poor start? Was there, for 
instance, a belief that the political and economic costs of 
creating an efficient and well-capitalised company could outweigh 
any potential benefits?
This leads on to the final, but perhaps most important, issue 
that must be addressed. Given the extensive, existing role of the 
Ecuadorian state in the upstream sector, and the necessity of 
ensuring the continued inflow of oil income to the economy, how 
could the political elites afford not to give priority to 
strengthening CEPE? The answer to this does, I believe, lie in 
the structure and nature of the Ecuadorian oil industry and 
CEPE's actual, as opposed to theoretical, role within it. In 
this respect, the continued presence and dominance of Texaco in
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Ecuador will be shown to be the fundamental reason why 
successive governments have been able to ignore CEPE's needs.
Little has been written on the development of CEPE, either during 
or after the 1970's. The thesis provides the opportunity to 
undertake an in-depth analysis of the state oil company. It will 
look at its financial resources and investment activity, its 
organisational and administrative structure, the policy disputes 
that surrounded it and the policy decisions that shaped its 
future. It will cover, in short, the nature of the relationship 
that has developed between the state and the political elites on 
the one hand, and the country's state oil company on the other. 
By focusing on these issues, a clearer picture will emerge to 
explain why CEPE has been an historically undercapitalised 
I company and why it has developed into one of the most inefficient 
\state oil companies in the region.
There has, moreover, been no detailed examination on the 
distribution of the country's oil income throughout the public 
sector, nor of the extent to which the Ecuadorian armed forces 
has sought (successfully) to captuf'e^virtually one-fourth of the 
country's oil wealth.
The second theme covered in the thesis looks at the search for an 
'external* solution to the country's oil problems and how the 
government sought to draw foreign companies back into the 
exploration play. It proved to be a long and difficult process. 
As well as looking at internal differences on the issue of 
foreign oil investment, the thesis will place the development of 
oil policy within a wider domestic political setting. 
Specifically, it will look at the constraints on policy formation 
and implementation generally in a highly fragmented and 
conflictive political environment.
Oil company responses to the process of 'apertura' will also be 
assessed. Although not averse to investing in countries which had 
previously pursued nationalist, and nationalising policies, oil
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companies adopted a highly cautious approach to Ecuador. To
understand the reasons for this, the thesis will look at how ail 
company investment strategy towards Ecuador was influenced by 
country-specific factors (contractual terms, geology and the 
country's recent history of acrimonious relations between the
state and oil companies) and international factors (the decline
in world oil prices, changes in global company investment 
strategy and the increasingly numerous opportunities for
exploration elsewhere in the world). Although the thesis focuses 
on the policies of the Roldos and Hurtado governments, it is 
worth noting that the 'open door' policy initiated during this 
period did eventually result in a number of oil companies signing 
exploration contracts in 1985. Thereafter, a succession of oil 
companies entered the country over the next few years. All of 
these were signed during the administration of Leon Febres 
Cordero, a period not strictly covered by the thesis. As the 
thesis will show, however, the general direction of government 
oil policy throughout the 1980's was largely mapped out in 1979- 
84, with the Osvaldo Hurtado government close to signing 
contracts with three oil companies in the weeks leading up to the 
transfer of power to the Febres Cordero government in August 
1984.
There has also been little detailed analysis of the problems 
facing countries which have sought to shift oil policy in a more 
neo-liberal direction. As the period covered by the thesis 
highlights, an acceptance of the need for foreign investment 
will not necessarily diminish the scope for internal conflict 
over the direction of oil policy. Instead, the internal debate 
will shift to other, equally important and no less controversial 
issues. To what extent, for instance, should foreign 
collaboration be sought, on what terms and to which geological 
zones?
In the case of Ecuador, the situation was further complicated by 
the initial unwillingness of foreign oil companies to respond 
positively to government invitations to undertake exploration
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work in the country. The thesis provides the opportunity to 
examine why oil companies were reluctant for so long to invest in 
Bcuador and why some eventually decided to bid for exploration 
blocks in 1983 when the first round of bidding was opened.
Before examining the development of oil policy during the Roldos 
and Hurtado governments, the first four chapters will ‘set the 
scene.• The themes covered are central to understanding 
developments in the early 1980‘s in respect of the domestic 
economic and political situation, the international environment 
and the relationship between the state on the one hand and CEPE, 
Texaco and potential oil investors on the other. Chapter 1 looks 
first at the economic context within which the new government 
came to office and the nature of the oil 'crisis' confronting 
the country. The key issues covered include the economy's 
increasing dependence on oil revenue and commercial bank loans in 
the late 1970's, the failure to mobilise non-oil income sources, 
and the potentially negative consequences of the 1979 oil price 
hikes for Ecuador, OPEC and the industrialised countries.
Chapter 2 covers the response of oil companies to the nationalist 
oil policies of the early 1970's, as well as the role played by 
the United States, Texaco-Gulf and domestic conservatives in the 
dismantlement of these policies. This chapter highlights the 
bitter domestic opposition towards both oil nationalism and 
CEPE, the absence of an organised base of support for oil 
nationalism and the reasons why oil companies came to regard 
Ecuador as a 'politically risky' country to invest in. Chapter 3 
provides a detailed analysis of CEPE's formative years, looking 
in particular at its relationship with the state, on the factors 
inhibiting its ability to develop into an efficient and well- 
capitalised company and its failure to compensate for the fall- 
off in private exploration work.
After outlining the oil policies of the Roldos government, 
chapter 4 suggests that the political climate and economic 
situation were less favourable to CEPE (and democratic reformism)
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than initial indications might have suggested. Concrete evidence 
of this is provided in chapter 5, which looks at the dispute 
between the Oil Ministry and CEPE over the direction of oil 
policy, decisions taken by Congress which undermined CEPE's 
investment capacity and CEPE's response to these decisions. 
Chapter 6 concentrates on the reassertion of Oil Ministry control 
over CEPE and the mix of political and economic factors that 
began to switch the main emphasis of oil policy away from a 
largely 'domestic' to an 'external' solution to the country's oil 
problems.
Chapter 7 is devoted entirely to country-specific and 
international factors that shaped oil company perceptions of 
Ecuador as a potential target for investment. Chapter 8 centres 
on the deteriorating political and economic situation, the 
declining investment capacity of CEPE and government proposals to 
create a more attractive investment climate for foreign oil 
companies. Chapter 9 covers the 'consulta nacional' that was 
carried out at the end of 1981 on the governments oil reform 
proposals and the ability or otherwise of CEPE to accomplish the 
priority objectives assigned to it. Chapter 10 looks at the 
political and economic crisis that enveloped the country in 1982, 
together with the decision of Congress to reform the country's 
Oil Law. Chapter 11 concentrates on the collapse in CEPE's 
investment capacity and essentially represents an overview of 
the deterioration in the company's financial position since 1980 
and the reasons for this. The final chapter covers oil company 
responses to the first round of bidding that opened in June 1983 
and which eventually led to three 'risk' contracts being signed 
with Occidental, Belco and Exxon-Hispanoil.
-  20 -
CHAPTER 1: OIL AID THE ECOIOMY. 1972-79; AI QVBRVIB¥
The response of oil consumers to the revolutionary turmoil in 
Iran provided a welcome and unexpected boost to Ecuador's
flagging economy. With fears of a possible oil shortage leading
to an undisciplined scramble for supplies during the early weeks 
of 1979, world oil prices spiralled out of control. In Ecuador, 
the record crude price of $13.15 pb obtained at the end of 1976 
faded into insignificance with each passing month: by June the 
price of Oriente crude had reached $28.71; six months later 
prices were moving beyond $32. As a direct consequence of 
events in the Middle-East, Ecuador's crude export earnings 
virtually doubled from $371m in 1978 to $631.5m. Public sector 
oil income, which was composed primarily of the revenue generated 
by crude and fuel oil exports, oil income tax and royalties, rose 
by a similar proportion to $619.5m. 1 Some measure of the economic 
impact of this petrodollar 'windfall* can be gauged by the fact 
that, for most of the 1970's, oil provided around 60% of total 
export revenue and 40% of public sector income, and was a vital 
(in the case of CEPE, the state electricity enterprise IHECEL, 
and the national development fund FOHADE, only) source of income 
for a variety of public sector entities, including the state
budget and the armed forces.
OPEC's second price offensive coincided with the election of a 
civilian government committed to welfare politics, job creation 
and an extensive programme of investment in social and rural
development projects. The reformist orientation of the electorate 
that propelled Jaime Roldos to the presidency was further 
reflected in the composition of Congress. Previously the 
virtual fiefdom of the country's agro-exporting elites, it was 
now dominated by urban middle-class groups on the centre and 
centre-left of the political spectrum. Of the 69 seats in 
Congress, just one third were held by the previously dominant 
conservative parties.
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The euphoria that surrounded the political ascendency of pro- 
reformist groups was, however, tempered - or should have been - 
by the knowledge that the dramatic boost to the state's 
financial resources had resulted solely from the response of 
Western oil consumers to events over which Ecuador had no 
influence and, along with many others at the time, little 
understanding. The price hikes of 1979 once again highlighted the 
extent to which the fortune's of the economy and the public 
sector were inextricably linked to developments in the world oil 
market.
It is not difficult to see why oil assumed such importance in the 
economy in the years immediately after Ecuador became an oil 
exporting country. While the country's total export income
between 1964-71 amounted to $1.4 bn, in 1973-75 oil export 
revenue alone totalled just over $1.5 bn.2 Nevertheless, the 
continued predominance of oil when the price and volume of
Ecuador's crude exports began to fall from the mid-1970's onwards 
does suggest that policies to maintain and stimulate non-oil 
income sources were neglected. The growth of traditional exports, 
for instance, was discouraged by the maintenance of an 
overvalued exchange rate and the imposition of a number of export
taxes. In the case of coffee producers, these taxes reduced
export receipts by as much as 27% in 1979.3 The . combined export 
volume of the country's main traditional exports meanwhile was 
31% lower in 1979 than in 1972. Non-oil tax revenue was also 
neglected. Prior to Ecuador's emergence as an oil exporter, this 
had represented over 14% of GDP; by 1979, despite rapid economic 
growth and the accompanying rise in per capita income, its share 
had actually fallen to around 10%. This partly reflected
generous personal deductions and exemptions which effectively 
excluded 94% of the country's economically active population from 
the payment of income tax. *
Tax evasion was also extensive, with one report estimating that 
'at least half of all potentially taxable income' remained 
undeclared.B The country's most powerful businessman, for
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instance, was alleged to have paid a mere $80 in taxes in 1978.® 
Corporate tax income did increase, but here too the extensive 
availability of attractive fiscal incentives - qualified firms 
could deduct up to 100% of their outlays for fixed capital from 
their taxable incomes - placed severe limits on the amount of 
revenue that could be generated from this source.-7
The failure to maintain non-oil income sources served to deepen 
Ecuador's dependency on oil revenue and increased the sensitivity 
of the economy to fluctuations in the price and volume of the 
country's crude exports. The sudden hike in oil prices had 
provided the Roldos government with the financial resources to 
finance its semi-refor mist policies and capitalise CEPE. However, 
as a cursory glance at the events that followed the first oil 
boom in 1973-74 would have highlighted, sudden and substantial 
increases in oil prices could set in motion a chain of 
developments that were potentially damaging to Ecuador's oil- 
dependent economy.
Some Consequences of the 1973-74 OPEC Price Hikes
The most immediate effect of the four-fold price increase in 
1973-74 was to increase the OECD's net oil import bill from 
around $33 bn in 1973 to $87 bn one year later. This occurred 
despite oil imports falling by lm b/d to 25tem b/d. Real GDP 
growth slowed to just 0.7% after increasing by 6.1% in the 
preceding year and then fell by 0.2% in 1975.® The combination of 
recession and double-digit inflation caused interest rates to 
rise from 6% to 10% in 1974, although they subsequently fell in 
the following two years. According to one estimate, the interest 
rate rises increased the debt-interest payments of the developing 
world by $10 bn.®
Oil consumption slowed considerably. Energy consumption after
1973-74 had grown disproportionately much less than OECD area 
GJTP. While energy use in the OECD area grew between 1960-73 at 
the same rate as real OECD GRP, OECD's primary energy
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requirements rose in the following six years by around 17%, 
' implying a reduction of energy use per unit of GNP of about 
9%. 1 10 This was due primarily to the reaction of energy users to 
increased prices together with direct government action to 
encourage energy conservation and the increased use of non-oil 
fuels, in particular coal. At the same time as seeking to reduce 
levels of consumption and thus demand, the OECD countries sought 
to reduce their dependence on OPEC oil through increased domestic 
production and by developing non-OPEC sources of oil, 
particularly those in Alaska, the North Sea and Norway.11
The slowdown in oil demand combined with an increase in oil 
supply sources and a rapid depreciation of the US dollar in 1978 
to cause oil prices to fall in real dollar terms, according to 
one estimate by as much as 17.9%. 12 In Ecuador, the depressed 
market conditions combined with stagnant oil production and a 
decline in crude export volume, to cause crude export earnings to 
fall from $601.9m in 1974 to $413.9m in 1978.
Between 1972-74, the sudden and substantial influx of oil 
revenue had enabled the economy to grow by an annual average of 
15.3% and financed a veritable explosion in public expenditure 
and imports.13 To compensate for the fall in export earnings the 
military junta had two domestic options: to reduce public
expenditure and imports and/or mobilise existing or alternative 
sources of foreign exchange and domestic income. It chose 
neither, preferring instead to cover the resulting deficits in 
the public sector and current accounts by turning to foreign 
commercial banks, all of which were willing to supply an OPEC 
member with loans on favourable terms. Through this means the 
government avoided the adjustment policies required in the post 
oil boom era: the high level of imports and public expenditure
were maintained, with loans financing around 70% of the current 
account deficit.1-* This strategy ensured that there was no 
decline in public investment either in real terms or relative to 
GDP, which increased at an annual average rate of 7.2% between
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1976 to 1978. The legacy of this strategy was inherited by the 
Roldos government in the shape of a $2.2 bn external debt.1S
Around three-quarters of the external debt was owed to 
commercial banks, with most of the loans carrying floating rates 
of interest.1S This had not been regarded as a problem when the 
loans were first contracted. Although nominal rates of interest 
(both the US Prime Rate and LIBOR) gradually climbed in the late 
1970's, the continued growth in world trade and the expansionary 
policies of the OECD countries ensured that real rates of 
interest remained low - in the case of LIBOR it was actually 
negative in 1976 and 1977.17 Nevertheless, floating interest 
rates, together with the dollar denomination of the loans, did 
serve to heighten the vulnerability of Ecuador's economy to the 
fiscal and monetary policies of the United States and other OECD 
countries.
Early Responses to the 1979 Oil Price Hikes
In the OECD countries, net oil imports represented over 60% of 
oil requirements, and oil one-third of total energy needs and 
2%% of GDP. The price hikes of 1979 were therefore expected to 
have significant impact on GDP growth, inflation and balance of 
payments accounts.,e Concern was already being expressed in the 
middle of 1979, with the US government warning that inflation 
would rise by around two percentage points and unemployment 
increase by 800,000. 19 In respect of the European Community, 
estimates were made that:
'every dollar per barrel above the December 
1978 price of $12.70 would result in a $3.6 bn 
annual increase in the Community's oil bill, a 
$3 bn worsening in its balance of payments on 
current account, a 0.4% reduction in economic 
growth and a 0.3% increase in inflation.'20
By the end of the year, OECD economic indicators revealed a 
performance below that of the preceding year. GDP growth slowed 
from 4.1% to 3.2%, while in the USA the rate of growth slowed
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even further, from 5.3% to 2.5%. With their combined oil import 
bill doubling from its 1978 level of $93 bn, the current account 
balance of the OECD economies moved from a surplus of $6.6 bn to 
a deficit of nearly $27.5 bn which was projected to double by the 
end of 1980.21 This swing was entirely attributable to their 
transactions with OPEC producers. For reasons which were largely 
(though not entirely) due to the rapid rise in oil prices, 
economic forecasts for 1980 pointed to:
'slow growth, rapid inflation and massive
balance of payments deficits for most of the 
industrialised world..[ In the USA] expectation 
of recession in 1980 is almost universal.122
Another disturbing development was the upward movement in OECD 
inflation, a trend that was encouraged by the adoption of 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. In the United States, 
inflation moved from 7.7% in 1978 to 11.3%.23 In an attempt to 
dampen inflationary pressures and restore confidence in the 
dollar, the US Federal Reserve Board initiated a policy of 
severe monetary restraint in October 1979. As a result of this 
shift in policy, the US prime rate rose from 9% in 1978 to over 
12%% in 1979.2*
Even before the upward trend was evident - indeed when real 
interest rates were barely positive - concern was being
expressed in Ecuador that the Roldos government would have to 
renegotiate its short-term debt. In May, the Quito Chamber of 
Commerce warned that 'the most acute effect' of the 'chaotic and 
unbridled' contraction of debts in 1977-79 'will be felt in the
next few years. '2S How 'acute' the effect would be, at least in
the absence of major readjustment policies, would largely be 
determined by developments in the world economy.
The oil price hikes carried potential negative consequences for 
OPEC producers. With the OECD countries moving into recession, 
demand for oil could be expected to decline. Renewed impetus 
could also be expected to be given to oil conservation measures, 
the development of alternative energy resources and exploration
-  26 -
and development work in non-OPEC countries. The price hikes did, 
moreover, provide OECD countries with the economic and 
political incentive to accelerate the development of high cost 
non-OPEC oil resources, including those in the North Sea and 
Alaska.
OECD responses to the price hikes were already having an effect 
on the demand side by the time Roldos assumed the presidency. 
Although OECD consumption fell only marginally in 1979, the 
weakening demand pressures had accelerated in the latter part of 
the year. By the last quarter, demand was 2m b/d lower than in 
the first quarter of 1979, a fall of 4.4%. Net oil imports did 
increase, but this reflected a rapid growth in stocks in the 
second half of the year, when stockbuilding was around 1.75 m b/d 
in excess of normal seasonal movements. Production from non-OPEC 
sources meanwhile increased, from 16.7m b/d to 18.1m b/d in 1979, 
a rise of 8.4%, compared to a 3.7% increase in OPEC's 
production.
The Sole of QPEC
Whether OPEC could meet these emerging challenges was 
dependent to a large extent on its ability to act as a unified 
and disciplined force. From the response to events in 1978-79, 
it was apparent that the potential for disunity at times of 
market crisis was high. Saudi Arabia had, together with pre­
revolutionary Iran, resisted pressure from other members in 1978 
for the $12.70 Marker crude price that had been in effect since 
the start of 1977 to be increased.27 Demands for an end to the 
price freeze were coupled with calls for a new pricing formula 
based on a mixed basket of currencies rather than simply the US 
dollar. Both demands were rejected on the grounds that they could 
destabilise the world economy and lead to a further loss of 
international confidence in the US dollar.
With the outbreak of political turmoil in Iran after September 
1978, Saudi Arabia had moved quickly to reduce the pressure on
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prices by boosting production by 2.3m b/d to 10m b/d. It then 
sought to accomodate the growing demands from other OPEC members 
for controlled price increases to be implemented in 1979. At the 
end of 1978, a compromise agreement was reached which involved 
the introduction of a quarterly price adjustment scheme.
Implementation of this scheme would have increased average
prices in 1979 by 10%, from $12.7 to $13.9.
The agreement was soon overtaken by events in Iran, with the
average monthly price for OPEC crudes exceeding $17 in Kay, while 
spot prices moved from $13 in January to $29. Despite mounting 
pressure from other OPEC countries, Saudi Arabia resisted 
demands to increase the Marker price to $17.5. Instead, a further 
compromise agreement was reached in March whereby the price
agreed for the last quarter of 1979 - $14.5 - would be
implemented from the start of April. The increasing disunity
within OPEC was further highlighted in June. By this time it had
become apparent that the new Islamic regime in Iran intended to 
maintain production at around two-thirds of the pre­
revolutionary level. This would have effectively eliminated 
the world supply surplus that had emerged since 1977 and created 
the conditions for the continued upward movement in oil prices. 
In the event, the meeting failed to re-establish a unified 
official price structure. Instead, a three-tier pricing structure 
was established, which was in the event largely ignored by most 
members including Ecuador. This consisted of the Marker price, 
set at $18, a surcharged reference price of $20, and an overall 
ceiling price of $23.5 pb.
A few weeks later, Saudi Arabia responded to US requests to 
cooperate in bringing price stability to the market by increasing 
output from around 8.5m b/d to 9.5m b/d. Together with the 
seasonal drop in demand and increased output from the North Sea, 
this move eased pressure on supplies and brought a temporary
halt to the escalation in prices.
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There were a number of reasons for Saudi Arabia's moderate stance 
on prices. A prime concern was the impact that sudden price 
increases would have on the developed economies, in particular 
the United States where a substantial quantity of Saudi oil money 
was invested. Political and diplomatic factors also played a 
part. A moderate stance on prices, together with evidence of its 
ability to manipulate market conditions, were two ways to make 
the US (and other Western countries) more receptive to its views 
on the Middle East and to requests for sophisticated military 
hardware. The resulting desire for close bilateral relations 
with the US government was reinforced by the Islamic Revolution 
in Iran, and Saudi fears that the revolutionary turmoil in 
Tehran could spill over into Saudi Arabia.
There was a further factor. As a result of its huge oil reserves, 
Saudi Arabia's primary concern was not with short-term economic 
gains, but the long-term development of its reserves to bank-roll 
the country into the next century. Spiralling oil prices, 
together with continued supply disruptions in the Gulf region, 
were thus deemed harmful for Saudi crude in the long-term since 
both would give fresh impetus to the development of non-OPEC oil 
supplies and alternative energy sources.
The Oil Crisis in Ecuador
In contrast to Saudi Arabia, Ecuador's vulnerability to 
depressed market conditions was heightened by the lack of 
readily available untapped reserves that could be swiftly 
channelled to the market in the event of a price slump. The 
central problem facing Ecuador was that the economy was 
dependent on a commodity whose revenue-generating capacity had 
been progressively declining throughout the 1970's. In 1973, 
77.4% of production had been exported; six years later the 
proportion had fallen to just 50.6%. This shrinkage in crude 
export volume reflected both stagnant output and the spiralling 
increase in domestic oil consumption.
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Domestic oil consumption had been increasing by an average annual 
rate of 15% during the 1970’s. This rate of increase had been 
stimulated by rapid economic growth, the expansion of domestic 
industry, the sharp increase in the vehicle population and the 
maintenance of non-market based prices.20 When consumption had 
continued to rise sharply even when economic growth slowed, price 
increases were increasingly seen as the principal method to slow 
down consumption, as well as halting the smuggling of oil
products to Peru and Colombia where prices were higher and
reducing waste. Price increases would also encourage the
substitution of new energy sources - primarily hydroelectricity - 
by eliminating the artificial edge enjoyed by oil and oil-related 
products. The net effect, therefore, would be to slow down the 
rapid decline in the crude available for export. For a cash- 
straitened government, a price hike had the additional benefit of 
mobilising what was possibly the most lucrative source of 
additional finance for the state.
There was, however, one obstacle. In Ecuador, as in the rest of 
Latin America, the political pressures against price increases 
have proved overwhelming, with gasoline prices in particular:
'a major focal point for political unrest.
Price increases involve opposition from a 
powerful urban lobby of professional drivers, 
car users and bus passengers which contains 
just enough poor people to convey a populist 
appeal. . .'30
This was graphically illustrated early in 1978 when the military 
junta appeared to be preparing the population for a major 
reversal in the country's low pricing policy. Some indication of 
the likely political response to such a move was provided in 
April when transport fares rose by 40%. The ensuing violence left 
four dead and hundreds injured, with order being restored by the 
army after ten days of rioting. In the wake of these 
disturbances, plans for a major price hike were shelved and the 
junta contented itself with increasing the import tariff on 
vehicle imports. It was hoped that this would, indirectly, slow
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down the growth in gasoline consumption. This was a rather poor 
substitute for a major price increase, particularly since a 
number of multinationals were already planning to establish car 
plants within Ecuador.
The decline in crude export volume also reflected stagnant 
production. After peaking at 76.2m in 1973, production slumped 
to 58.7m in 1975 and then recovered to reach 74.2m three years 
later. It was not until 1979 that production surpassed the 1973 
level, though the increase to 78.8m barrels in that year was 
still insufficient to prevent crude exports falling by 5.5% to 
39.9m barrels.
There were two reasons why production remained either stagnant 
or fell. The main problem was that the country's tiny proven 
deposit base was being steadily reduced by production without 
replenishment by new discoveries. As the fallowing chapter 
highlights, the mass departure of oil companies from the country 
in the early 1970's led to a dramatic fall-off in private 
(foreign) sector investment. Vhile an average of 44 wells had 
been drilled each year in 1971-74, the number fell to just 14 in 
1975 and to 12 in 1978.31
Exploration activity after 1974 was largely undertaken by CEPE, 
though the results proved disappointing. Lack of funds and the 
vagaries of geology were two factors accounting for CEPE's 
failure to compensate for the fall-off in foreign exploration 
activity. However, as a detailed analysis of CEPE's exploration 
work in chapter 3 will show, political rather than technical 
reasons often determined where drilling activity would take 
place. Indeed, of the 150m barrels of new reserves discovered 
between 1972-79 - all by CEPE - nearly all were in:
'small reservoirs, often of heavy crude, not 
necessarily near present productive centres 
and thus difficult to incorporate into 
production.'32
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With no new major production sources discovered during the 
1970's, the country remainded dependent for virtually all of its 
oil production on the fields discovered and operated by Texaco- 
Gulf. This placed the American consortium in a strong bargaining 
position vis a vis the state which it used to full affect to win 
substantial improvements in its operating conditions. The 
consortium used a variety of methods to translate its economic 
power into political influence. One method involved reducing 
output (and thus exports), while another - which was maintained 
after 1974 - was the refusal to undertake any fresh investment in 
maintenance and secondary recovery work. According to a report in 
1979, the failure to undertake maintenance work resulted in 54 of 
the consortium's 214 wells being rendered inoperative due to 
flooding. In the case of the country's third largest oil field, 
at Lago Agrio, only 18 of the 24 wells - four of which provided 
60% of the fields total output - were producing crude.33
The following chapter looks at the conflict between Texaco-Gulf 
and the state and the conflictive nature of state-oil company 
relations generally during the 1970's. This 'historical 
perspective' is central to understanding the problems facing the 
country's oil industry and the difficulties that Ecuador was 
later to face in stimulating foreign oil company interest in the 
country. The chapter also highlights the bitter divisions that 
have existed within Ecuador over CEPE and the role that it should 
play in the country's oil industry.
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CHAPTER 2: THE RISE AID FALL OF OIL HATIQIALISX: PRIVATE SECTOR 
RESPONSES
Prior to 1972, one oil executive recalled, 'everything was in 
favour of the oil companies' which were allowed to operate with 
little if any interference or supervision from the state.1 The 
contractual terms were highly liberal, allowing long concession 
periods, large areas and low royalties. Payments to the state 
were minimal, with companies exempt from the payment of income 
tax, local taxes and import duties. The weakness of the state's 
role in the oil industry was further reflected in the absence of 
a state oil company or state refinery. Production, refining and 
marketing of the small quantities of crude discovered along the 
Santa Elena peninsula were controlled entirely by Anglo- 
Ecuadorian Oilfields, which was then a subsidiary of Burmah Oil. 
As late as 1966, the government conceded that:
'the state does not dispose of sufficient
personnel to be able to carry out 
satisfactorily the administration, control and 
regulation of all aspects of the oil 
industry.'2
Oil nationalism was not completely absent. In 1937, a contract
with the US company Leonard Exploration was anulled due to legal
'irregularities' and the failure to repay a S/126,000 debt to the 
state.3 Two years later, attention had switched to the 
increasing profitability of Anglo-Ecuadorian's operations, with 
the government giving the company 15 days notice of its intention 
to renegotiate the contract. After Anglo had responded by 
increasing its royalty payment from 7% to 10%:
'the companies were again left in peace. A bill 
submitted to Congress which called for the 
nationalisation of domestic oil marketing was 
allowed to lapse after the government extracted 
loans from Anglo and Shell. A Petroleum 
Congress, which the government had called in 
Quito in February 1939, was left with nothing 
to cheer.'A
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Aside from periodic allegations that Anglo sought to protect its 
monopoly of the oil industry by 'buying' congressmen and funding 
•favoured' candidates in elections, organised campaigns against 
the oil companies were notably absent over the next thirty 
years.*
While the lack of state involvement in the oil sector can be 
related to the weakness and backwardness of the state itself, 
the 'free rein' enjoyed by companies also reflected the absence 
of any significant ail finds. Despite claims by one company in 
1921 that the Oriente could contain 'the world's most valuable 
oil reserves', exploration results proved consistently 
disappointing.6 This remained the case until 1967 when Texaco- 
Gulf announced a series of major oil finds in the 1.43m hectare
contract area it had obtained three years earlier. With initial
estimates suggesting that the fields could contain up to 5 
billion barrels, a succession of oil companies flooded into the 
country. By the end of 1970, 9.4m hectares had been contracted 
out to 24 foreign companies.7
Faced with the prospect of large-scale production, the state 
proceeded to tighten the consortium's contract terms, first in 
1967 and again in 1969, In the same year, the government brought
an end to the ' concession' era by announcing that new areas of
the Oriente would be opened up to companies operating under 
'association contracts.' There was little interest at this 
stage, however, in breaking the private sector monopoly over 
the country's oil industry. According to one report in 1968:
'Calls for the establishment of a state concern 
to compete with private enterprise are only 
occasionally heard in Congress, while calls for 
outright nationalisation have so far found 
little echo in the country.10
Further steps were taken to tighten the country's oil regulations 
in September 1971 when the Velasco government revised the 1937 
Oil Law. The development period was reduced from 40 to 20
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years, a ceiling of 200,000 hectares established for each 
contract area, the minimum royalty set at 12%% on production of
30,000 b/d and payments to the state increased. For companies 
already operating in the country, however, the most important 
feature of the new Oil Law was the stipulation that the new 
regulations were non-retroactive and were therefore applicable 
only to future contracts. Moreover, although the government also 
announced that a state oil company would be established, no 
practical steps were taken to make this a reality. In these 
circumstances, the relationship between the state and the 
companies remained heavily weighted in favour of the latter.
The Military and Oil Nationalism
The turning point in state-company relations came in February 
1972 with the establishment of a radical, nationalist military 
government headed by General Rodriguez Lara. The objective 
political and economic conditions for a policy of oil 
nationalism could hardly have been better: large quantities of
investment had been sunk and, in the Texaco-Gulf contract area at 
least, substantial quantities of oil found which was scheduled to 
come on stream in June. Internationally, the oil companies were 
in retreat in the face of an OPEC offensive, while the upward 
trend in world oil prices was gathering momentum.
Soon after seizing power, the government informed companies that 
they had 12 months to renegotiate their contracts to bring them 
into line with the 1971 Oil Law and to relinquish 60% of their 
concession areas. The nationalist orientation of the government 
was further confirmed with the creation of a state oil company, 
CEPE, the introduction of reference prices, increased tax levels, 
a 15% surcharge imposed on the f.o.b. value of crude exports and, 
in November 1973, the entry of Ecuador into OPEC.
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The Response of Oil Companies
Companies were reported to be 'shaken' by these measures, 
leading many to question whether the new operating environment 
justified the high cost of exploration in Ecuador.9 Due to the 
remoteness and heavily forested nature of potential oil-bearing 
zones, the price of failure in Ecuador was considered high by 
international standards.10 A number of companies were facing 
severe financial difficulties in meeting their investment 
commitments even before the change in the political climate, 
Farm-outs or the outright sale of one company's equity to another 
were two options that companies had used to alleviate the 
increasing financial strain.11 Faced now with having to accept 
tighter contractual terms most chose to close down their 
operations altogether.
Two companies were denied the option of renegotiating their 
contracts. 'MinAs de Petroleos' and the ADA consortium were 
expelled for allegedly failing to fulfill their contractual 
obligations and for irregularities when the contracts were 
originally awarded. Although both actions caused concern among 
oil companies, the extension of the ensuing conflicts into the 
international arena turned Ecuador into a virtual 'no-go' area 
for oil investors for the remainder of the decade.
Following the expulsion of 'Minas', the radical Oil Minister and 
principal author of the government's nationalist oil policy 
Captain Gustavo Jarrin Ampudia placed part of the MinAs contract 
area up for international bid in March 1974. Although the Oil 
Ministry claimed that 32 companies had expressed interest in the 
five blocks on offer, bids were only received from Argentina's 
state oil company Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) and 
Polands KOPEX. Local observers attributed the lack of interest to 
the difficulties and risks attached to two of the blacks in 
particular and to the change in the political climate. However, 
Jarrin claimed that MinAs had engineered an 'international 
boycott' against Ecuador by informing all 32 companies that it
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remained the legal owner of the areas up for bid. 12 In the event, 
YPF signed an agreement in January 1975 to explore far oil in the 
Pastaza province, though after investing $10.3m and drilling 3 
non-commercial wells the company closed down operations four 
years later.
The annulment of ADA's contract in November 1972 was regarded as 
virtually an act of theft by the US government and ADA, with the 
consortium issuing a $25m legal suit against the government.13 In 
April 1975, the government contracted out 200,000 hectares of 
ADA's former contract area (including the area containing the 
rich Amistad gas field) to the US company Northwest. ADA 
responded by bringing out another suit claiming that the 
Northwest bid had resulted from a breach of confidentiality 
involving a former executive who had been part of the Northwest 
negotiating team. Subsequently OKC, which had been part of the 
original ADA consortium, purchased the rights to the ADA company 
itself and issued a suit of its own. Although both suits remained 
dormant, further drilling work in the Gulf of Guayaquil remained 
at a standstill for the remainder of the decade as Northwest 
itself became embroiled in conflict with the government. (See 
chapter 7).
Company assessments of the political risk, of what was 
attractive geologically and even whether the new contractual 
terms justified continued investment did differ. Seven companies 
did agree to renegotiate their contracts. However, in all but one 
case disappointing geology combined with a high tax regime, an 
increasingly unfavourable political climate and changes in the 
global investment strategy of companies (which are dealt with in 
chapter 7) to lead these companies to close down their 
operations. Sun Oil relinquished its concession in the eastern 
jungle region in March 1974 after having invested $4.8m in four 
dry wells. A year earlier, the companies forming the Anglo 
consortium transferred all their rights to the Anglo company with 
the latter returning its acreage in the following year after 
drilling two dry wells. Anglo maintained control of the Santa
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Elena fields until 1976 when these were handed over to CEPE. In 
1977 OKC closed down its operations after drilling four dry 
wells.
Cayman's decision to pull out provided a further illustration 
of the difficulties being experienced by oil companies in their 
relations with the government. The company had found commercial 
quantities of oil in 1972. However, the refusal of the government 
to allow the construction of a 70-mile pipeline to link its 
fields to the 100,000 b/d Orito-Tumaco line in Colombia (in which 
Cayman had a 25% controlling interest) prevented the company from 
exploiting the oil deposits. At the end of 1974, the Petroleum 
Economist reported that:
'the company was instructed [by the government] 
to use Texaco-Gulf' s line from the Oriente to 
Esmeraldas, a physical impossibility since the 
line was already operating at full capacity.'1-*
Cayman's fields were subsequently operated by City Ecuatoriana 
Production Company (CEPCO), which was owned by a US based holding 
company City Investing, which began producing small quantities of 
oil from its Oriente fields in the late 1970's. Aside from this 
company the only constant foreign presence in the upstream sector 
during this period was Texaco-Gulf. The US consortium's decision 
to renegotiate its contract proved crucial in shaping the 
direction of government oil policy towards both the private oil 
sector and CEPE.
Texaco-Gulf: The Private Sector Offensive
The consortium was uniquely vulnerable to government pressure: 
it had already invested around $250m, commercial quantities of 
oil had been found and exports were scheduled to begin in August 
1972 at a time of rising world oil prices. Ecuador's bargaining 
position was, however, substantially reduced by the state's lack 
of previous involvement in the oil industry and the absence of 
any realistic state alternative to the consortium. Anxious to
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reap the benefits of the impending petrodollar windfall, the 
government was disinclined to provoke Texaco-Gulf's departure or 
risk a long drawn-out dispute that threatened the inflow of oil 
revenue. Although negotiations proved lengthy, an apparently 
amicable agreement was reached in August 1973. Aside from higher 
tax payments, the key elements in Texaco-Gulf's original 
'concession' contract were left untouched. For instance, 
although the new Oil Law established a maximum contract area of
200,000 hectares, Texaco-Gulf was only required to reduce the 
areas under its control from 1.1m hectares to 491,000, with the 
consortium able to choose which areas to retain. Moreover, with 
the exception of royalties, the consortium's ownership of 
production and exports remained intact.
Relations soon soured as the government took a number of measures 
that the consortium considered as 'intolerable.'16 With world oil 
prices spiralling fallowing the Middle East oil embargo against 
the Vest, Texaco-Gulf pressed for the authorised level of 
production to be increased from 250,000 b/d to 400,000 b/d. 
Claiming that its contract area contained 3.42 bn barrels of 
reserves, of which 1.73 bn had been proved, the consortium 
promised to develop the remainder once this increase had been 
authorised. Initially, Jarrin linked any future production 
increases to a commitment by the consortium to undertake the 
development work necessary to prove the remaining 1.7 bn barrels 
of reserves. By May, his position had hardened, with Jarrin 
reducing production on 22 May 1974 to 210,000 b/d for 
conservation reasons.
Relations deteriorated further when the government unilaterally 
revised or reintepreted the contractual provisions agreed in 
August. Although the agreement had contained an option for 
CEPE to acquire a 25% share in Texaco-Gulf the understanding had 
been that this would only be exercisable in 1977, subject to 
the negotiation of mutually acceptable terms. Early in 1974 
Jarrin informed the consortium that negotiations were to be
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opened to enable CEPE to obtain its 25% share in 1974. By the 
end of May the government:
'bluntly told Texaco-Gulf that it would be 
taking its 25% share as of 6 June, whether or 
not the negotiations were finalised. 'ie
In July, the level of income tax payable by the consortium was 
increased from 44.4% to 49.4% and then, three months later, to 
57.4%. In the meantime, the Oil Minister sent a draft decree to 
the president for the purchase of an additional 26% of Texaco- 
Gulf to enable CEPE to secure a 51% majority shareholding.
Changes in the world oil market provided Texaco-Gulf with the 
opportunity to resist and eventually reverse the government's 
nationalist oil policy. Against the background of a growing 
world oil glut and the end of the OPEC price offensive, the 
bargaining relationship between the Ecuadorian state and Texaco- 
Gulf shifted in favour of the latter. From June 1974 onwards 
the consortium reduced production:
'stopped purchase orders, and thus ended 
exports. It cancelled contracts, making oil- 
dependent workers and businessmen realise that 
all would be over for them - at least for the 
time being - if the consortium left. Texaco- 
Gulf played its cards: it was ready to leave.
If the regime wanted to go through with its oil 
policy, fine. But it would do it alone and face 
the consequences.'17
The economic 'consequences' came in the form of a mounting fiscal 
crisis, a growing balance of payments deficit and an acute 
shortage of the foreign exchange necessary to finance the raw 
material and capital goods imports on which domestic industry was 
increasingly dependent.
To supplement the consortium's economic offensive the US embassy 
sought to 'improve' the ideological climate by distributing 
pamphlets prepared by the US Information Agency attacking 
'communism' and stressing the benefits of private enterprise and
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foreign investment. External US support was provided as part of 
the government's overall strategy to divide and undermine OPEC. 
At the start of 1975, the US government prohibited the granting 
of tariff concessions to OPEC members and announced its 
opposition to international lending agencies advancing loans to 
OPEC countries. 13 Other, less tangible and more covert pressures 
were also exerted. Rumours, for instance, began circulating
that US military aid to Ecuador would be halted unless Jarrin was 
removed from the Oil Ministry.13
A series of meetings took place between local company officials 
and the government, but with little success. In a bid to break
the impasse, the presidents of Texaco and Gulf travelled to
Ecuador in March 1975 to meet General Rodriguez Lara. At the 
meeting, the companies promised to normalise production and 
exports and carry out a vigorous investment programme if the 
reference price was reduced. A few days later the Ecuadorian 
president was informed that the consortium would pull-out unless 
the reference price was reduced from $13.90 to $10.35, domestic 
oil prices were increased and that the state paid the consortium 
'$55.2m' which it claimed was still owed following CEPE's 
purchase of a 25% shareholding.20
Domestic Opposition to Oil lationalism
Crucially for Texaco-Gulf, these demands were supported by the 
country's powerful business community. Taking advantage of the 
economic turmoil, the country's economic Elites mounted a major 
political offensive against a government which had denied them 
access to state power and whose 'reformist' and 'statist' 
philosophy was interpreted as a direct assault on the private 
sector. Concern at the policy direction pursued by the military 
government was further heightened by Ecuador's entry into OPEC 
and by the government's 'hard-line' oil policy, both of which 
jeopardised the country's traditionally close ties with the 
United States and foreign capital. Together with conservative
political organisations, the media, Texaco-Gulf and sympathetic
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military officers, the elites sought to manufacture the overthrow 
of the government.
The private sector claimed that the government was controlled by 
'Bolsheviks on a romp to ruin the country. 121 There had, however, 
been no attempt to effect a radical transformation of society. 
All the main sources of the dlites economic power remained 
intact. The government had suspended the right of political 
parties to operate openly, but no steps were taken to dismantle 
the country's business chambers or to muzzle the country's 
'primitively reactionary' press. As part of their strategy to 
create a 'crisis' atmosphere and conditions propitious for a 
coup, both were used to unleash a non-stop campaign denouncing 
the 'communist' government and claiming that its extreme oil 
policies were leading the country to economic ruin.22 The 
government itself had few means at its disposal to counter these 
charges: all of the country's main newspapers, five television 
channels and - with one exception - 271 radio stations, remained 
under the control of conservative businessmen with close links 
with Texaco-Gulf.23
A central target of the conservative campaign was CEPE, whose 
technical, managerial and operational capabilities were the 
subject of constant ridicule. Although the business community 
had given their 'tacit approval' to the formation of state 
enterprises in basic industries, there was increasing concern at 
the 'statist' orientation of government policy, particularly in 
respect of the oil industry. As a potential instrument for 
nationalisation, the campaign against CEPE was supported and 
encouraged by Texaco-Gulf. At the time, there was little evidence 
available to link the consortium directly with this campaign. 
However, the disclosure in the United States at the start of May 
1975 that Gulf had paid bribes and funded various political 
parties in an unidentified Latin American country - then thought 
to be Venezuela, Bolivia or Ecuador - led to the government 
seeking an assurance that the country referred to was not 
Ecuador.2A
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An assurance to this affect was received on 7 May. However, 
documents were produced in 1976 showing that the deputy editor of 
the Guayaquil tabloid 'Expreso', Esther Avil6s, had received 
$280,000 from Texaco to fund a press campaign against CEPE and a 
proposed drilling contract between CEPE and its Romanian 
counterpart Rompetrol.2S
The primary purpose of this campaign was to undermine the 
position of the military radicals within the government by 
convincing moderate officers that, in the absence of a credible 
state alternative to the consortium, the continued inflow of oil 
revenue could only be secured by reaching an accomodation with 
Texaco-Gulf.
The larrow Political Base of Oil Rationalism
One of the striking features of the period was the absence of a 
broad-based coalition supporting oil nationalism and favouring 
the state-led development of the oil industry. In his analysis of 
oil nationalism in Latin America, Philip had found strong 
evidence to link oil nationalist policies to 'an urban class 
alliance with a strong middle-class component.'26, In the case of 
Ecuador, no such alliance emerged. Middle-class technocrats were 
influential in the state bureaucracy and the national development 
agency JUIAPLA. However, they had no organised base of political 
support and were therefore unable to mobilise support in defence 
of the government's programme of reform and oil nationalism. 
Those middle-class organisations that did exist, notably 
Izquierda Democratica and the Christian Democratic party, were 
very much in the embryonic stage of development. Their 
organisational structure was weak and few links had been 
established with the social groups they purported to represent.
There was support for the government's oil policies from labour 
groups and the Communist Party, but these were too small and too 
fragmented to provide a viable base of support for oil 
nationalism. Just 16% of the labour force belonged to a trade
-  43 -
union, with 47% of these belonging to one of the three central 
labour confederations: CTE, CEDQC and CEQSL. The remaining 53%
were distributed among over 4,000 independent organisations.27 
The power and influence of the labour movement was further 
undermined by rampant factionalism, with union leaders preferring 
to pursue 'personal and ideological rivalries rather than 
concentrating on advancing the interests of their members. 120 The 
influence of the labour movement - and oil workers - on the 
development of oil policy in Ecuador was (and was to remain) 
negligible.
No steps were taken by the government to create an organised base 
of support outside of the military institution. Radical officers, 
including Jarrin, were military elitists who shared with their 
more conservative colleagues a distaste for military populism and 
radical mobilisation politics.29 Moreover, in view of their 
overriding concern for order, discipline and institutional unity, 
the bulk of the officer corps had little taste for mobilisation 
politics and confrontational policies.
Military radicals and civilian technocrats did, however, assume 
that a programme of reform and the expansion of the consumer 
market would generate popular support for the government. There 
was, in particular, a belief that such a programme would lead to 
the emergence of a 'modernising' segment of the bourgeosie which 
would act as a counterweight to the country's agro-exporting 
elites. In so doing, both:
'failed to appreciate the industrial 
bourgeosie's structural position as well as the 
depth of its ideological commitment to the 
symbols and images of the market.'30
Far from being an autonomous group or class, the bourgeosie was 
inextricably linked to other dominant-class fractions ' in terms 
of social origins and investment connections, and foreign 
capital.'31 The limited differentiation between the principal 
fractions - agro-exporters, importers, financiers and
-  44 -
industrialists - was most clearly evidenced by Luis Noboa Naranja 
and Antonio Granda Centeno, whose economic interests spanned 
commerce, industry, agriculture, livestock, banking and 
insurance. The twin objectives of government economic policy - 
the development of domestic industry and the expansion of the 
consumer market - attracted little support from the bourgeosie. 
According to Catherine Conaghan, the increase in urban middle and 
upper class purchasing power, growing export opportunities, the 
rise in semi-processing industries and 'symbotic' ties with 
foreign capital all combined to reduce the obstacles created by 
mass poverty to continued business growth.32 With no direct 
economic interest in policies to expand the internal market, the 
bourgeosie 'closed ranks' with the rest of the private sector to 
condemn state interference in the economy, to oppose even the 
mildest of socio- economic reforms and to discredit that most 
visible example of state expansionism, CEPE.
A.JHgfdfid-fflLUtary
The political fate of oil nationalism was therefore inextricably 
linked with the degree of military commitment to the state-led 
development of the country's oil industry. Crucially for the 
private sector and Texaco-Gulf, the military was not monolithic 
on the issue of reform or oil policy. The government that had 
emerged after February 1972 was essentially a 'coalition' 
government, composed of a hard-right 'Brazilian' (conservative 
authoritarian) faction and a radical 'perunistas' faction which 
sought to emulate the nationalistic and anti-oligarchical 
policies of the Velasco government in Peru.33 The influence of 
the radicals was particularly strong in the navy, though even 
here there were differences in political outlook. According to 
Philip, close contacts between naval officers and the Guayaquil 
business community helped to ensure that 'at least some key 
naval officers, although nationalist, had little interest in 
social reform.'3'4
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The bulk of the officer corps was composed of less ideologically 
committed or more moderate, careerist officers. At moments of 
crisis, these officers were to emerge as a major conservatising 
influence on government policies. According to Fitch, they were:
' much more concerned with orderly 
administration and avoidance of crises than 
they were with domestic reforms. Despite 
occasionally bold talk, the government was not 
willing to accept the political or 
pyschological risks of undertaking any radical 
changes. '3S
This was graphically illustrated when the radical Minister of 
Agriculture, Guillermo Maldonado Lince, announced plans to reform 
the country's feudal agrarian structure. Landowners responded by 
threatening to withold all tax and debt payments and halt all 
further investment, while the media launched a vociferous 
campaign against the 'traitor' Maldonado Lince. In the face of 
this pressure, the Minister was forced to resign and the much 
heralded reform programme dropped.
A similar retreat in the area of oil policy appeared increasingly 
likely as the country became enveloped in political and economic 
turmoil. Faced with an oil export embargo, the uncompromising 
hostility of the business community and the United States, and a 
worsening economic situation, the balance of power within the 
military began to shift away from those advocating 
'confrontational' and 'adventurist' policies and towards those 
favouring a more accomodationist posture towards Texaco-Gulf and 
the government's political opponents.
The first tangible evidence of this shift came in October 1974 
when Jarrin was replaced by a moderate, Admiral Luis Salazar 
Landeta, and his plans for a 51% state share in the consortium 
dropped. Thereafter, the facade of institutional unity that had 
been maintained in public since the coup crumbled. While 
Salazar called for improved operating conditions for the oil 
companies, the head of CEPE Colonel Ren6 Vargas together with
-  46 -
Vice-Admiral Sergio VAsquez Pacheco called for a 'reaffirmation 
and deepening' of the nationalist oil policy. In June 1975, 
V&squez was replaced by a conservative Rear-Admiral Alfredo 
Poveda Burbano, who in turn was replaced at the Ministry of the 
Interior by a leading member of the 'Brazilian' faction, General 
Guillermo Dur&n Arcentales. The slide to the right combined with 
Rodriguez Lara's failure to obtain a large OPEC loan at the 
Algiers Conference to make a major concession to Texaco-Gulf 
inevitable: in July, the gbvernment reduced the tax on the
export of crude from 58.58% to 53.03%, thereby reducing the cost 
per barrel by 43c from $10.84 to $10.41.
The last few months of the government 'looked like a CIA man's 
dream destabilisation campaign' , with the outbreak of a series of 
strikes and anti-government riots, all of which were 'put to good 
use by the press and conservative civilian politicians.'3e 
Following an unsuccessful coup attempt in September by 
conservative officers, a string of further concessions followed. 
In a bid to calm the conservative opposition, the recently 
imposed 60% tax on imports of non-essential goods was lifted and 
a number of radical ministers replaced by conservatives with 
close links to the business community and, in the case of the 
new Oil Minister Colonel Jaime Duefias Villavicencio, the American 
oil company OKC.37 In a further bid to persuade Texaco to drop 
its investment boycott, the government ignored an OPEC decision 
to raise prices by 10% and instead settled for an increase of 
just 4%, effective from January 1976.
The Demise of Military Radicalism
The replacement of the Rodriguez Lara government in January 1976 
by a three-man military junta appeared to signal the start of a 
major change in the direction of the country's oil policies. As 
Texaco-Gulf had hoped, the oil export boycott and the economic 
dislocation that followed proved sufficient to convince the 
bulk of the officer corps that extreme nationalism did not pay 
and that a more conservative oil policy was needed to maintain
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the inflow of oil revenue. All three members of the military 
junta - Admiral Poveda, General Luis Leora and General Dur&n - 
were on the right of the political spectrum, though Dur&n 
initially sought to create a 'progressive' image for himself. In 
the area of oil policy, the primary objective of the new 
government was to break with the nationalist policies of its 
predecessor, adopt a more concilitory approach towards Texaco- 
Gulf, and move oil policy generally in a more neo-liberal 
direction.
The institutional disunity of the military had played a key role 
in limiting the radical, nationalist orientation of the Rodriguez 
Lara government. The continued absence of ideological unity after 
1975 now had the contrasting effect of preventing an immediate 
break with oil nationalism. To maintain some semblance of 
institutional unity, a number of military radicals were brought 
into the cabinet. These included Colonel Ren6 Vargas Pazzos, the 
new Oil Minister. A fellow nationalist, Colonel Luis Pifieiros, 
became the new manager of CEPE.
Vargas' nationalist credentials soon became evident. In 
response to a new and ' absurd' demand from Texaco-Gulf for a 
SI. 05 pb tax cut in return for carrying out investment in 
maintenance and development work, he advocated the total 
nationalisation of the consortium.3® The military junta found 
the idea of nationalisation ideologically distasteful. However, 
in view of the delicate balance of forces within the military, 
the junta's own lack of political support and its determination 
to transfer power to a civilian government, it preferred to 
remain aloof from the ensuing controversy. It was left to the 
media, with funds supplied by Texaco, to mount a major campaign 
against CEPE. The campaign was helped with the publication of a 
report in May 1976 by the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Normalizacion, 
which set technical standards for industry. This proved 
particularly embarrassing for oil nationalists, since its claim 
that the valves used by CEPE were unsafe came just two weeks 
before the corporation was scheduled to assume control over the
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internal distribution of all oil products.39 The anti-CEPE 
campaign was not confined to the media. In August, 'a high 
powered explosive device' was hurled at the CEPE headquarters in 
Quito.-*°
External support designed to undermine the position of the 
radicals within the military came in the form of an article in 
the Washington Star. This warned that the nationalisation of 
Texaco-Gulf could lead to the country's oil industry falling into 
the hands of Romania, whose state oil company was then holding 
talks with CEPE an a possible joint drilling venture. It is not 
known whether this story served to strengthen opposition within 
the military to the radicals, but as one report noted:
'The thought of East Europeans taking aver a 
strategic resource may be relied upon to 
provoke a Pavlovian anti-communist response 
from perhaps the majority of the Ecuadorian 
officer corps.'-*1
The military junta was not sufficiently secure politically to 
remove Vargas. With a group of progessive army colonels 'making 
its influence felt in the political arena' any sharp rupture with 
its predecessor's nationalist oil policies was ruled out.-*2 Aware 
that time was running out, Vargas quickly pressed on with his 
radical policies, with CEPE's control of the domestic oil market 
completed on 6 June. Hot unexpectedly, a spate of pipeline 
'breakages' - these had an uncanny habit of occurring at the most 
inopportune moments for the government - swiftly followed, 
causing oil production to fall sharply. The resulting petrol 
shortage was further aggravated when an oil tanker - 'quite 
deliberately' according to CEPE - rammed a pier at Guayaquil 
harbour.*3
In the same month, Vargas applied, for the first time since its 
introduction in April 1975, decree 285. This entitled CEPE to 
receive 25% of authorised production - set at 210,000 b/d - and 
not 25% of actual production. Since the pipeline had 'broken 
down' several times in June, the amount of crude that CEPE
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demanded as its legal share was substantially higher than 
Texaco-Gulf would allow. When the ’Ruth' tanker arrived on behalf 
of the US company Arco to collect 918,839 barrels of crude 
purchased from CEPE, Texaco - which operated the port even 
though it was under the legal jurisdiction of the Navy - refused 
to load the tanker, with Gulf claiming that CEPE had 'stolen* the 
crude. After a delay loading did take place, though only after 
Vargas had ordered naval officials to compel Texaco to do so 'at 
gun-point if necessary.'** In late July, Gulf filed a $5.3m suit 
against Arco and informed CEPE's clients that it retained legal 
ownership to the crude.
Gulf subsequently called for its own nationalisation, presumably 
in the belief that a we 11-compensated withdrawal was the best way 
of recovering its investment. The goverment, Gulf charged, had 
prevented it from earning a reasonable return on its invested 
capital - a mere 5% compared with the 15-20% it would have liked 
- by:
'witholding taxes with regard to increased 
production costs; by failing to pay in full for 
CEPE's 25% stake; (and) by enforcing the 
delivery of oil for internal consumption at an 
uneconomic price.'*5
The government, with the exception of Vargas, had no enthusiasm 
for the nationalisation and was anxious that the issue should not 
be 'politicised' to the advantage of the Left and transformed 
into a nationwide call for the nationalisation of Texaco. A 
proposed 'march for the nationalisation of oil' in August was 
therefore banned and Vargas excluded from the negotiations with 
Gulf over compensation terms. While his demand that compensation 
be paid in 5-10 year bonds would clearly have found little favour 
with Gulf, his exclusion was nevertheless a measure of the extent 
to which the conservatives had consolidated their influence 
within the government and the armed forces. Throughout the year, 
nationalists were gradually eased out of office. In June, the 
Interior Minister Colonel Richelieu Levoyer, who had publicly 
accused Texaco of pouring money into the press campaign against
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CEPE, was ousted from his post. A few months later, the head of 
CEPE Colonel Pifieiros was transferred to the Consejo de Seguridad 
Bacional and replaced by Colonel H6ctor Miranda.
Conservative dominance was further confirmed at the end of 
1976, when economic policy was placed in the hands of Santiago 
Sevilla Larrea, an admirer of the Pinochet government. He was 
also, along with Vargas' eventual replacement General Eduardo 
Semblantes Polanco, an habitud:
'of the Sunday morning 'polo club' at Quito's 
exclusive La Carolina racecourse..and..closely 
linked with..business groups, and particularly 
with press magnate Antonia Granda Centeno..'
Vargas' political fate was eventually sealed when Dur&n openly 
called for the Oil Minister's removal in the hope of 
ingratiating himself with the country's economic dlites while 
simultaneously eliminating a potential political rival.A7 On 8 
February 1977, the government appointed the right-wing chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Semblantes to head the Oil 
Ministry. Vargas meanwhile was despatched to the country's 
embassy in Chile to assume the post of military attachd. The 
former CEPE manager Colonel Pifieiros was also transferred abroad, 
to the country's embassy in Bolivia.
There seems little doubt that these dismissals occurred for 
political reasons and were designed to facilitate a shift towards 
a more neo-liberal oil policy. Indeed, the removal of Vargas on 
the same day as an official statement concerning the arrest of 
CEPE's marketing director Ramiro Estrella on bribery charges, was 
timed to cause the maximum damage to his prestige and to the 
credibility of the nationalist line he represented in the armed 
forces.
With the military radicals a spent force, the junta sought to 
effect a decisive break with the country's nationalist past. 
Official oil policy was now openly directed towards appeasing
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Texaco, creating attractive incentives for foreign oil companies 
and improving Ecuador's image among potential investors.
The Gulf Settlement
The negotiations with Gulf over compensation terms provided the 
first opportunity to convince potential investors that official 
attitudes had changed. Agreement was reached on 22 April 1977, 
though differences remained over the value of Gulf's investments. 
Rather than sour what had otherwise been an amicable settlement, 
the two sides appointed an independent arbiter - Deloittes - and 
abide by its valuation. To back up their good intentions, both 
endorsed standby letters of credit to cover the disputed amount, 
totalling $40m. Deloittes eventually placed a $33m price tag on 
the balance of Gulf's holdings, bringing the total settlement to 
$115m, only slightly lower than Gulf's original estimate. Aware 
that oil companies outside Ecuador had been waiting to see how 
Gulf fared in the dispute, the government honoured the agreement 
and paid Gulf in full.
The Agreement with Texaco
The priority for the government was to persuade Texaco to end its 
investment boycott. The company's decision to remain in Ecuador 
reflected the company's greater regard for the security of its 
past investments, as well as its own refinery needs. Whereas 
Gulf had sold its own share of crude to third parties, Texaco had 
sold directly to its subsidiaries and was therefore able to 
charge whatever prices it considered convenient. Company 
officials may also have had a clearer perception of the 
developing political situation due to the close links that the 
local company manager Ren6 Bucaram maintained with government 
officials.
The agreement to end Texaco's investment boycott was reached in 
December 1977. Under the terms agreed, the US company promised 
to carry out a major investment programme which included the
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drilling of ten exploration wells and nine development wells. 
Secondary recovery work was to be carried out on the Shushufindi 
field - which contained an estimated 372m additional barrels of 
reserves - while maintenance work was to be undertaken to 
increase output from the older fields. To oversee this 
programme, as well as the consortium's future drilling and 
production activites, both sides agreed to establish a new 
operating company 'Petroamazonas.'
The end of Texaco's investment boycott proved costly for the 
state. Decree 285 was rescinded and made retroactive, while 
decree 287, issued in 1975, was also rendered harmless. This had 
established limits on the length of time that companies could 
hold onto concession areas without undertaking exploration work, 
and discovered structures without developing them. The deadline 
for the decree's application had been set for April 1976, by 
which time all areas under the control of Texaco-Gulf with the 
exception of the five structures under exploitation, were to 
revert to the state. Under pressure from Texaco this decree was 
amended: the areas would now only revert to the state if the
deadlines for the new annual work schedules were not respected.
It was further agreed that the system of state-set prices would 
be replaced by a more flexible market-orientated pricing policy 
on oil exports. This had been regarded by Texaco as a key 
condition for its agreement to undertake investment. However, the 
abandonment of what had been an almost doctrinaire adherence to 
unrealistically high prices also reflected the marketing 
difficulties Ecuador was experiencing once cheaper Alaskan and 
Mexican oil began flowing into the US market. Taxes, which had 
previously been calculated on a reference price of $13.90, were 
henceforth based on actual export prices.
Although this decision was mutually beneficial, it was less clear 
which of the two parties gained most from revisions to the tax 
system. In December 1975, all the differing individual taxes 
that Texaco had been required to pay were unified into a single
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rate of 71.42%. From December 1977, a new level of income tax was 
fixed, at 87.31%, and the royalty increased from 17% to 18.57%. 
Although. Finance Minister Sevilla claimed this increased the 
government's share by $0.90, from $10.70 to $11.60 pb, Jarrin 
argued that the agreement - 'the biggest Christmas present in the 
country's history' - :
' sets taxes at an even lower rate than what was 
acceptable to Texaco, having a net effect of 
transferring $13m in unrealised taxes to 
Texaco.'eo
Texaco's profits in 1977 were $1.35 pb, said Jarrin; only $0.95 
pb, said Sevilla. The company considered the tax and royalty 
increases to be 'substantial', but nevertheless still felt that 
the new terms provided it with a 'reasonable' rate of return on 
its investment. Early evidence of Texaco's apparent satisfaction 
with the agreement was provided when the company made a first 
payment of $13.7m towards its extra tax bill for 1977.S1
Attractive Incentives for lew Oil Investors
Having reached an agreement with Texaco, the military junta 
turned its attention towards creating 'attractive incentives' for 
new investors by liberalising the country's Oil Law. The 
military junta justified this shift in policy by arguing that 
CEPE did not have the financial capacity to assume the burden of 
exploration work, nor, in view of the high risk involved, was it 
deemed sensible to allow it to do so.52 Reforms to the country's 
oil law had been agreed on by the middle of 1977, though 
implementation was apparently delayed until a more 'stable' 
political situation had emerged.63 As a first step in encouraging 
foreign investment in exploration work, the junta announced in 
August that ail companies would receive a 30% exemption on import 
duties. GJt
It was not until November 1978 that new contractual terms were 
officially adopted. The key change was the introduction of the
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contract of 'hydrocarbon operations' which contained a number 
of important new benefits for oil companies. Companies would not 
be required to pay royalties, superficiary rights or entrance 
fees, nor would they be obliged to return equipment, machinery 
and installations at the end of the exploration period. The size 
of the area that contractors could retain during the exploration 
period was doubled and the minimum investment required was 
reduced to one exploratory well per 100,000 hectares, and S/1,000 
per hectare in each year in the first three years of the 
exploitation period. In the event of 1 commercially exploitable' 
quantities of oil being found, companies would receive as payment 
a volume of hydrocarbons 'enabling him to recover his investment, 
in adequate terms and with reasonable profit margins. ' The 
hydrocarbons received as payment could not be used to cover 
domestic needs, though if such oil was required for this purpose 
it would be purchased by CEPE at international, not domestic, 
prices.ss
The reforms were condemned as a 'sell-out' by former Oil Minister 
Jarrin who continued to call for the nationalisation of the oil 
industry. However, this was very much a minority viewpoint. By 
the late 1970's, even many nationalists were reported to favour 
the continued presence of Texaco and the collaboration of foreign 
companies in the increasingly urgent task of reversing the rapid 
downward trend in the country's oil reserves. “
As the following chapter will show, a fundamental reason for this 
shift in attitudes was a growing recognition that CEPE did not 
have the financial, administrative or technical capacity either 
to assume control of the consortium or to carry out an extensive 
programme of exploration.
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CHAPTER 3; CEPE'S FQRJtATIVE YEARS
Since a state oil company provides the state with a potential 
instrument of nationalisation, the existence of CEPE might have 
been expected to strengthen the bargaining hand of the Ecuadorian 
government. In the event, the failure of CEPE to develop into a 
competent and efficient state company was such that it could not 
even credibly threaten to assume total control of the oil sector. 
CEPE proved, in the final analysis, to be the achilles heel of 
oil nationalism.
Conservative groups had argued that CEPE's problems emanated from 
the government ownership structure: state enterprises were, by
their very nature, inherently inefficient. This chapter, however, 
will suggest that CEPE's problems largely resulted from the 
government-imposed environment within which the company was 
required to carry out its entrepreneurial functions and the 
nature of the company's relationship with the state. Both served 
to restrict CEPE's ability to develop into an efficient and well- 
capitalised company.
Other factors that affected CEPE's development should first be 
mentioned. For instance, teething problems were perhaps 
inevitable during CEPE's early years in view of the novelty of a 
state oil company and state involvement in the oil industry. As 
an early section in chapter 2 highlighted, the nationalist oil 
policies of the Rodriguez Lara government did not represent the 
culmination of a process in which the state's role in the oil 
sector had gradually been increased. The oil policy of the early 
1970's instead represented a voyage into previously unchartered 
waters. More generally, the state's role in the economy had been 
traditionally limited. Prior to 1970, the only state enterprises 
consisted of two fertilizer plants, the national railway, a 
utility and a distillery.1
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The establishment of a state enterprise in an area in which 
military officers and civilian technocrats had no experience and 
little knowledge would in itself have presented problems. 
However, these problems were compounded by the rapid extension 
in CEPE's range of activities. By 1976, CEPE had assumed control 
of the DurAn-Quito pipeline; secured a 24% and 12% participation 
in the Anglo and Gulf refineries respectively; obtained a 25% 
shareholding in the Texaco-Gulf consortium; initiated exploration 
and drilling work; assumed control of Anglo's fields along the 
Santa Elena peninsula; and taken over the marketing and 
distribution of domestic oil products from Anglo and Gulf.
The preference for a rapid, rather than gradual, expansion of 
state involvement in the oil industry partly reflected the 
desire of the military nationalists to give a broader, 
international dimension to the country's oil policies. It was 
not coincidental for instance that the decision to purchase a 25% 
share in the consortium was taken shortly after OPEC had called 
on oil producers to increase state participation in their 
respective oil industries. However, a more potent factor 
underlying the policy of abrupt transformation was the 
fragmented nature of the military government and the existence of 
strong domestic opposition to oil nationalism. Faced with 
opposition to his policies from within the military and from the 
business community, Jarrin (and for that matter Vargas):
'did not expect to last long enough in office 
to be able to enjoy a long-term bargaining 
relationship leading to eventual
nationalisation. His aim, rather, was to use 
the short time which he expected to remain in
office to bring about economic and political
transformations of a kind that would be 
irreversible when (as he fully expected) the 
conservatives regained control.'2
This suggests that those who pressed for the rapid extension of
CEPE's activities were more preoccupied with ownership per se
than with the efficiency of what passed into the hands of the 
state. Even when these new responsibilities had been assigned to
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CEPE, few steps were taken to modernise the company's 
organisational structure or improve the general level of 
technical and managerial expertise. The most evident example of 
this was in the marketing and distribution of domestic oil 
products, with serious fuel shortages occurring in 1975 and 1977. 
In the fallowing year, further shortages occurred which paralysed 
economic activity and resulted in 'immense numbers of consumers 
queuing for many hours and days for gasoline.'3
CEPE argued that these shortages resulted from the 'archaic, 
obsolete and inadequate' distribution network that it had 
inherited from Anglo and Gulf.1* However, there seems little 
doubt that the planning, overall coordination and control 
exercised by CEPE was less than satisfactory. According to one 
report, there was little if any coordination between the various 
directorates and departments, particularly with regard to the 
appropriate meshing of the capacity, location and construction 
schedules of processing and transportation facilities, and in 
terms of setting overall investment levels and priorities 
consistent with the country's needs.® For much of the decade CEPE 
had no central office in charge of gathering, processing and 
distributing information on the company's different activities 
and different regional operations. JTor, in addition, was there 
any central office in charge of planning and programming. 
Instead, each department was left to plan its own activities 
in isolation, with little idea of what resources were available 
for their particular activity.
The administrative chaos that characterised CEPE's early years 
often led to costly errors being made which were exploited by 
the company's opponents and which did little to generate public 
confidence in the company. Following the construction of the 
Esmeraldas refinery in 1977, for instance, it was discovered 
that no pipeline had been built to transfer the refined products 
to the main market in Guayaquil. Refineries were the 
responsibility of the industrial division, while pipelines fell 
under the transportation division, a situation which undoubtedly
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contributed to the confusion. Since the refinery could not 
operate at full capacity due to the physical problems of removing 
the refined products, substantial quantities of oil products had 
to be imported to meet domestic demand. Despite the high 
financial losses that this entailed, since these oil products 
were purchased at international prices and sold at the low, 
domestic prices, work on constructing the pipeline had still not 
taken place by the end of 1979.e
There was, as a later section on CEPE's exploration work will 
further confirm, no lack of evidence to support conservative 
claims that the company was inefficient and that costly mistakes 
had been made. nevertheless, there seems little doubt either 
that CEPE's efficient development was hampered by the external 
imposition of a highly bureaucratic system of centralised control 
that encouraged inefficiency and excessive political
interference, delayed working schedules and constrained 
management's ability to manage.
CEPE* s Dependency Status
CEPE was not created as an autonomous public sector enterprise. 
According to article 1 of its Constitution, CEPE was 'a 
Corporation under public law. ..tied to the Ministry of Energy and 
Mines.'7, It was, therefore, essentially an appendage or
'department' of the Oil Ministry.
CEPE's lack of autonomy and its marginal role in the decision­
making process was reinforced by the tight political control 
exerted over the company's internal structure. Executive
authority was exercised by a Board of Directors composed of the 
Oil Minister, who acted as chairman, the head of the Joint 
Command of the Armed Forces, the president of JUMAPLA, and the 
Ministers of Finance and Industry. At board meetings, the CEPE 
manager had an informative role only with no voting rights and 
acted as secretary.
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The Board's main function was to ensure that CEPE implemented 
the policies laid down by the Executive. Specifically, it had the 
power to approve or modify the annual budget presented by the 
CEPE manager, before submitting it for the final approval of the 
President. Board approval was required for all contracts and
expenditure in excess of S/1,000,000. It also had the authority 
to appoint the manager of CEPE, who was proposed by the Oil 
Minister.
As a result of the political nature of the Board, CEPE's
operating milieu was exposed - and subjected - to the vagaries of 
political, regime, ministerial and bureaucratic changes. This in 
itself was hardly conducive to the efficient development of a 
state oil company. In CEPE's case, the problem was exacerbated by 
the absence of a political consensus on oil policy generally or
the role of CEPE in particular. The problem of administrative
instability was no minor matter: between 1964-79, Ecuador had
eight different governments and 12 chief executives; the average 
term of a Minister of Finance was nine months, an Oil Minister 
12 months and a CEPE manager 17 months. This administrative 
instability adversely affected project implementation, harmed 
CEPE's operational capabilities, acted as a brake on policy 
formation, continuity and implementation - key concerns it 
should be added of foreign oil companies - and frequently 
paralysed the operations of CEPE while the new manager adapted 
to his new role.
Constraints on Management Authority
The CEPE manager's functions were tightly circumscribed. As the 
legal representative of CEPE, he was responsible for: executing 
the decisions of the Board; the technical, financial and 
administrative performance of the corporation; and the 
appointment or dismissal of technical-administrative personnel. 
Without the approval of the Board, he could authorise expenditure 
and investments up to a value of S/500,000. With the approval of 
the Oil Minister, the ceiling increased to S/1,000,000. In other
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words, his ability to independently authorise expenditure was 
limited (in dollar terms at constant 1972 prices) to just $20,000 
in 1972, equivalent to 2.9% of CEPE's total budget, and $12,240 
in 1979, equivalent to just 0.003% of CEPE's total budget of 
$394.6m. In practice, therefore, Board approval was required for 
virtually all key operational and investment decisions.
The centralised nature of the decision-making process was 
reinforced within the organisation by the constraints placed on 
the CEPE manager's ability to delegate responsibility to his 
management team. He was required to:
'carry out his numerous activities himself. He 
must travel to Guayaquil, to Santa Elena, to 
the Esmeraldas refinery and to CEPE's office 
in Houston, Texas in order to purchase nuts or 
colouring for the gasoline because he cannot 
delegate these trivial tasks to anyone.'®
The decision-making process was also highly centralised 
geographically, with little if any delegation of authority by 
the head office in Quito to CEPE's local offices. This resulted 
in excessive and expensive delays in the decision-making process, 
particularly since the country's inadequate infrastructure made 
communications difficult. Management at the Esmeraldas refinery, 
for instance, was required to obtain approval from CEPE's head 
office for most of its decisions, including any expenditures 
over $4,000. When seeking such approval, managers relied on 
radio-telephone links with Quito 'which is frequently not 
operating. '3
In the absence of any meaningful delegation of responsibilities 
and authority, there was little opportunity for management to 
exercise its initiative or respond quickly and effectively to 
situations that required immediate action. They, like the CEPE 
manager, became weighed under by a mountain of bureaucratic 
regulations and procedures that often paralysed the decision­
making process. This situation was aggravated by CEPE's legal 
position as a 'department' of the Oil Ministry. Since the
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company formed part of the centralised administrative structure 
of the state, its operations were also constrained from the 
centre by numerous bureaucratic controls and procedures common to 
the rest of the public sector. As a result, that which in a 
private company took minutes, hours or a few days, such as the 
purchase of equipment, could and frequently did take many months 
in CEPE.
The frustration experienced by CEPE's management team was 
heightened by the knowledge that their decision-making functions 
had been usurped by individuals who had little, if any, knowledge 
of the oil industry. These included not only the government 
ministers who sat on the CEPE board, but also the general manager 
of CEPE himself. One future CEPE manager candidly admitted on 
his appointment that he had no experience of the oil industry, 
'though 1 do know something of the oil policy of the country.'10 
As a result of the high degree of administrative instability 
within central government, few ministers or heads of CEPE 
remained in their posts long enough to become fully acquainted 
either with the oil industry or CEPE itself.
Management morale was further undermined by an inadequate reward 
and remuneration structure. During the 1970's, staff at CEPE 
formed part of the Ecuadorian civil service and its pay scales 
were determined by the Law of Remuneration and Classification. 
Salaries within CEPE were not particularly high in comparison 
with the private sector. In 1979, for instance, a trained 
technician at CEPE with one or two years experience could expect 
to double his salary by moving to a private sector company. This 
situation was not peculiar to CEPE. Vhile the financial manager 
of a private sector company with a turnover of over $3m earned a 
basic salary of between $1,028 to $1,330 a month, the Minister 
of Agriculture, whose total budget in 1978 amounted to $53.2m, 
earned just $532.11
CEPE has undoubtedly made serious and costly errors, but since 
much of the power of decision-making had been removed from
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management there was little of substance for which they could be 
held accountable. Nevertheless, the inconveniences caused by 
intermittent fuel shortages in particular did little to improve 
CEPE's credibility or support its claims to be a 'friend of the 
consumer.' Most crucially, however, in terms of government and 
public attitudes towards CEPE and foreign oil investment, CEPE's 
credibility was badly damaged by an exploration strategy that was 
little short of disastrous, financially and politically.
CEPE's decision to undertake exploration was a source of bitter 
dispute from the outset, with business groups and the media 
arguing that foreign companies were better equipped financially 
and technically to undertake risky and costly exploration work. 
It is some measure of the failure of CEPE's exploration work 
during this period that this view began to be shared more widely 
throughout Ecuadorian society.
CEPE's Exploration Vork
In what appeared to be an attempt to compensate for the fall-off 
in private sector investment, CEPE allocated increasing sums of 
investment to exploration activities after 1975. Between 1976 to 
1978, CEPE's investments in upstream activities more than trebled 
in real terms to $37.5m, equivalent to 43.5% of CEPE's total 
investments in that year. This partly reflected the emergence 
of CEPE as a majority shareholder in the consortium, although 
after reaching $3.3m in 1975 CEPE's investment contribution 
subsequently slumped to just $0.8m in 1977.12 Some investment 
was also used to finance upstream work in the fields formerly 
owned by Anglo along the Santa Elena peninsula. However, the 
largest proportion was directed towards funding exploration and 
drilling work in areas exclusively reserved for CEPE. After 
completing one exploratory well in 1975 and then 1976, CEPE's 
drilling activity was stepped up, with 13 exploratory wells 
drilled between 1977-79.
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The atmosphere surrounding CEPE's exploration work verged on the 
euphoric as CEPE officials announced one successful discovery 
after another. However, evidence soon emerged that much of the 
finance in exploration was being wasted on what were termed
'political wells.' The fact that so many companies had explored 
for oil in Ecuador and then pulled out after failing to discover 
commercial quantities should have saved CEPE the trouble of 
exploring in those areas. In fact, the opposite occurred with 
CEPE drilling 'wildcats' in fields discovered by foreign 
companies in the previous twenty years. Despite the subsequent 
claim by CEPE that it had proven 'successful' in its exploration 
work, the fields 'discovered' were often small, containing 
heavy crude and located far from the principal production 
areas.13
The Shiripuno 'discovery' in particular proved highly damaging 
to CEPE's credibility. Immense publicity had initially surrounded 
the announcement of this 'significant' find in March 1977. CEPE 
officials and nationalists regarded Shiripuno as a positive 
response to the company's critics and proof of CEPE's ability to 
undertake exploration work. 1‘* It then became clear that the 
crude was too dense to be commercial and that the field had not 
been discovered but merely 'unplugged.' As a result, CEPE's 
image was further dented and demands intensified for 
exploration to be left to foreign companies. This view had 
consistently been voiced by a leading oil expert Cyrano Tama Paz 
who, through his column in 'Expreso', opposed demands that more 
finance should be given to CEPE to:
'spend on the doubtful, risky and adventurous 
area of exploration, in which as we all know 
millions of dollars can be lost in the event 
of not discovering oil....We vehemently oppose 
the plan of financing oil exploration with 
Ecuadorian money because we do not have the 
millions of dollars that the risky and costly 
work of exploration requires..'15
CEPE's exploration work even attracted criticism from some left- 
wing nationalists, with Nueva's oil expert Ignacia Romero
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condemning CEPE for having drilled 'absurd' wells. CEPE, he 
suggested, should 'stop playing blind man's bluff' and 
concentrate instead on:
'the less glamorous but more effective work of 
developing and incorporating into production 
over ten fields which have already been 
discovered and which could quickly be brought 
into production.'1G
The level of success CEPE had achieved in relation to the 
investment involved also attracted criticism and undoubtedly 
contributed to the creation of a political environment more 
conducive to the return of foreign oil companies. Despite 
spending $123.3m on exploration and production in 1975-79, CEPE 
discovered just 150m barrels. In other words, for every $lm 
spent on exploration and production, 1.2 barrels were discovered 
in areas so isolated that their exploitation was impossible to 
carry out.
It appears that more than simple incompetence or inexperience lay 
behind CEPE's exploration strategy and the euphoria that 
surrounded it. As studies of other Latin American oil industries 
have shown, over-optimistic assertions of exploration results 
and the country's oil potential generally have, on occasions, 
been deliberately encouraged by governments. Such was the case in 
respect of the Velasco regime in Peru, whose 'wilful over­
optimism' was designed to 'impress foreign bankers and secure the 
best possible terms for Peru's foreign borrowing.'17'
One can only speculate as to whether similar thought-processes 
lay behind the euphoria that accompanied CEPE's exploration work 
in the late 1970's. Tangible confirmation of Ecuador's continued 
future status as an oil exporter could only have facilitated the 
military junta's policy of maintaining oil boom conditions by 
borrowing heavily on the international market. It is possible 
too that elements within the government may have encouraged the 
publicity surrounding CEPE's work in order to revitalise company
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interest in the country's oil potential and, at the same time, 
strengthen the state's future bargaining position.
Nevertheless, it appears that the exploration strategy and the 
euphoria that surrounded it had its roots in CEPE's lack of 
political and financial autonomy and in the constant attempts by 
conservative groups to discredit it. As well as instilling 
national pride in CEPE and asserting its importance, the 
exploration strategy was designed to create a political 
environment more responsive to CEPE's financial, and other, 
needs. For these very same reasons, CEPE was unwilling to risk 
not finding oil. The exploration strategy pursued by CEPE during 
the 1970's was therefore devised as a bargaining ploy geared to 
securing additional financial resources.
It was shown earlier that the state failed to balance its 
desire for control with the need to respect the organisational, 
administrative and managerial needs of the company. There was a 
similar disregard for CEPE's financial needs. Historically, CEPE 
has been an undercapitalised company which was required to borrow 
heavily to fund most - over two-thirds - of the investment work 
undertaken in the 1970's. Indeed, the company's resources were 
barely sufficient to cover operational costs.1S
The Financial Resources of CEPE
In CEPE's first full year of existence, the company's main 
sources of finance were superficiary rights, a 50% share in the 
oil pipeline tariff paid by Texaco-Gulf, a share in each gallon 
of gasoline that passed through the Dur&n-Quito pipeline and a 
$600,000 allocation from the state budget. Total income in 1973 
amounted to just $5. lm. With the purchase of a 25% share in the 
consortium in 1974, the Rodriguez Lara government passed 
legislation which allowed CEPE to receive part of the revenue 
generated from its share of crude oil exports. In addition, 
article 20 of CEPE's constitution stated that a further portion 
of crude export income - the amount to be determined by the CEPE
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Board and approved by the president - would be allocated to a 
♦reserve fund' to help finance CEPE's investment work. The 
balance remaining was then to be transferred to the Treasury 
for distribution to the state budget and other public sector 
entities. The initial intention when CEPE was created therefore 
was to allow the corporation the capacity to be financially 
autonomous from the state.
It was an intention that was never realised, with both military 
governments regarding CEPE as an easy, almost unlimited source of 
revenue that could be used to finance macroeconomic objectives, 
fund military expenditure and finance fiscal deficits. The 
milking of CEPE's revenue proved so 'easy' that a delayed 
payment of $37.6m from Petroperu for oil delivered by CEPE was 
simply confiscated by the Minister of Finance - a Board member of 
CEPE - and rerouted to the Treasury to help finance the budget 
deficit.13 Similarly, the delayed payment of $6.5m for the sale 
of the crude from the tanker 'Ruth' was transferred in its 
entirety to the Ministry of Finance.20 In their search for 
revenue, both military governments preferred to syphon funds from 
CEPE rather than raise taxes (and thus antagonise upper and 
middle income earners) or increase domestic oil prices (and thus 
provoke the hostility of the labour movement and urban transport 
users).
CEPE* s Access to Qil Revenues
The main mechanism used by the state to capture the bulk of 
CEPE's economic surplus was created by decree 1260-A on 3 
December 1974. This established a 'Special System for the 
Retention and Distribution of Income from CEPE's Exports.' 
According to the decree, it was essential 'for the higher 
interests of the country to endow CEPE with the economic 
resources essential to fulfill its objectives.' It was agreed 
that CEPE would receive 28% of the income generated from the 
company's crude oil exports, plus $1.48 for each barrel of crude 
that it delivered to the refineries for processing.
-  67 -
The remaining 72% of the revenue from CEPE’s crude exports was to 
be used to fund social and capital investment programmes and 
finance the state budget. A total of 13 public sector entities 
were entitled to a fixed percentage share of this income: FONADE 
(47.7182%), the state budget (36.4673%), FONAPAR (3.4855%), the 
Ministry of Employment (2.7523%), the state universities and 
technical colleges (2.732%), the Ministry of Health (1.8844%), 
the Rational Child Association (0.9165%), IECE (0.1439%), INECEL 
(0.1195%), the Central Bank (0.0271%), the Province of Esmeraldas 
(0.0081%) and CEPE (0.1263%).
While the percentage share allocated to CEPE may have initially 
appeared generous, the decision to rigidly fix the 'tax' at 72% 
was highly unsatisfactory. The main problem was that it was 
based, not on net profits, but on gross export income. No 
account, therefore, was taken of the rapid expansion in CEPE's 
responsibilities nor the increase in operational costs that 
resulted. This was no minor defect: between 1974 and 1978 CEPE's 
operational costs increased almost twenty-fold, from $5.3m to 
$99.5m. In 1974-76 CEPE's costs had averaged just 18% of total 
expenditure; by 1978 the proportion had risen to 42%.
Equally disturbing was the fact that CEPE's 28% share of its 
crude exports was, from the outset, more theoretical than real. 
Within a few months of decree 1260 being issued, decree 492 of 
17 July 1975 was* passed which required CEPE to pay a royalty 
equivalent to 16% of production for more than 60,000 barrels. 
Two years later, on 12 September 1977, decree 218 was issued 
which transferred 8% of the revenue from CEPE's (and Texaco's) 
crude exports to the Junta de Defensa Nacional. The 72:28 ratio, 
therefore, applied not to gross export income but to gross export 
income less royalties less the 8% assigned to the military. As a 
result of these decrees, the proportion of oil income received 
by CEPE (and other public sector entities) bore little 
resemblance to the percentages established in 1974.
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CEPE had limited access to other oil income sources. It received 
a large share in the income generated from superficiary rights, 
but the amounts involved were extremely small. In 1978, for 
instance, CEPE's 43.5% share brought it a mere $1.8m, with the 
remainder distributed to the state budget and the Ministeries of 
Agriculture and Health.
From the income generated by Texaco's exports, CEPE received 
$0.20 per barrel exported and, from 1977, 0.1154% of the income
generated from the 87.31% tax imposed on the company's gross 
income. The bulk of Texaco's income tax payments - net of 
royalties and the 8% of export revenue allocated to the military 
- was distributed to FONADE (43.5815%), the state budget 
(33.3059%), FONAPAR (6.0730%) and BEV (3.3508%). There were 12 
other participants, including the Armed Forces which received 
1.7338% and the Air Force which received 1.1559%.21
CEPE had no access to royalty income, which was distributed to 
just three participants. The largest percentage share went to 
the military, which first secured access to royalty income by 
virtue of Supreme Decree 2745 (15 December 1965) which
stipulated that 20% of royalty income would be transferred to the 
Air Force. Five years later, a secret decree was issued 
allocating a further 30% of royalty income to the armed forces in 
order to finance what was vaguely described as a ' programme of 
works and investments' necessary to 'protect and defend the 
nation's sovereignty.'22 The remaining 50% was distributed to 
INECEL (47%) and the Province of Esmeraldas (3%).
The Distribution of Qil Income
In 1972, the public sector's oil income totalled $24.7m, with 
around half of this allocated to the state budget. Most of the 
remainder was transferred to INECEL (14.9%), the military (13.6%) 
and the state universities (3.2%). As a result of the addition of 
new participants or increased allocations to existing oil income 
sharers, the percentage shares received by public sector
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institutions fluctuated. The key addition was FONADE which had
been created in 1974 to channel oil income into capital
investment programmes. As table 3. 1 shows, by 1975 it was 
receiving one-third of the country's oil income.
Table 3.1; Distribution of,011 Income 1972-75 ($m)
1972 1973 1974 1975 Total
State Budget 15.9 61.9 106.7 83.5 268. 0
FONADE - - 122.2 107.9 230. 1
JDN 3.9 6. 4 11.4 42.2 63.9
INECEL 3.9 6.4 11. 1 39.9 61. 3
CEPE 1.4 1.7 3.7 23.5 30.3
State Universities 0.9 4.5 9.8 7.3 22.5
BEY - 4. 1 10.8 7. 1 22. 0
FONAPAR 0.6 3.4 6.9 5.5 16.4
Other 2. 0 16.6 32.5 26.5 77.6
Total 28.6 105. 0 315. 1 343.4 792. 1
Note: 'Other' covers IECE, the Ministeries of Agriculture,
Employment, Health and Natural Resources, the Province of 
Esmeraldas, the Central Bank, and the Banco de Fomento.
Source; JUNAPLA, Ecuador: Estrategla de Desarrollo
(Hidrocarburos), (Quito, July 1979), p 77.
CEPE's percentage share in the country's oil income was just 1.0% 
in 1974, rising to 7.4% in 1975. During the four-year government 
of Rodriguez Lara, when nationalists were rapidly extending the 
company's sphere of responsibilities, CEPE received just 3.7% 
of the country's oil income, equivalent to $30.3m. The bulk of 
the country's oil income during this period was channelled to the 
state budget (30.4%), FONADE (27.3%) and the military (8%).
The most striking development over the next few years was the 
doubling in the military's share of oil income, which rose from 
8.2% to an annual average of 16% in 1976-78. By 1978, the 
military was receiving 9.9% of CEPE's crude export income, 17.2% 
of Texaco's income tax payments and 50% of royalty income. In 
all, the military received $78.2m in 1978, equivalent to 22.7% 
of total oil income. This figure takes no account of the 
Ministry, of Defence budget which increased from $48.3m in 1973 to 
$108.9m in 1978. Since the state budget relied heavily on oil
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revenues, it is likely that the amount of oil income channelled 
to the military was substantially higher.
Oil income which might otherwise have been spent on capitalising 
CEPE or funding social and economic development programmes was 
therefore consumed by the armed forces and used to advanced their 
institutional interests. During the period of military rule, 
the number of men under arms increased from 20,000 to 35,000 
while Ecuador's known imports of military weapons - tanks, 
missiles, fighter planes and armoured personnel carriers - 
amounted to $704m, with around two-thirds of this total spent by
the military junta.23 
Table 3.2: Distribution of Oil Income 1976-78 <$m)
1976 1977 1978 Total
FONADE 112.7 78.2 71. 0 261.9
State Budget 91.3 61.5 64.7 217.5
JDN 28.4 46.3 78.2 152.9
INECEL 28. 0 31. 8 50. 7 110.5
CEPE 28. 1 26.2 40.3 94.6
FONAPAR 7.3 5.7 10.5 23.6
BEV 8.6 6. 0 5.6 20. 2
State Universities 7.4 5.2 4.3 16.9
fitter 9.P>: & 0 53,5
Total 338.2 270. 0 343.3 951.5
Source: Data for 1978 was taken from the Ministry of Finance,
Estadistica de Ingresos Petroleros, 1978-83, (Quito, June 1984), 
p 22. Ministry of Finance figures for 1976-77 were obtained from 
Magdalena Aguilar, Petroleo y Desarrollo Nacional, in Alberto 
Acosta, et al, Ecuador: Petroleo y  Economica, (ILDIS, 1986), pp 
62 and 68.
The shares of most other participants fell, particularly the 
state budget whose percentage share dropped from 30.4% in 1972- 
75 to 22.8% in 1976-78. The other major participants in 1976-78 
were FONADE, which received 27.5% and INECEL which received 
11.6%.
CEPE's own share rose to 9.9% in 1976-78. By 1978, $40.3m worth 
of oil income was being channelled to CEPE, equivalent to 11.7% 
of total oil income. Taking the period 1972-78 as a whole, CEPE
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received 12.2% of the country's oil income, compared to 28.2% far 
FOITADE, 22.9% for the state budget and 16.5% for the armed 
forces.
Oil taxes, exports, royalties and superficiary rights were not 
the only sources of oil income, though they represented the 
primary components of 'public sector' oil income. Another, 
potentially important income source, was the sale of oil 
products on the domestic market, the revenue from which was 
channelled directly to CEPE.
Domestic _QiL Sales
Sales to the domestic market represented a potentially lucrative 
source of income for CEPE. After totalling just 9.5m barrels in 
1972, domestic oil consumption had grown rapidly, reaching 
22.8m barrels in 1978. However, as a result of government 
interference in the pricing of oil products, CEPE was unable to 
reap any financial benefit from this expanding market. The price 
of the lowest grade gasoline had been frozen at 'S/4' per gallon 
since 1940, while the price of higher grade gasoline had been 
fixed at 'S/4.65' since 1959. At these levels, CEPE was unable to 
cover its refining and marketing costs let alone earn the 
'reasonable' profit that it was entitled to under article 73 of 
the Oil Law. CEPE's inability to satisfy internal demand from 
domestic oil sources magnified the company's losses. By the end 
of the decade, CEPE was paying S/41.66 ($1.02) for each imported 
gallon of gasoline which was then sold on the domestic market for 
S/4.60 ($0.11), generating a loss of S/37.06 ($0.91) on each
imported gallon sold.2*
The income that CEPE received for each barrel of crude delivered 
to domestic refineries was also based on government-imposed, non- 
-market based prices. These were set at 'S/36.48', equivalent in 
nominal dollar terms to $1.46. Here too, therefore, CEPE was 
deprived of substantial sums of revenue which might have 
otherwise have been used to fund major investment projects. For
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instance, while the 32.2m barrels of crude exported by CEPE in 
1979 generated $462.7m, a mere $19.8m was generated from the 
22.7m barrels that CEPE delivered from its Oriente fields to the 
domestic refineries.
Table 3.3; CEPE's Income from Deliveries to Domestic Refineries
Barrels Price per Total Income
(millions) Barrel ($) (in $ million)
1974 3.1 $1.26 $ 3.9
1975 3.8 $1. 16 $ 4.4
1976 5.2 $1. 10 $ 5.7
1977 16.8 $1. 04 $17.5
1978 19.8 $0.97 $19.2
1979 22.2 $0. 89 $19.8
ffote: This refers to crude delivered from the Oriente fields. The 
data has been converted from sucres into dollars. These have 
then been expressed in constant 1972 price terms.
Source: CEPE, Informe Estadistico de la Actividad
Hidrocarburlfera del Fais, 1972-1984, (Quito), pp 216 and 218.
The Slide into Indebtedness
The combination of high 'taxes’, low domestic oil prices and 
escalating costs left CEPE with insufficient resources to finance 
it's investment programme. As table 3.4 shows, an annual 
average of 14% of CEPE's gross sales income was left for 
investment in 1974-78 after the corporation had met its financial 
obligations to the military and public sector and covered its 
costs.
Table 3.4: % Distribution of CEPE's Gross Sales Income. 1974-78
Sales Costs Operational
Expenditure
Taxes/
Public Sector
Surplus/ 
Profit... C$)
1974 24. 1 5.3 56. 0 14.6 ( 0.3m)
1975 14.3 2.7 62. 8 20.2 ( 5.8m)
1976 15.8 2.6 71. 0 10.6 (15.3m)
1977 28. 1 4.6 50. 4 16.9 (54.1m)
1978 18.9 12.5 57. 0 11.6 (50.3m)
Source: CEPE, Reporte Financlero, (Quito, 1985), p32
-  73 -
To finance its priority investment projects, CEPE was forced to 
borrow heavily. In the period to 1978, over 70% of all CEPE's 
investment expenditure was financed by loans, with most carrying
floating rates of interest.
Table 3.5: Sources of Investment Finance. 1975-78 ($m>
CEPE Other Total
1975 6.1 56.3 62.4
1976 18.5 34.1 52.6
1977 37.5 21.7 59.2
1978 7.7 58. 0 65.7
Total 69.8 170. 1 239. 9
Source: CEPE, Estadisticas Presupuestarlas, 1972-1987, (Direccion 
de Economia y Presupuesto, July 1988), p 44.
Small loans were obtained for the construction of pipelines,
pipeline terminals and storage facilities and the rehabilitation
of the Santa Elena oilfields. However, the bulk of the loans
contracted during the 1970's were used to purchase a 25%
shareholding in the consortium ('$42.8m'), Gulf's 37.5%
shareholding ('$115.6m') and finance the construction of the 
Esmeraldas refinery.
The construction of the refinery was financed with a '$118.8m' 
loan from FONADE that was contracted in June 1974. Under pressure 
from the Treasury - which administered FONADE - funds for
investment had increasingly been allocated in the form of non­
reimbursable loans. CEPE had initially been under the impression 
that such a ' loan' had been granted for the construction of the 
refinery. However, early in 1977 the military junta passed a
decree obliging CEPE to repay the loan, with the Finance Minister 
suggesting that the company could repay it with the 'profits' it 
made from the sale of refined products.25 At the time, domestic 
oil sales were being subsidised at the rate of about $190,000 a 
day.
CEPE's investment capacity, already undermined by government
decrees, low domestic oil prices and escalating operational
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costs, was reduced still further by the need to meet its 
mounting debt service obligations. By 1978, CEPE's debt
repayments amounted to $73.6m, equivalent to just under one-third 
of total expenditure. Investment as a proportion of expenditure 
subsequently fell to just 27.4%, nearly half the level in 1974- 
76. 26
Table 3.6; CEPE’s Debt Service Payments ($m)
Total Expenditure Debt Service % of Total
Payments Expenditure
1974 62.7 30. 4 48.5
1975 94.1 15. 1 16. 1
1976 86.3 8.9 10.3
1977 128.5 9. 9 7. 7
1978 239.2 73.6 30.7
Total 850.3 183.9 21.6
Source: CEPE, Estadi stlcas Presupuestarlas, 1972-1985, C
de Presupuesto, May 1986), p 13.
State Policy Towards Texaco
The manner in which CEPE's needs were ignored contrasts 
strikingly with state policy towards Texaco after 1974. While 
CEPE was subject to tight political control, Texaco was allowed 
to operate the consortium's fields with little if any
interference from the state. Even after the nationalisation of 
Gulf, when the state became majority shareholder, CEPE remained a 
silent and largely unseen partner. Unlike Texaco - or other 
foreign oil companies in Ecuador for that matter - CEPE was not 
reimbursed for its costs or investments in the event of finding 
commercial quantities of crude. While CEPE was starved of 
financial resources and forced to resort to extensive borrowing,
the state provided all manner of financial and other incentives
to improve Texaco's operating conditions.
The 43c tax cut brought the company $18.7m; the decision to
confine the oil price increase agreed at Doha in October 1975 to 
4% ($0,418 pb) rather than 10% ($1,046), $22.5m; and non­
-  75 -
implementation of the 10% OPEC price rise at the end of 1976, 
$1.42 pb or $10. lm.at'7
The benefits extracted by the American company, often to the 
detriment of CEPE, multiplied still further when Semblantes was 
Oil Minister. The decision, for instance, to rescind decree 285 
and make it retroactive was estimated to have cost CEPE $164m, 
since the actual level of average daily production in 1977 was 
only 177,500 b/d, way below the authorised level of 210,000 
b/d.2e Substantial benefits for Texaco - and further losses 
for CEPE - also resulted from Ministerial Accord 14052 of 16 
December 1977. This rejected CEPE claims (subsequently 
confirmed) that Texaco had illegally lifted 4.3m barrels of 
crude in 1977, and instead claimed that just 1.2m barrels had 
been overlifted. According to one source, the total financial 
loss caused to the state and CEPE by the Accord was 'not less 
than $9. 9m. ' 23
Precise figures on the 'profits' obtained by Texaco-Gulf are 
difficult to obtain. Texaco apparently 'does not keep that sort 
of information' in Quito, according to a company official.30 
Philip has suggested that the combination of high taxes, 
weakening oil prices and the maintenance of a fixed tax reference 
price did cause the consortium's profits to fall after mid-1974. 
There is no reason, he wrote:
'to doubt company claims that their profits in
Ecuador between June 1974 and October 1975
were negligible or even negative.'31
However, figures compiled by the national development agency 
JUNAPLA suggest that in that year alone, profits exceeded the 
consortium's original investments. According to JUNAPLA, the 
consortium's profits rose from $112.9m in 1973 and then more 
than doubled in the following year to $255.9m. After declining 
in 1975, they recovered to reach $266.3m in 1976 - and this 
despite the fact that virtually no new investment had taken place 
since 1974.3:2 The fact that the company had recovered its
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original investments many times over may have allowed the company 
to adopt a more uncompromising position and be prepared to call 
the state's bluff when confronted by policy decisions that it 
found irksome or unacceptable. Such decisions, as the Roldos 
government would discover, would include demands for the 
implementation of an expensive programme of secondary recovery 
and maintenance work and attempts to increase CEPE's role in the 
operation of the Oriente fields.
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CEPE's failure to compensate for the rapid fall-off in private 
sector investment led to increasing fears that Ecuador's days as 
an oil exporter were numbered. Time, according to a report in 
1979, was fast running out. Unless substantial new quantities of 
oil reserves were found, the national development agency JUNAPLA 
warned that Ecuador faced the prospect of becoming the first net 
oil imparting member of OPEC. In the absence of new oil 
discoveries, the country's oil reserves were projected to fall 
between 1979-84 from 1.079 bn to 880.3m barrels, while output 
would slump from 75.7m to just 61.3m. If domestic oil demand 
continued to increase at the same rate as in 1973-78, Ecuador 
would become a net oil importer by 1983. 1
Faced with the possible loss of the country's main source of 
foreign exchange, as well as a key source of revenue for the 
public sector, the Roldos government outlined an extensive 
programme of exploration and and development work involving a mix 
of private and public investment. In a number of important 
respects, there was a degree of continuity with the oil policies 
pursued by the military junta.
Texaco
Until new production sources became available, the financing of 
welfare policies, social development projects, as well as the 
capitalisation of CEPE, were dependent on ensuring the continued 
inflow of oil revenue from the oilfields operated by Texaco. 
With the older wells showing signs of depletion, a major 
programme of secondary recovery and maintenance work was drawn 
up, together with the drilling of ten exploratory wells. 
Secondary recovery work in Shushufindi and Sacha alone was 
expected to add 570m barrels to the country's oil reserves. 
Shushufindi was thought to contain about 300m barrels recoverable 
through waterflood, which suggested that the field could
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eventually produce an additional 80,000 b/d over the following 20 
years.2 This work programme was regarded as essential to ensure 
that production between 1980-84 averaged at least 225,000 b/d, 
and thus enabled the government to fulfill its growth and export 
targets.
In these circumstances, and with the government aware of the 
high political and economic costs that conflict with Texaco could 
entail, the US company's continued presence in the country was 
not in question. The democratic nature of the new government and 
its political and economic priorities pointed to the government 
seeking to maintain amicable relations with the company. As 
Philip notes:
'Democratic governments in oil-exporting 
countries expect to buy, or at least to
maintain, political support by judicious
public spending policies. Once these come to 
benefit the majority or even a large minority 
of the electorate it becomes crucial for any 
government to keep up the inflow of revenue.
Under such circumstances confrontational or 
overly ambitious oil policies are generally
avoided.'3
It was not simply the civilian political elites who had a direct 
interest in avoiding conflict with Texaco. Having accrued for
itself around one-fifth of the country's oil income, the 
military too had a direct financial interest in ensuring that 
confrontational policies towards Texaco were avoided and the flow 
of oil income maintained. From a purely financial perspective, 
oil policy in respect of Texaco was unlikely to be complicated by 
a resurgence in military nationalism.
Foreign Q11 Companies
A further degree of continuity with the policies pursued by the 
military junta was reflected in the government's announcement 
that foreign oil companies would be invited to explore for oil on 
the basis of the contract of hydrocarbon operations established
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in November 1978. There was a general acceptance among the main 
political groups that some form of foreign collaboration was 
required in the search for new oil reserves. This was even 
accepted by many who had previously called for a state monopoly 
of the upstream sector. Calls for the nationalisation of the oil 
industry were largely confined to the weak and fragmented labour 
movement and to political parties on the far left whose poor 
showing in the elections suggested that voters themselves did 
not hold strong nationalist views.
CEPE
There was, however, a clear change of direction in respect of 
CEPE and the precise role that foreign oil companies would be 
required to fulfill. While the conservative business community 
argued for the virtual privatisation of the upsteam sector - and 
CEPE itself - the urban middle-class parties that now dominated 
Congress argued that the main burden of exploration should be 
assumed by CEPE. The Roldos government, therefore, drew up an
extensive programme of exploration for the company, which 
included the running of 7,000 km of seismic lines and the 
drilling of 61 exploratory wells and 207 development wells. All 
areas considered to be of low risk and cost were reserved 
exclusively for CEPE. Strict limits, on the other hand, were
placed on foreign oil investment. Oil companies wishing to
explore were welcome, but only to supplement CEPE's own efforts
by exploring in areas of high risk and high cost.
Major steps were also to be taken to make effective CEPE's 
majority shareholding in the consortium and thereby ensure that 
Texaco implemented agreed investment programmes. The government 
reasserted that the US company would be replaced as operator by 
a new company 'Petroamazonas' in which CEPE would have majority 
control and that CEPE would assume complete operational control 
of the consortium by 1985.
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As chapter 3 highlighted, CEPE at that time had neither the 
financial, administrative or technical capacity to undertake an 
extensive programme of exploration or to assume a more dominant 
role in the consortium. The company's needs had been consistently 
neglected by both military governments, which often treated CEPE 
more like an official finance company than the main instrument of 
state oil policy. As a matter of urgency, therefore, the 
government, with the support of parties on the centre and centre- 
left, promised to take the necessary measures to transform CEPE's 
structure and financial position.
For a state oil company to be successfully 'turned round* after a 
poor start, a number of preconditions need to exist. These, 
according to Alfred Saulniers, include:
'central government recognition that problems 
exist, government consensus to implant 
adequate management structures, and government 
delegation of autonomous management 
responsibility to the companies themselves.
Without these key changes outside the 
companies, quality management within them will 
not occur.'A
These preconditions appeared to be in place in Ecuador. That CEPE 
had problems seemed beyond doubt, but there was also widespread 
acknowledgement that these were rooted, not in the government- 
ownership structure nor the internal organisation of CEPE, but 
in the company's Constitution and the government-imposed 
environment within which it was required to operate. For CEPE 
to function effectively, the government accepted that it would be 
necessary to 'restructure [CEPE] administratively, technically 
and operationally.'6 Specifically, it was essential to allow CEPE 
greater managerial and operational autonomy and to take steps 
that would free management from the bureaucratic constraints 
that often reduced the decision-making process to a ponderous 
crawl.
The second priority was to ensure that CEPE had the necessary 
financial resources to undertake the objectives assigned to it. As
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well as increasing domestic oil prices, a firm commitment was 
given that part of the additional income generated from the rise 
in crude oil prices would be used to 'create a fund so that CEPE 
can intensify exploration. 'e CEPE's financial position had 
already been substantially improved as a result of the oil price 
hikes, with its share of public sector oil income more than 
trebling in real terms, from $40.3m to $146.9m. This was 
equivalent to 23.7% of total public sector oil income, double the 
percentage share it received in 1978. The company's income from 
crude exports rose from $37.6m to $65. lm. The increase would 
have been even more substantial if the delayed payment of $37.6m 
from Petroperu had not been confiscated by the military junta 
and used to finance the budget deficit. However, in percentage 
terms CEPE's share of crude export income remained unchanged 
from 1978, at 24%. That CEPE's overall percentage share of oil 
income rose so dramatically was due entirely to the emergence of 
a new source of oil income in the form of fuel oil exports. These 
generated $73.6m in 1979, all but a small proportion of which was 
transferred directly to CEPE.
Table 4.1; Distribution of Oil Income 1978-79 ($m)
1978 % .share 1979 % share % Change
BEDE 71. 0 20.7 112.8 18.2 + 59%
State Budget 64.7 18.8 98.4 15.9 + 52%
JDH 78.2 22.7 136.7 22.1 + 74%
CEPE 40.3 11. 7 146.9 23.7 + 264%
IMECEL 50. 7 14.7 74.9 12. 1 + 48%
Other 38. 4 11.2 49.8 8. 0 + 29%
Total 343.3 619.5 + 81%
Source: Ministry of Finance, Estadistlca de Ingresos Petroleros, 
1978-83, (Quito, June 1984), p 22-23.
When all other revenue sources were taken into account (primarily
domestic sales and loans), CEPE's income rose from $269.5m to
$343. lm. After the deduction of 'taxes' and costs, CEPE's surplus
by the end of the year had increased to $97.6m, the highest in 
the company's history and equivalent to one-fifth of total sales 
income.7.
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Government policies to boost non-oil income sources, and thereby 
reduce the sensitivity of the economy and the public sector to 
fluctuations in both the price and volume of crude oil exports, 
could also be expected to benefit CEPE, at least indirectly. 
Particular emphasis was to be placed on the elimination of tax 
evasion, improved administration and collecting procedures and 
higher income tax for middle and upper income groups. Steps were 
also to be taken to increase the prices of domestic oil products. 
These measures were regarded as essential to finance the 
government's investment programme and ensure that the state had 
sufficient resources to service the huge external debt inherited 
from the military junta.
The failure to mobilise these income sources had, in the past, 
led cash-straitened governments to sypon revenue from CEPE. It 
was reasonable to expect, therefore, that the mobilisation of 
non-oil income sources (as well as the substantial boost in the 
oil revenue directed to the state budget that occurred in 1979) 
would reduce the amount of unwelcome political attention that 
CEPE's funds had attracted in the past.
Potential Obstacles Facing the Government
There were potential obstacles to the government's attempt to 
provide an essentially domestic solution to the country's oil 
problems. In the first place, the unexpected boost to CEPE's 
finances in 1979 was likely to be temporary, even if oil prices 
remained unchanged during 1980. In the final days of the
military junta, two further decrees had been issued which were 
expected to reduce CEPE's income in 1980, in the case of decree 
3672-A severely so. This decree, which had been issued on 30 
July, stipulated that 50% of the net income from fuel oil 
exports would be transferred to the state budget. A few days 
later, on 6 August 1979, decree 337 was passed ordering that 
part of the revenue from oil exports would be used to finance 
amortization and interest payments on a $300m loan contracted by 
the military under decree 274 of 14 September 1978.
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The economic situation was also less favourable than the oil 
price hikes of 1979 might have suggested. When Roldos came to 
office, he immediately found himself confronted by a $2.2 bn 
external debt and a budget deficit which was equivalent to 
$280m. ° Even more problematic were developments in the 
international arena. In the closing months of 1979, there were 
already signs that economic growth in the industrialised 
countries was slowing and that measures were being developed 
which were designed to reduce oil consumption whilst 
simultaneously increasing non-OPEC oil supply sources. Hot only 
was the upward pressure on oil prices already easing, but there 
were also indications that the era of cheap loans might be 
coming to a close as the US government sought to dampen 
inflationary pressures through a policy of tight monetary control 
and high interest rates. The vulnerability of Ecuador to both 
these developments was heightened by the economy's excessive 
dependence on commercial bank loans and the continued inflow of 
income from a resource whose revenue-generating capacity had been 
in constant decline since 1974.
The political situation too was less favourable to CEPE (and 
reform generally) than the 'reformist' complexion of Congress 
might otherwise have suggested. Despite his stunning electoral
victory, Roldos was neither in a position to dictate on his own
the policies of his government or appoint the people to carry 
them out.
The Balance of Political Forces
The first problem that Roldos faced was that the 29 seats won 
by the Concentracion de Fuerzas Populares (CFP) - three of which, 
it should added, belonged to Democracia Popular - were not 
sufficient to form an overall majority in Congress.
Nevertheless, Roldos had expected that this could be achieved by 
forming alliances with Hurtado's Democracia Popular, Partido 
Democrata and Izquierda Democratica, which had emerged as the 
second largest party with 15 deputies (including two from
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Democracia Popular). In view of the general ideological and 
programmatic affinities of these parties, this was not an 
unreasonable expectation.
Party labels in Ecuador, however, have rarely provided an 
accurate indication of an elected official's ideological 
orientation or likely voting behavior. Political parties have 
traditionally been:
'alliances of convenience between powerful 
factions, in which ideology, programmes, or 
policies have had little importance. More 
often than not, aspiring young politicians 
selected their party affiliation on the basis 
of their own regional origins and family 
backgrounds rather than on programmatic or 
ideological criteria.'®
Moreover, they have been 'elitist' in the sense that their links 
with those social groups which they purport to represent have 
often been weak or non-existent. Little attention either was paid 
to party development or party organisation, a feature of 
Ecuadorian politics that was encouraged by the dominant role that 
elitist cliques, populists and personalists have played on the 
country's political scene.10
The election results of 1978-79, in particular the emergence of 
Izquierda Democratica and Democracia Popular, appeared to mark 
a new chapter in the country's political development. New forms 
of political organisation had emerged, led by well-trained and 
well-educated professionals armed with comprehensive programmes. 
It soon became evident, however, that many of the officials 
elected to Congress had little commitment to a party culture or 
ideological consistency.
This was to be demonstrated most graphically in 1979-84 by the 
continued prevalence of the phenomenon known as the 'cambio de 
camistetas' and the important political role played by 
'independents.' The former, involving elected individuals moving 
effortlessly from one political party, or interparty alliance,
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to another, had been apparent in the run-up to the elections. One 
of many examples, was the case of the mayor of Quito who, after 
failing to be selected by the 'social democratic' Izquierda 
Democratica, ran successfully for the Liberal Party, home of the 
coastal elite.11
Legislation passed in 1978 encouraged such political 'fluidity'. 
To reduce the plethora of small personalist parties standing 
for election, the 'Ley de Partidos' stipulated that only 
individuals affiliated with a legally recognised party could 
stand for election. According to Catherine Canaghan, one of the 
side-effects of this attempt to regulate the party system:
'was that it essentially forced many of the 
politically ambitious into parties as a matter 
of convenience rather than conviction. Ties 
between the parties and the new partisan elite 
were thus often ephemeral... Party affiliations 
were effortlessly shed by congressmen, once 
elected, as they calculated their future 
electoral fortunes and patronage
opportunities.'12
The absence of party loyalties and a lack of concern for 
ideological consistency was to be further reflected by the 
important role played by independents in the formation of 
cabinets and pro-government alliances. Lacking a definitive 
position on the problems facing the country, and the solution to 
them, these individuals were willing to lend their support to 
a president in return for positions in central or local 
government.13
Parties, therefore, often assumed the character of political 
patronage organisations in which ideology and programmatic 
concerns were secondary to the overriding necessity of securing 
public office for loyal party veterans. It followed from this, 
that political success was often measured, not in terms of the 
formulation and implementation of concrete social or economic 
measures, but on the degree of access to state resources and 
public office. In these circumstances, party loyalties can (and
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did) shift rapidly. As both Roldos and then Hurtado were to 
discover, this created major problems in the construction of 
stable and lasting coalitions between parties. It had, moreover, 
the additional effect of creating great tensions within parties. 
For instance, by 1981 no single party controlled more than 12 
seats. When Congress first met in August 1979 the number of 
parties totalled 10; by May 1983 the number had risen to 16. The 
tendency towards fragmentation was to be most apparent in respect 
of the CFP. Of the 18 parties or groups that appeared at one time 
or another between 1979-84, splits in the CFP were responsible 
for six of these. As a result, the CFP's representation collapsed 
from 29 to just four in 1983. 1A
The Division of the CFP
Evidence of the continued predominance of patronage politics, and 
the political problems this created for Roldos, was provided 
before the government came to office. Earlier in the year, open 
conflict had broken out between Assad Bucaram, the demogogic CFP 
leader, and his nephew, Roldos. Viewed as a 'dangerous' leftist 
by the Right and opposed by the military, Bucaram - considered 
the most likely to win in any free elections - had been debarred 
from standing for the presidency when the military junta ruled 
that all presidential nominees had to be born of parents who were 
citizens of Ecuador at the time of the candidate's birth.
Following Bucaram's elimination Roldos had been selected to 
run in his place. This decision was made, it appears, in the 
belief that Roldos would be a mere 'figurehead' president, with 
real political power being wielded by Bucaram. In the event, 
Roldos' independent stance, highlighted by his alliance with 
Hurtado's Democracia Popular party - which for technical 
reasons had also been barred from participating in the elections 
- and the choice of Osvaldo Hurtado as his running mate, severely 
strained relations between the two men. The complete rupture in 
relations, and the subsequent division of the CFP into 
'bucaramistas' and ' roldosistas', came when Roldos refused to
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accede to Bucaram's demand that all cabinet posts should be 
filled by loyal party militants. 1S
Unable to form a majority with the CFP-roldosistas and Hurtado's 
DP, Roldos had approached Izquierda Democratica for support. Led 
by Rodrigo Borja, the party had called on its supporters to back 
Roldos in the second round elections. However, the party was 
determined from the outset to 'carve out' its own image in order 
to prepare itself for victory in the 1984 elections. Fearing 
that too close an association with the Roldos government could 
damage its future election prospects, ID refused to accept posts 
in the cabinet or to join a pro-government alliance. Only once, 
in 1981, was the party prepared to join the government to 
stabilise the democratic process and implement a legislative 
programme for the benefit of the popular classes. Even then, 
such support for the Hurtado government was heavily qualified 
and, in the event, short-lived.
Bucaram meanwhile, anxious to punish Roldos and exert his 
dominance in Congress, effectively plunged Executive-Congress 
relations into a semi-permanent state of conflict by establishing 
a pact with the Conservative, Liberal and Social Christian 
parties. As a result of this pact and the fragmentation of pro­
reformist parties, conservative groups in Congress assumed an 
influence that was out of all proportion to the meagre 19 seats 
they had won in the elections. In return for posts on various 
congressional committees, the Supreme Court and the Supreme 
Electoral Tribunual these parties agreed to support Bucaram's 
election to the presidency of Congress and join him in forming 
an opposition majority. Once armed with a working majority, 
Bucaram - together with 17 of the original 29-member CFP 
delegation - prepared to undermine the authority of Roldos, by 
sending inflationary and economically embarrassing projects for 
executive decision and by throwing out, delaying or watering down 
bills submitted to Congress by Roldos.
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The Conservative Opposition
The uncompromising hostility of conservative groups to both 
Roldos and Hurtado first became apparent following their victory 
in the first round elections. Having successfully dealt with the 
radical threat in 1972-75, conservative groups and the business 
community were loath to standby and see the 'dangerous radical' 
Roldos and the 'closet Marxist' Hurtado take office. From the 
outset of the democrat i sat ion process that was initiated in 
1977, conservative political and business groups had, together 
with 'golpist' elements in the military, made a succession of 
attempts to manipulate the election process or halt it
altogether. After failing to have the first round elections 
annulled due to 'evidence* of electoral fraud, attempts were 
made to create conditions propitious for a coup.
Following the collapse of an attempted coup by the head of the 
'golpist' faction General Dur&n in September 1978, conservative 
groups had then sought to undermine the anti-golpist mentality 
within the military by plunging the country into political 
turmoil. To this end, elements within the military organised the 
assassination in November 1978 of the unsuccessful candidate for 
the Alfarista Party, Abdon Calddron Munoz. Although the
assassination and the resulting scandal served instead to further 
weaken support for the termination of the electoral process, the 
conservative media made a last ditch attempt to manipulate the 
voting behavior of the electorate by warning of violence and even 
civil war if Roldos won the presidential elections.
The formation of a government headed by Roldos and Hurtado was 
therefore viewed as little short of disastrous by conservative 
forces. Despite the mildly reformist nature of the new
government, the emphasis on tax reforms, the strengthening - 
though not extension - of the state sector and the emphasis on 
social welfare, were sufficient in themselves to ensure the 
uncompromising hostility of the elites and their representatives 
in Congress to the new government.
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Despite their poor electoral showing, the conservative parties 
were well-placed to block the government's policy initiatives. As 
a result of the deal reached with Bucaram (and indeed Roldos in 
Kay 1980), the right became virtual co-owners of the legislative 
and juridicial apparatus of the state during Roldos' first year 
of government. When access to political power through the 'back 
door' was closed, all manner of methods were successfully used to 
undermine the government and bring the legislative process to a 
virtual halt. The most favoured method was to constantly call
ministers before Congress to justify policy decisions or be
questioned on alleged 'irregularities'. Rot only did this reduce 
the time available for Congress to fulfill its legislative 
function, but it also provided delegates with the opportunity to 
descredit or punish the government. In the period to 1984,
ministers were to be called before Congress on 35 separate 
occasions.
Due to the vast network of personal and professional links that 
existed between politicians and the private sector, the elites 
and their political representatives were also able to indirectly 
influence the policy process by exerting pressure on individuals 
within the state apparatus. ie More directly, the desire of the 
Roldos and Hurtado administrations to avoid confrontation with 
the private sector led both to appoint individuals closely linked 
with the business community to ministerial, or other, state
positions.
In summing up the strategies adapted by the conservative 
opposition in Congress during this period, Mills wrote that:
'supported by the enormous economic apparatus 
of a powerful section of the private sector, 
and armed with its legendary political 
astuteness, the partriarchs of the opposition 
freely employed flattery and intimidation in 
order to influence votes and in order to 
orientate legislative work in such a way as to 
ensure that the results coincided with their 
own interests and those of its clients. ' 17
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Outside Congress, the propaganda war was undertaken by the media 
and the Chambers of Industry, Commerce and Agriculture. These, 
rather than political parties, were regarded as the principal 
instrument for articulating class interests. According to one 
survey carried out in 1979-80, only 9% of major industrialists 
reported a party affiliation, while over 70% reported membership 
of one or more business interest group organisations.10 This 
extra-party activity was to be supplemented at particular 
moments with more extreme measures to exert pressure on the 
government. These included calling 'emergency' meetings of the 
private sector, lock-outs - or at least the threat of them - as 
well as thinly veiled calls for military intervention.
The Role of the Armed Forces
A key priority of both Roldos and Hurtado was to ensure the 
smooth transfer of power to a democratically elected government 
in August 1984. This was seen as an essential step towards the 
consolidation of a multi-party democracy in a country that had 
been under military rule for the previous seven years. The 
accomplishment of this objective was to take precedence over all 
other policy priorities. Crisis avoidance, in particular the 
avoidance of open conflict with the business community, was 
therefore high on the government's political agenda.
Roldos' election to the presidency had caused concern to the 
military hierarchy, which had favoured the election of the 
conservative Sixto Duran. This concern, however, had been 
dampened by the knowledge that the military had secured for 
itself a permanent foothold in the Cabinet, in the form of the 
Defence Minister, and on the boards of the main state 
enterprises, and a sizeable chunk of the country's oil wealth. 
Nevertheless, the military's acceptance of a government headed by 
Roldos was not unqualified. It demanded, and received, a 
commitment that the new government would enshew 'mobilisation 
politics' and resist the inevitable pressures from below for 
increased political participation.19 Roldos was also required to
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give an assurance that no senior officers would be investigated 
or charged for alleged corruption during the period of military 
rule.20 The Roldos government, in short, had not been given a 
blank cheque. Throughout the period under review, concern that 
the military might once again assume the reins of power was to 
play a crucial role in moulding the behavior of the government 
and shaping the direction of official policies, particularly in 
respect of the business community.
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CHAPTER 5: II DKFBICB QP CEPE
The continued political influence of conservative groups in 
Congress was particularly worrying for CEPE: the dominant class
fractions that they represented were, along with their standard 
bearer in Congress Leon Febres Cordero, the very same that had 
struck an informal alliance with Texaco-Gulf in the early 1970's 
to undermine oil nationalism and discredit CEPE. In view of 
their past hostility to CEPE, they could be expected to oppose 
any plans to capitalise the company or increase its influence in 
the consortium.
It soon became clear, however, that a number of elected 
officials in political parties that purportedly favoured 
strengthening CEPE's role in the upstream sector had doubts over 
the wisdom of allowing CEPE to assume the main burden of 
exploration. This was perhaps not surprising, given CEPE's past 
poor performance and the high costs and risks attached to 
exploration. The composition of Roldos1 first and subsequent 
cabinets, moreover, were hardly conducive to developing a policy 
consensus on oil or any other issue. The new president did not 
enjoy the luxury of selecting individuals for cabinet positions 
on the basis of their ideological commitment to a common 
programme.
There were a number of groups and individuals that Roldos could 
not afford to ignore, either because they had supported him 
during his election campaign or because they were demanding 
official posts in return for their support in Congress. 
Democracia Popular received the vice-presidency and two 
ministeries, with the post of Oil Minister going to Mauricio 
D&valos, a former president of Citibank. The CFP-roldosistas also 
received two ministeries, with most of the remaining cabinet 
posts distributed among ' independents' , many of whom were close 
friends of Roldos. Individuals with close links to the private 
sector, including Rodrigo Paz who became Finance Minister, were
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also invited into the cabinet. There was, therefore, considerable 
scope for policy disagreements, inter-Ministerial conflict, and 
disgruntlement from organised political groups at the high number 
of posts reserved for Roldos' friends.
These problems became most apparent with respect to oil policy 
and the role, if any, that CEPE and foreign oil companies were to 
play in the exploration sector. Differences within the government 
over whether any, some or most of the exploration work should be 
carried out by CEPE first emerged when the Oil Minister Mauricio 
DAvalos publicly rebuked the new head of CEPE, Jos6 Carvajal, for 
claiming that Ecuador's oil prospects were 'very good' and that 
the country could count on sufficient reserves for the next 30 to 
40 years. 1 Vhat followed was a virtual replay of the disagreement 
that had taken place a year earlier between Oil Minister General 
Semblantes and Finance Minister Juan Reyna. When the former 
claimed that 'there is oil for 20 more years', the Finance 
Minister retorted that the oil boom was 'over' and that it was 
time 'to live in reality, to think of the future of Ecuador on 
the basis of traditional economic resources and to stop depending 
on oil'.2
Cqirfligt over Qii Policy
The level of oil reserves in Ecuador has long been a source of 
dispute, with conflicting figures being presented by the General 
Board of Hydrocarbons (DGH) and Texaco. DGH oil reserve figures 
have generally been lower than those presented by the American 
company. Figures published by the Board in 1979 pointed to oil 
reserves falling to just 880.3m by 1984, with just 159.6m new 
reserves being incorporated into production. These projections 
were largely accepted by D&valos and played an important role in 
influencing his view that the crisis confronting the oil industry 
was of such magnitude, that substantial quantities of foreign oil 
capital were required as a matter of urgency. DAvalos saw little 
point in CEPE itself assuming anything more than a marginal role
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in exploration work, and believed that the main focus of CEPE's 
activities should be confined to refining and marketing.
Texaco has consistently presented a far more optimistic picture 
of the country's oil potential, with the local manager Ren6 
Bucaram claiming in late 1978 that:
'the oil boom is not over; it has not even 
started. There are many possibilities in the 
Oriente and the coast which ought to be 
explored, and that, in the worst of lucks, we 
shall triple present oil reserves.'3
Unlike the DGH, whose figures related only to 'proven' reserves, 
Texaco's oil reserve data included the additional reserves that 
could be obtained through artificial lift, well reconditioning 
and water injection. At the end of 1979, Texaco was claiming 
that the consortium's reserves alone totalled 1.79 bn barrels. 
This was 19% higher than the estimated level in 1973, even 
though 598m barrels had been extracted since then. Texaco's 
projections on the future trend in oil reserves and production 
levels also differed markedly from the DGH, with Texaco
claiming that reserves totalling 1.5 bn barrels could be
incorporated into production. Just over half of these could be
obtained from secondary recovery work in the Shushufindi and Yuca 
fields. Far from declining, implementation of a programme of 
secondary recovery and artificial lift could, Texaco argued, 
quickly boost the consortium's production by over 10m barrels a 
year.*
Carvajal largely accepted Texaco's assessment of the current 
and potential oil situation. The oil sector was experiencing
problems, but there was no 'crisis.' With increased funding for 
CEPE and closer cooperation with Texaco, he argued, the oil
situation could be very quickly transformed - and without having 
to increase the foreign presence in the exploration sector.
Thus, while DAvalos sought to create a 'crisis' atmosphere, 
Carvajal repeatedly provided a more optimistic interpretation of
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the oil situation. By the end of 1979, Carvajal was giving 
support to revised evaluations by Texaco of the consortium's 
reserves. These suggested that, through a combination of 
secondary recovery work and well reconditioning, the country's 
oil reserves could be virtually doubled.
Carvajal was also reporting that fields waiting to be developed 
contained more reserves than initially estimates had suggested. 
The Yuca field, according to Carvajal, contained not 112m barrels 
but 200m, while reserves in the Cononaco field were estimated 
to be around 90-100m barrels, over double the original 
estimate.6 In areas reserved exclusively for CEPE, all manner of 
opportunities existed to significantly boost reserves, claimed 
Carvajal. The most promising were those in the JTororiente, where 
CEPE's major exploration programme was to be initiated. The 
Suroriente also represented one of the brightest hopes for a 
major oil discovery, particularly in Blocks 17 and 19, the two 
blocks 'most eagerly sought after' by foreign oil companies, 
according to Carvajal.6 Although both blocks had previously been 
drilled by Amoco without success, CEPE believed that Amoco had 
drilled outside the potentially productive areas. There was also 
a strong conviction that both blocks formed part of the same 
structure currently being exploited by Occidental across the 
border in Peru. Even without drilling to precretacic levels, CEPE 
estimated that at least 200m barrels of reserves could be 
discovered.
Highly positive results were also expected from CEPE's drilling 
programme in the Gulf of Guayaquil, in particular Block 11 which 
contained the rich Amistad field. Optimism was even being 
expressed that an additional 60m barrels would be found in the 
Santa Elena peninsula, where production had been taken place for 
over 50 years.
For Carvajal, it was difficult to understand why there was so 
much emphasis on stressing the 'crisis' situation that the 
country was supposedly facing when so many attractive
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possibilities existed. He was later to conclude that this was 
part of a deliberate strategy designed to prepare the way for 
the return of the foreign multinationals.7
The Removal of D&valos
The dispute between the two men was not confined to differences 
over the level of oil reserves. The increasingly bitter nature of 
the dispute also reflected DAvalas' belief that Carvajal was 
actively seeking to undermine his own authority and that of the 
Oil Ministry. It was clear to the Oil Minister from the outset 
that Carvajal had no intention of 'sitting around waiting far 
his orders' and was determined to seek a more ambitious, 
influential and independent course for CEPE.3 Despite the tight 
political control imposed on CEPE and its subordinate position 
vis a vis the Oil Ministry, Carvajal was able to achieve this by 
seeking influential political support outside the organisation. 
This he found in the shape of his close friend, Jaime Roldos. As 
one former CEPE official recalled:
'Carvajal became more influential than the Oil 
Minister thanks to his close friendship with 
Roldos. When he wanted certain things done he 
by-passed the Oil Minister and went straight 
to the president.'9
With the support of Roldos, Carvajal successfully shifted the 
weight of influence between the Oil Ministry and CEPE in favour 
of the latter and effectively usurped the functions that were 
traditionally the preserve of the Oil Minister. According to 
Weekly Analysis, Carvajal:
'strived to invest the manager of CEPE with 
the prerogatives to conduct wide-ranging oil 
policy matters. It was he who negotiated with 
Texaco; -it was CEPE who was to deal with the 
foreign oil companies. . . It was CEPE which was 
to have the louder voice in the consortium's 
new operator Petroamazonas. '10
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Presidential approval for Carvajal and CEPE appeared confirmed 
in December. In a bid to smooth relations between the Oil 
Ministry and CEPE, and as part of a wider strategy to strengthen 
his own political position, Roldos announced a cabinet reshuffle. 
One of the casualties was D&valos, who was moved to the Central 
Bank and replaced by an independent Jos6 Corsino Chrdenas. He 
was a former Minister of Industry who had signed the original 
contract with Texaco-Gulf in 1964. Relations between the Oil 
Ministry and CEPE improved markedly. This was partly because 
Chrdenas largely accepted Carvajal's assertion that oil reserves 
could be doubled within five years, but it was also due to the 
Oil Minister's willingness to 'take a back seat' and allow 
Carvajal to assume (or rather maintain) the dominant role in 
policy-making.
It is important to emphasise that Carvajal recognised that the 
success of the 'domestic solution' would depend - geology 
permitting - on the government channelling increased financial 
resources to CEPE and freeing the company from the highly 
bureaucratic system of centralised control. At the very least, 
funds were urgently needed to compensate the company for the 
income losses that it was expected to suffer as a result of the 
decrees passed in the last days of the military junta.
Just a few weeks before D&valos was removed, however, patronage 
politics had combined with the ideological hostility of 
conservative groups to set in motion a train of events which was 
to severely undermine CEPE's investment capacity and lead to the 
dismissal of Carvajal. The removal of D&valos proved, in the 
event, to be a hallow victory for Carvajal.
The Debate on the 1980 Budget Proposals
In October, Congress threw out what observers had generally 
regarded as an austere but responsible set of budget proposals. 
The government's package of tax reforms suffered a similar 
fate. The proposed budget for 1980 was 38% up on the initial 1979
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budget, to $873.9m. Most of the increase was required to fund a
hike in the minimum wage to $73.44 a month and a hike in
teachers salaries. The remainder was needed to cover the state 
budget's debt service repayments, which were expected to 
increase from $117.5m in 1979 to $190.9m, equivalent to one-fifth 
of total budget expenditure.11 The tax reforms had included new 
taxes on certain consumer goods and measures to improve the
collection of taxes and reduce tax evasion. These were expected 
to provide an additional $66. lm worth of income to finance the 
1980 budget.12
The budget debate provided the head of the opposition majority in 
Congress, Assad Bucaram, with the opportunity to fulfill two 
political objectives. One was to undermine the authority of 
Roldos, the other was to supply patronage and short-term
benefits to his followers in Guayaquil. 13 The opportunity for 
patronage that the budget presented was widely shared. In the 
event, the response of elected officials to the government's 
budget proposals proved to be little different to the reactions 
engendered by previous budget debates. Commenting on a budget 
some 20 years earlier, Peter Pyne concluded that:
' Most Congresses saw in the budget an
opportunity to increase their electoral 
popularity and for some it provided an 
opportunity for personal financial enrichment. 
Legislators have traditionally established
public works projects in their constituencies 
financed by budgetry allocations for which 
inadequate revenues have been provided. . . It 
allowed them [legislators] to benefit through 
the disbursement of public funds without
suffering the unpopularity that the imposition 
of additional taxation would have involved.'11*
Little had, indeed, changed. After throwing out the package of 
tax reforms, Congress proceeded to embark on a spending spree. 
The minimum monthly salary was increased to $97.92 and several 
new public works programmes designed to satisfy demands from the 
provinces were adapted. The inclusion of new road programmes 
alone more than doubled the expenditure programme of the Ministry
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of Public Works, from $59.4m to $129.9m. Overall, budget 
expenditure jumped from $876.6m to $1.1 bn, while the expected 
budget deficit rose to around $391.7m. 1S
The authority of the Roldos government, and the finances of the 
state, came under further pressure, with Bucaram seeking 
executive approval for a number of highly inflationary, but 
politically popular, projects. These included the reduction in 
the basic working week from 44 hours to 40 hours, retirement for 
women after 25 years, the expansion of higher and vocational 
education and a price freeze on basic goods, services and rents. 
Although Roldos could have vetoed these bills, as indeed he did 
with 38 of the 67 bills presented in the first session of 
Congress, the need to maintain his popular base of support 
compelled him to sanction a number of Bucaram's proposals. 1G
The problem the government now faced was how to finance a 
previously austere but now grossly inflated budget. The most 
obvious and most lucrative step was to raise domestic oil 
prices. However, prospects for a price increase were not 
encouraging with Bucaram voicing his opposition to any increase, 
however small.17 The government, no doubt concerned at the likely 
political reaction on the streets, appeared uncertain what to 
do. On 1 November, DAvalos announced that the government was 
'establishing how much, when and how a progressive increase in 
the price of gasoline will be implemented', only to deny a few 
days later that increases were being planned. By mid-November, 
the Oil Minister had reverted to his previous stance saying that 
prices would be increased gradually and that a new brand of 
gasoline would soon be available costing S/15 ($0.37) per
gallon.10
There was a growing expectation that the hike in salaries would 
be used as the pretext for raising prices. Amid fears of a price 
hike, and with speculators increasing the price of staple goods 
even before the introduction of the new minimum wage, violent 
demonstrations by students and workers broke out in the
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capital.19 A key concern, apparently, was the impact that any 
price increases would have on transport fares. Even though fuel 
costs represented a fraction of total transportation costs, bus 
owners were expected to follow a price hike with fare increases. 
The government, already besieged by an opposition-dominated 
Congress, swiftly retreated. It was not yet ready to take the 
politically risky but financially attractive step of increasing 
domestic oil prices.
The November Decrees
As in the past, the government took the politically easy way 
out to finance part of the deficit. To finance the salary 
increases for teachers, an additional tax of 'S/5' was imposed on 
each barrel of oil exported by Texaco, CEPE and City Investing. 
Two weeks later, on 19 November, a further law was passed which 
channelled a large chunk of the 'windfall' in oil revenues to 
the municipal and provincial councils. The law, which was signed 
by Roldos in January, stipulated that the first 'S/2.1 bn* of oil 
revenue would be transferred to the municipal and provincial 
councils. The remaining oil revenue would be distributed 
throughout the public sector as before, with one crucial 
difference: the crude export price on which the shares of income 
participants including CEPE would be calculated was frozen at 
$23.50 per barrel (in January the average price of Ecuadorian 
crude was $36.6), while a ceiling of $17.50 pb was established 
for fuel oil exports (CEPE's average sales price in January was 
$28.14). In other words, a ceiling was placed on the dollar 
amount that each participant could receive from 1 January 1980. 
The income from crude and fuel oil exports sold above this price 
was to be transferred directly to the Treasury to finance the 
social and economic infrastructural work of the councils.
According to Congressional spokesmen, these measures were 
expected to bring an additional $183.8m to the Treasury, leaving 
just under $190m of the projected deficit to be financed through 
other means. This was considered by the Minister of Finance
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Rodrigo Paz to be a ‘manageable’ figure, though this statement 
was made on the assumption that there would be no further 
increases in budget expenditure and that income projections for 
the year were met.20
This new revision in the distribution of public sector oil income 
was to severely undermine CEPE's investment capacity. More 
generally, the November decrees were expected to substantially 
reduce the investment capacity of those public sector 
enterprises whose revenue largely originated from oil export 
activities and lead to a further deepening of the country's 
dependence on external finance. According to Weekly Analysis:
'New oil income is now officially directed to 
current - and not capital - expenses. High oil 
prices will not benefit BEDE (formerly FONADE) 
nor for that matter CEPE, INECEL, INERHI or 
IETEL but will be used to cover payroll needs 
and projects of local interest. Not only that, 
but expenses have been blown so out of 
proportion that not even steep oil price 
increases have sufficed to bring the deficit 
to manageable proportions. Meanwhile the 
programmes which would increase government 
income and help foot future budgets such as
oil exploration are left resourceless. The 
goose that lays the golden eggs has been
slain.'21
The Revised System of Oil Income Distribution
An even longer process was now involved before the income shares 
of those public sector entities with access to the country's oil 
revenue could be calculated and distributed. Before income from 
CEPE's crude exports could be distributed in the manner 
established in 1974, the S/5 tax imposed on each barrel of oil 
exported had first to be deducted. A calculation then had to be 
made of the amount of revenue generated on the basis of $23.5 pb. 
All additional revenue generated above this price ceiling was 
immediately transferred to the municipal and provincial councils. 
Before the revenue generated on the basis of $23.5 pb could be 
distributed, however, 8% was deducted and transferred to the
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armed forces. It was only then that the 72:28 distribution ratio 
established in 1974 came into effect. CEPE's '28%' share, 
therefore, was calculated on the basis of $23.5 pb exported, 
less royalties, less the 8% assigned to the Junta Nacional 
Defensa, less decree 337 (covering the provision of funds for 
debt servicing), less the S/5 tax on each barrel exported.
CEPE's share of fuel oil export income - which had been over 80% 
in 1979 - was also expected to be heavily reduced by the $17.50 
price ceiling. The problem was compounded, however, by the decree 
issued by the military which required CEPE to share half of its 
fuel oil export income with the state budget.
The new distribution system was also applied to the income 
generated from the 87.31% tax on Texaco's gross income. CEPE was 
largely unaffected since its participation in oil tax revenue 
was negligible. The November decrees, however, had damaging 
financial consequences for BEDE (formerly FONADE). To determine 
the amount of revenue available for distribution, the 87.31% 
income tax was imposed on the revenue generated by exports at a 
price of $23.5, plus deliveries to the domestic market - at $1.48 
per barrel - less the S/5 tax. Income generated above the price 
ceiling was channelled directly to the municipal and provincial 
councils and the state budget. The remaining income (less the 
$0.20 that CEPE received for each barrel exported by Texaco and 
the 8% allocated to the military) was then available for 
distribution to 16 public sector entities in the percentages 
established by decree 2959 in 1977.
The income from the 18.5% royalty imposed on Texaco and CEPE had 
traditionally been shared between the military and INECEL. As a 
result of the November decrees, only the income generated at the 
price of $23.5, less the S/5 tax was available for distribution, 
with the JDN receiving a 50% share and INECEL 47%. All income 
generated at prices above this level was to be transferred to the 
municipal and provincial councils and the state budget.
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The Response of CEPE
Following this latest move to use the state oil company’s funds 
to overcome fiscal problems and fund social development 
programmes, Carvajal warned Roldos that CEPE could be pushed to 
the brink of bankruptcy within two years.22 The company’s deputy 
head of Finance, Raul Molina, predicted that CEPE's share of 
crude export revenue would slump to just 7% in 1980, while its 
budget deficit would reach $44.8m by the end of 1980 and then 
more than treble in the following year to $176.3m. 23
The financial consequences for CEPE of the decrees passed by both 
the military junta and the Roldos government were detailed in an 
internal memorandum to Carvajal from Raul Molina.24 On the
assumption that CEPE's income from crude exports would gross 
$439.lm in 1980, the company would have received, on the basis 
of the 28% share stipulated in 1974, $122.9m. However, decree 492 
was expected to reduce this figure by $41.9m to $81. lm,
equivalent to 18% of CEPE's gross crude export income. Decree 
218, which transferred 8% of export revenue to the JDN, was 
expected to lose CEPE $9.8m and decree 337 a further $12.8m. By 
this stage, CEPE's crude export income would be just $58.4m, 
equivalent to just 12% of gross crude export income.2S The S/5 
tax, meanwhile, was expected to reduce CEPE's crude export 
income by $0.6m, while the implementation of the $23.50 price 
ceiling was projected to deprive CEPE of $26.8ms In all, as a 
result of decrees passed by the military junta and Congress, 
CEPE's projected crude export revenue was expected to be reduced 
by $92m, leaving the company with just $30.9m. This was
equivalent to 7% of crude export revenue, and less than half the
sum it had received in 1979.2S
With respect to fuel oil exports, the decision to transfer 50% 
of net income from this source to the state budget was expected 
to reduce CEPE's income by $39.7m. Implementation of the price 
ceiling of $17.50 was expected to cut CEPE's income by a further 
$9.3m, leaving CEPE with just $44.5m, equivalent to 48% of the
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projected gross income from this source of $93.6m. In 1979, CEPE 
had received $73.6m, equivalent to over 80% of total fuel oil 
export income.
As a result of these decrees, CEPE's income was expected to be 
reduced in 1980 by $143.2m. According to Molina, each barrel of 
oil produced by the company in 1980 would generate, on average, 
$18.144. Of this CEPE would receive $2.139 less production and 
transport costs, leaving the corporation with just >0.913 to 
finance its exploration and investment projects.27.
As table 5.1 shows, while CEPE's share of its crude export income 
was expected to slump to 7.1%, the shares of the state budget and 
military were forecast to jump to 44.9% and 25.9% respectively.
Table 5.-1: Projected Distribution of Income in 1980 from CEPE's
Crude Exports
$ .ailllon % share of
total
State Budget 197. 2 44.9
Junta Defensa Nacional 113.9 25.9
INECEL 43.6 9.9
Banco de Desarrollo 37.6 8.6
CEPE 31. 0 7. 1
Other 15. 8 3.6
Total 439. 1 100. 0
Source: CEPE, Boletin ' Legislacion Petrolera', No 3, 1980, p 7.
CEPE officials responded to these latest measures to syphon off 
the company's revenue by putting forward proposals to Roldos 
for safeguarding CEPE's financial position and improving its 
efficiency. According to company officials, one of the central 
problems affecting CEPE's operational capabilities was its 
archaic Constitution, which served to ' impede the efficient and 
flexible management of its activities. . ' It was, therefore, 
considered necessary to reform CEPE's Constitution and replace it 
with a modern legal framework which would allow the state company 
a degree of economic, managerial and administrative autonomy
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’similar to that of a private company.'33 It was accepted that 
CEPE should remain within the public sector and that the 
formulation of oil policy should remain in the hands of the 
president and his cabinet. However, officials called for senior 
management to be given greater decision-making powers and for the 
introduction of modern technology and accounting systems to 
ensure that decisions were taken on the basis of business not 
political criteria. 29
CEPE emphasised that it was not opposed to the distribution of 
the country's oil income throughout the public sector, since the 
oil wealth was the 'property of the state and therefore the whole 
community.' There was an acceptance that the company was 
required to fulfill social as well as entrepreneurial
objectives. However, it was CEPE's marginal share in the very
oil income that it generated, together with other politically 
imposed constraints that compelled the company to operate under 
very different conditions to domestic and foreign private 
companies, that CEPE officials found irksome. For instance, in 
contrast to foreign oil companies like Texaco, CEPE was not 
reimbursed by the state for its investments and costs in the
event of discovering commercial quantities of oil nor was it 
permitted to receive a reasonable profit from its business
activities. Measures needed to be taken, therefore, to ensure 
that:
'CEPE's position must be no different to that 
which prevails for multinational
companies. ..On the contrary, it requires a 
common treatment that will enable it to 
operate in conditions at least similar to 
those under which foreign companies operate in 
Ecuador. Neither the freezing of prices..nor 
secret decrees have affected the profits or 
income of foreign oil companies. On the 
contrary, they have reduced and weakened the 
income and financial situation of the state 
oil company.’30
On the other hand, the situation of CEPE 'cannot be equal to the 
rest of the participants' in oil income, since none of these are
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required 'to meet the continued increases in costs and 
expenditures on production, transport, refining and marketing, as 
well as saving some of its income for investment projects.'31
A series of proposals were put forward to ensure that CEPE had 
the necessary resources to cover its casts and fund priority 
investment projects. In the immediate term, CEPE called for 
revisions to the November decrees. The key demand was for the 
price ceilings to be raised from $23.5 to $37.8 for crude 
exports and from $17.5 to $22 for fuel oil exports. These 
measures alone would provide CEPE with an additional $23.6m and 
$7.6m of crude and fuel export income respectively. Other demands 
from CEPE, together with the additional income that their
implementation was expected to bring, included eliminating 
Article 3 (d) of Ministerial Accord 057 of 11 February 1980 and 
transferring the increase in derivative prices charged to ships 
with international routes to CEPE ($21.3m), and allowing CEPE to 
receive a 'commission' of 2% on the real value of royalty exports 
($6.5m).32
As well as seeking revisions to the distribution system covering 
existing oil revenue sources, Carvajal pressed for CEPE to 
receive 30% of the income generated from new production sources. 
If this demand was implemented in respect of the Yuca field,
which was close to coming on-stream, CEPE's income could be 
increased by as much as $63.6m.33 Other measures which Carvajal 
advocated to bring extra revenue to CEPE included a substantial 
hike in domestic oil prices and an increase in the authorised
level of production. Carvajal faced strong opposition to both
demands, however, in the latter case from urban transport users 
and the labour movement, and in the former from the DGH and, 
after the removal of Cardenas, Oil Minister CAsar Robalino. On 
the basis of revised reserve estimates from Texaco, Carvajal had 
argued that output levels could be increased by 10,000 b/d. 
Later, he went further and suggested that output from the 
Shushufindi field could be increased from 100,000 b/d to 150,000 
b/d without risking any structural damage. 3A By May, Carvajal was
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calling for an immediate increase in the consortium's production 
from 204,000 b/d to 220,000 b/d, at least until production from 
CEPE's Nororiente fields (which were expected to add 50,000 b/d 
by 1983) came on stream. The Oil Minister and the head of DGH 
Marcelo Guerra refused to compromise, repeating their view that 
output increases could only be justified if secondary recovery 
work was carried out by the consortium or if new fields were 
incorporated into production.36
The Mood of Optimism
CEPE's demands coincided with a series of highly optimistic 
claims in respect of the company's drilling activities. Even the 
normally cautious Weekly Analysis reported in May 1980 that 
'there is promise of hydrocarbons almost everywhere' and that ' a 
minor oil boom may still be on in the near future for Ecuador.' 3e 
A spate of discoveries in the Ifororiente in the first half of the 
year appeared to justify this optimism:
'The first wells drilled in the Sansahuari and 
Cuyabeno fields have tossed reserves of about
70m barrels. More recent drilling, in the
fields known as Secoya and Shuara have proven 
good for 200m. ..All told, and including the
exploitation of Bermejo - discovered and 
returned by Texaco - the CEPE bloc in the
ITororiente may be worth about 300-400m barrels 
of reserves, excluding the precretacic. . . '37
Further discoveries were made later in the year at Tetete and 
Shushuqui. CEPE's stepped-up exploration campaign - 10 wells
drilled in 1979 and nine in 1980, compared to 13 in 1975-78 -
appeared to be achieving substantial success. Few days passed on
which CEPE officials did not announce some new success or other 
in the company's exploration work. There was, in addition, 
continued optimism surrounding the oil potential of areas yet to 
be drilled. Aside from the Suroriente, the consortium's fields 
and the Santa Elena peninsula, preliminary studies along the 
central northern coast suggested that the hydrocarbons potential 
was 'three to four times' larger than that of the Hororiente.30
- 108 -
Carvajal later claimed that Manabi alone had 'huge' oil potential 
and could contain an oil reservoir larger even than the 
Amazonian oilfields. 3-9 These announcements were supplemented by a 
vigorous TV and newspaper advertising campaign extolling the 
virtues of CEPE and emphasising the importance of its work to the 
economy and 'its sole shareholder: the Ecuadorian people.'
According to Weekly Analysis:
'Carvajal was fully aware of the public's need 
to know, the media's need to inform and the 
government's need to cast an image of 
dynamism. The Manager of CEPE became the star 
of the government team. ' '*°
However, the fact that CEPE felt it necessary to publicise 
(often in a blatantly inflated manner) its achievements 
suggested that political motives lay behind this campaign. It 
seems likely that the hype surrounding CEPE's exploration work in 
1980 - like that which surrounded its work in the late 1970's - 
was aimed at creating a political environment more receptive to 
CEPE's demands for increased funding. If Congress agreed to this, 
Carvajal argued, then Ecuador would have no need to bring foreign 
oil companies into the exploration play.
There was, however, little prospect of more resources being 
chanelled to CEPE. Having just changed the system of oil inco>me 
distribution, Congress was hardly likely to revise or cancel the 
November decrees. To do so would have deprived the state of the 
resources to fund its social development programme and the 
Congress of the means to finance patronage politics. Unless 
resources were diverted from the councils and the state budget to 
CEPE, then the only other significant source of oil income left 
was that allocated to the military.
Beyond lobbying Congress and the president and publicising CEPE's 
'successes' Carvajal had few other means at his disposal to 
persuade Congress to meet his demands. Lacking any organisation.al 
independence and with little political clout, CEPE was clearly 
at a disadvantage to other pressure groups within society - for
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Instance, organised labour, the military, regional interests - 
seeking increased allocations from the state. CEPE's claims for 
more funds were further weakened by the purpose for which these 
were to be used and, increasingly, concern over whether existing 
resources were being managed efficiently. Hot only was 
exploration highly costly, but CEPE's past peformance cast doubts 
on its technical capacity to maintain an expansive and successful 
programme of exploration. There were, after all, other less 
costly alternatives available to boost the country's oil reserves 
- secondary recovery work by Texaco and foreign oil investment - 
neither of which, it should be added, required a diversification 
of oil revenues away from existing income sharers.
It was also clear from the middle of 1980 onwards that 
Carvajal's influence was waning. This partly reflected an 
increasing belief that Carvajal had been at best over-optimistic, 
at worst deceitful, in his claims regarding CEPE's exploration 
successes and the country's oil situation. More importantly, 
changes in the balance of political forces within Congress and 
the cabinet saw a further weakening of Roldos' authority during 
1980. This eventually proved fatal for Carvajal, since the power 
and influence that he had accumulated had been built on his close 
links and friendship with Roldos. Particularly worrying for the 
CEPE manager was the increased representation in the cabinet of 
the Democracia Popular, which had made little secret of its 
hostility towards Carvajal following the removal of D&valos from 
the Oil Ministry.
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CHAPTER 6: THE REMOVAL OP CARVAJAL
The process of government had remained in a state of virtual 
paralysis for most of 1980. Following the budget debate, the 
attention of the opposition groups had focused on an executive 
project covering the legal establishment of the Consejo Nacional 
de Desarrollo which was to replace the Junta Nacional de 
Planificacion y Coordinacion Economica ( JUNAPLA). The government 
wanted CONADE to be headed by the vice-president of the 
Republic, and hence Hurtado. The occasion was used by Bucaram 
(unsuccessfully in the event) to undermine Hurtado by attempting 
to have the president of Congress (and thus himself) to head 
CONADE. By March, attention had turned to the National
Development Plan itself. Conservative groups attacked its more
'radical' elements, while Bucaram denounced the Plan as
unconstitutional since it had been formulated by CONADE which
lacked legal recognition.
The rise in the political temperature in March was linked to a
speech made by Roldos at a mass meeting in Quito. Although
abstensibly planned to announce the formulation of the National
Development Programme, Roldos used the occasion to condemn 
attempts by opposition groups to undermine democracy and sabotage 
the government's legislative programme. More significantly, he 
hinted that constitutional reforms might be introduced to limit 
the power of Congress. Following the meeting, Roldos announced a 
package of reform proposals. These included reducing the period 
between congressional elections from five years to an unspecified 
period and, more threateningly for Bucaram and his conservative 
allies, granting the president the right to dissolve Congress 
once during its five year term and force new legislative 
elections. Aware that these changes would require the support of 
two-thirds of Congress, government spokesmen painted out that 
under the 1978 Constitution Roldos would be within his rights to 
hold a national referendum on the issue if Congress rejected his 
proposals.
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Expectations that a referendum would be held intensified 
following the rejection by Congress of Roldos' proposals and of 
compromise proposals drawn up by a Commission of Notables, 
composed of religious, political and business leaders. Opposition 
groups then launched a counter-attack by demanding that the 
Minister of Government, Carlas Feraud, appear before Congress on 
6 May, just three days before the threatened referendum. At the 
last minute, Roldos reached a deal with conservative groups which 
effectively undermined Bucaram's dominance within Congress. The 
knowledge that their obstructionist tactics in Congress would 
have resulted in Roldos winning the referendum was sufficient to 
undermine the unity of the opposition bloc. The Conservative and 
Liberal delegates officially withdrew from the Bucaram-led block, 
while the ID took steps to reach a legislative 'understanding' 
with Roldos. This was to lead to the election of the idista,Raul 
Baca Carbo, as president of Congress in place of Bucaram. More 
immediately, the restructuring in the balance of political 
forces within Congress resulted in delegates voting by 33 to 27 
against the censure of Feraud in June.
Events in May did, however, represent a major defeat for Roldos 
and democratic reformism. Following the decision to drop the 
threat of a referendum, Weekly Analysis concluded:
' that the government is foregoing the 
possibility of enacting controversial social 
radical legislation... When Bucaram joined the 
Conservatives Roldos denounced him for joining 
the oligarchy and backward social forces. Now 
the same Conservatives are included among the 
enlightened, while Bucaram himself bears the 
onus of being an anachronism. ' 1
The influence of the Conservatives, Liberals and CFP
'bucaramistas' remained extensive throughout 1980, with their 
control of the judiciary and the permanent commissions remaining 
largely intact. Moreover, due to the fragmentation of the CFP and 
the continued refusal of idista delegates to provide formal 
support to Roldos, the voting strength of conservative groups 
remained out of all proportion to their numerical representation.
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Through-out the year, they continued to bring the process of 
government to a halt, with six ministers been hauled before 
Congress for questioning. As a result, not a single project of 
law was approved during the second session of Congress that 
opened in August 1980. The inherent weakness of the ’new 
majority* on the one hand and the extraordinary vitality of the 
apposition on the other, led 'Bueva* to conclude that the pro­
government alliance forged in May:
'was more a pyschological than political 
triumph over the oligarchical-Bucaram alliance 
which was in no manner displaced from its
privaleged position within Congress. '2
The reformist credentials of the government were further dented 
when the National Development Plan was published. In terms of 
both tone and content, it differed from the original draft, with 
policies likely to provoke apposition from the private sector, 
most notably the advocacy of worker participation on company 
boards, removed.
It is important to emphasise, however, that radical change had
never been on the agenda of the new government. As events in May 
confirmed, the priority political objective for both Roldos and 
Hurtado, was to ensure the :
'consolidation of the democratic, multi-party 
system, and not the implementation of a 
radical transformation of society.'3
In pursuit of this objective, Roldos was reluctant to overly
antagonise the business community and their political
representatives in Congress. As events in the recent past had 
shown, moreover, sections of the private sector, particularly the 
agro-exporting elites in Guayaquil, were not averse to using 
extra-constitutional means, including the threat of a military 
coup, to secure their political objectives. Although committed 
to the increased involvement of the popular classes in the
political process, a referendum threatened to extend the highly
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charged and conflictive atmosphere of Congress into Ecuadorian 
society as a whole. It did, moreover, carry the risk of 
antagonising a conservative-dominated military that was opposed 
to anything that smacked of 'mobilisation politics.'
The spectre of military intervention had, in fact, been raised in 
the weeks before the threatened referendum. In December, a
special congressional committee had been established to
investigate acts of corruption during military rule, as well as 
the murder of Abdon Calderon, the Aztra massacre and the 
Previsora bank scandal.A Military concern was further raised when 
DP delegates called for an extraordinary session of Congress to 
try the three members of the military junta. The military 
hierarchy had responded to these moves by issuing a series of 
communiques which condemned the committee's activities, and
reminded the political elites of the central role played by the 
military junta in the return to civilian government. According to 
one report:
'this implicit accusation of ingratitude on 
the part of the new government is seen by some 
as a clear sign that the military are not 
prepared to be pushed too far.'s
Economic, as well as political factors, served to constrain 
Roldos' reformist impulses. By the middle of the year, the 
government's economic programme was in complete disarray. An 
annual average GDP growth rate of not less than 6.5% in 1979-84 
had been projected, with the growth target for 1980 set at 5.6%. 
By the middle of 1980, the most optimistic projections now 
pointed to GDP rising by 4.2% in 1980. If correct, that would 
require GDP rising by an annual average of 7.5% in 1981-84 to 
reach the 6.5% average required over the four year period.
The central problem confronting the government was that the 
primary assumptions on which the financing of the state budget 
and the public sector investment strategy had been based -
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namely, an average oil price of $37.7 and output averaging 
205,191 b/d (75.1m barrels) - were overly optimistic.
Qll Market Trends
By the middle of the year, the oil price hikes of 1979 were 
contributing to a slowing down in the rate of economic growth in 
the OECD countries, in particular the USA where GDP for the year 
actually fell by 0.2%. According to the OECD:
'energy conservation induced by the price
increases and supported by other measures is 
reducing energy demand and has led, along with
the lower induced economic growth, to a less
volatile oil market situation.'6
OECD consumption in the first half of the year averaged 39m b/d, 
around 2.5m b/d down on the same period one year earlier. In a 
bid to prevent oil prices declining, OPEC's aggregate output 
during the year was progressively reduced: by the last quarter of 
the year, it had fallen to 24m b/d, 23% lower than in the same 
quarter in 1979. These cut-backs failed to arrest the drift 
towards a buyers market. This was partly because of increased 
production from Mexico and the North Sea and partly because of 
Saudi Arabia's decision in March 1980 to maintain output at 
9.5m b/d, even though world output exceeded consumption by 
around lm b/d. Saudi production strategy appeared to be aimed at 
cajoling OPEC members into agreeing a long-term pricing 
strategy in which oil prices were to be adjusted quarterly in 
line with inflation, currency exchange fluctuations and the real 
rate of GDP growth in OECD countries.
The impact of these developments on the price of Oriente crude 
became evident in the early months of the year. Prices fell 
sharply, from $36.58 in January to just $31.78 in April. After 
recovering to $35.26 in May and June respectively, they resumed 
their downward trend. By September, when prices averaged $32.10, 
Weekly Analysis warned that the state budget's oil income would 
be $88.9m lower than originally expected.7 The fall in oil prices
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combined with lower than expected revenue from non-oil sources 
and further increases in budget expenditure - to $1. lbn - to lead 
to a revised budget deficit of between $327.7m and $374. 5m. e 
With no steps having been taken to mobilise non-oil revenue 
sources to compensate for the inflated budget, a number of 
state investment projects were either cancelled or postponed and 
allocations to BEDE heavily cut-back. These measures were 
officially expected to reduce the deficit by $156.9m, with a 
large chunk of the remainder having to be covered through further 
borrowing. 9
The only domestic option available to compensate for the price 
declines was to boost crude exports, by reducing oil consumption 
and/or boosting production. By the middle of the year, the oil 
price falls and the mounting fiscal crisis led to attention
turning once again to the issue of domestic oil prices. Such a 
move had been encouraged by Carvajal, who claimed that it 
could provide CEPE with an additional $49.3m. 10 Expectations of a 
price hike rose in July, when Roldos announced that 'realistic' 
prices should be imposed on sugar, milk and oil products. 
However, this statement appears to have been made to prepare the 
population pyschologically for a future increase in prices. With 
his room for manoever highly constrained by Congress and his 
popular standing damaged by events in May, Roldos was reluctant 
to mobilise what was potentially the most lucrative source of
revenue for the state. Instead, a new 92 octane gasoline was
introduced at the new 'political' price of S/18.2 ($0.42). This 
was expected to reduce the state subsidy by a mere $11.2m.
Developments in the area of production proved equally 
disappointing, with output for the year eventually falling from 
78.8m to 74.8m. With domestic consumption rising by around 10%, 
the volume of crude available for export fell during the year by 
16%, to 33.4m barrels, equivalent to just 44% of total
production. The government's output projections had assumed that 
the Yuca field would be incorporated on schedule and thus boost 
output by 8,000 b/d and that maintenance and secondary recovery
- 116 -
work would be carried out. The failure of the consortium to 
fulfill these targets - production from the Lago Agrio field 
actually slumped by 32% - was the key reason for the drop in 
output.
Texaco-State Relations
Texaco remained reluctant to invest in maintenance or secondary 
recovery work, arguing that output could be increased on the 
basis of existing known reserves. These were now estimated by the 
company to be 1.4 bn barrels, almost double the DGH's revised 
figure of 900m. Texaco (and Carvajal) was anxious to take 
advantage of the price hikes and had pressed for the consortium's 
output to be increased from 204,000 b/d to 220,000 b/d. These 
demands were refused by the DGH and the Oil Ministry which 
claimed that this could damage older oil structures. Ho increase 
was possible, therefore, until secondary recovery work had been 
carried out. By September, there was also a growing body of 
opinion within the Oil Ministry that production should be held 
back because of the softening of oil prices. It was, argued one 
in September, '1,000 times more preferable to have the oil stored 
in the wells of the Oriente where it does not cost us a penny 
than to store it in barges in Esmeraldas. ' 11
Despite its reluctance to undertake investment, Texaco was always 
more forthcoming in informing the government of the immense 
benefits that a programme of secondary recovery could bring. 
Reserves, the company claimed, could be boosted by over 500m 
barrels and, with little difficulty, production capacity raised 
to 88m barrels. Why then Texaco's reluctance to undertake a 
programme of secondary recovery work? Cost was one factor. Not 
only was the initial investment required high but extraction 
costs were expected to be over three times the level currently 
being incurred by the company. High extraction costs combined 
with three other factors to raise doubts over whether the profits 
obtained from secondary recovery work could justify the initial 
investment. First, the company's income tax was rigidly fixed at
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87.31%, second there was no guarantee that the authorised output 
level would be increased and third, and most importantly, the 
company had no guarantee that the additional output from a 
programme of secondary recovery work would not simply be diverted 
to meet domestic needs. There was, then, the possibility that 
investments made by Texaco would have no impact on its export 
levels.12
The company’s exportable surplus had shrunk considerably since 
the early 1970's, together with the amount of income that the 
company's operations in Ecuador generated. Vhen viewed in terms 
of net profit per barrel, Texaco appeared to be earning 
'windfall' profits in 1979 and 1980 as a result of the oil price 
hikes. According to one estimate, the company's net profit had 
increased from $1.1448 pb (equivalent to a 28.73% rate of return) 
to $1.6895 (equivalent to a rate of return of 43.05%), almost 
double what the company was claiming in 1976.13 The 
representation of Texaco's profits in these terms, however, 
served to mask the rapid decline in the number of barrels on 
which this net profit was earned. Due to rising domestic oil 
consumption and the increase in the royalty tax from 16% in 1973 
to 18.5% in December 1977, just 8.3m barrels of Texaco's 
production share of 28.9m barrels in 1979 was available for 
export, around half the level registered five years previously. 
Texaco's deliveries to the domestic refineries, on the other 
hand, totalled 13.3m barrels. By the end of 1980, Texaco's 
exports (depleted further by the judgement that it had overlifted 
4.3m barrels in 1977) had slumped to just 5.3m barrels, scarcely 
20% of the company's production share.
This would not have been such a problem if the crude delivered 
to the domestic refineries was paid for at international prices. 
If this had been the case, Texaco's deliveries to the domestic 
refineries would have generated pre-tax income of $508.3m in 
1980. However, with prices frozen at $1.48, Texaco received a 
mere $21. lm.
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The refusal to undertake secondary recovery work may also have 
reflected concern that the company might not be in Ecuador to 
enjoy the fruits of its investments. Aside from the perennial 
problem of low domestic prices and declining export volume, other 
issues had emerged which soured relations between Texaco and the 
Roldos government. On 30 July 1980, the Special Judge on 
Hydrocarbons, ex-Oil Minister C&rdenas ruled that Texaco had
indeed illegally lifted 4.3m barrels of crude in 1977 and that 
this should be returned to CEPE. The company responded by 
refusing to export its share of crude and threatened to cancel 
the payment for the excess exports that Semblantes had adjudged 
that Texaco had made in 1977, but which, due to constant legal 
wrangling, had still not been paid.1B The protest proved short­
lived: with oil prices moving to over $40 in the following month 
the conqpany dropped its export boycott and effectively accepted 
C&rdenas' ruling. 1G
The government's commitment to place operational control of the 
consortium in the hands of Petroamazonas posed greater problems. 
The new operating company was regarded by the government as 
essential to allow closer state supervision of the consortium's 
activities and ensure that Texaco complied with its investment 
obligations. However, after striving over the years to 
maintain its hegemonic position within the country's oil
industry, Texaco was ill-disposed to any measure which would
allow control of the consortium to pass to CEPE, which Texaco 
regarded as inefficient, amateurish and too political. In
Texaco's view, moreover, Petroamazonas was simply a 'trojan
horse' conceived in order to effect nationalisation 'through 
the back-door.'17
When talks on Petroamazonas had first taken place between D&valos 
and Texaco, the company stubbornly rejected any moves that would 
undermine its operational role. The government had demanded that 
CEPE should, as the majority partner, hold the majority of seats 
on the board of Petroamazonas. This proved unacceptable to 
Texaco, which demanded equal voting representation on a board
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chaired by Ren6 Bucaram. In the face of this impasse,
negotiations were soon brought to an end. Some observers 
suggested that D&valos himself had little interest in the 
project.10
Discussions were later reopened by Carvajal, though with little 
success. If the government was serious in reducing Texaco's
control of the consortium, only two options remained: to impose 
Petroamazonas unilaterally and thus risk Texaco's departure, or 
begin a process of full-scale nationalisation. Neither option 
held much attraction for the government, which was anxious to 
maintain its good relations with the United States and the 
international banking sector and improve Ecuador's image among 
potential oil investors.
Such a move would, in addition, threaten the government's semi­
reformist programme and its priority objective of consolidating 
the democratic process. As events in the 1970's highlighted, the 
domestic political and economic costs of a dispute with the 
company were likely to be high. CEPE itself, moreover, was not
yet a viable alternative to Texaco. It remained undercapitalised,
its operational efficiency was suspect and it lacked the 
knowledge and expertise to undertake either secondary recovery 
work or precretacic drilling.
There is some doubt as to whether Carvajal himself was 
particularly anxious for CEPE to assume control of the 
consortium. His prime concern was to expand CEPE's exploration 
work in areas exclusively reserved for the state and he had 
little interest in diverting any of the company's already 
limited technical and financial resources away from these areas. 
In any event, it was hardly realistic to expect CEPE to 
assume responsibility for operating the Texaco bloc and undertake 
an expensive programme of secondary recovery work while 
simultaneously undertaking a stepped-up exploration programme.
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There was little prospect of CEPE having any spare financial 
capacity in the near future. Indeed, political developments 
during the year were combining with growing economic pressure to 
undermine the position of the one individual most closely 
indentified with the establishment of a financially strong and 
independent state oil company.
The Dismissal of Carvai al
The restructuring of political forces after May 1980, and the 
further diminishment in Roldos ability to dictate on his own 
government policy or cabinet appointments, proved fatal for 
Carvajal. In the deals reached in May, there had been no formal 
pledges of support from conservative groups. No formal support 
either had been received from Izquierda Democratica, which 
continued to stress that it would treat each issue that came 
before Congress on its merits. Although ID sought no ministerial 
posts, other groups within the 'new majority' did expect a larger 
share of political power, in particular the five DP deputies 
and the 12 CFP-roldosistas. The problem facing Roldos was that 
these demands could only be met by removing other pro-government 
elements, most notably his close friends and 'independents'.The 
increasing influence of the DP posed a particular problem for 
Carvajal since the party held him responsible for the removal of 
D&valos in December. 19 The DP party was to play a central role in 
the campaign to undermine Carvajal's position at the state oil 
company.
Question-marks over Carvajal's managerial qualities were first 
raised following claims that one of CEPE's clients had nearly 
been allowed to sail with a free shipment of crude. On 23 
January and 9 May, CEPE had been authorised to make a spot sale 
to the Essex company of 1.1m barrels and 680,000 barrels 
respectively. However, as a result of oil price falls over the 
next few months, Essex obtained CEPE's permission to reduce the 
1.1m sale to just 394,168 barrels, with CEPE cashing the $500,000 
guarantee. Less than a month later, Essex 'repurchased' the
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remaining 720,000 barrels at a much lower price. On 21 June and 
29 June, two tankers chartered by Essex were loaded with 1.94m 
barrels of crude even though CEPE had not received any letters 
of credit. Hence the claim that Essex was on the point of 
sailing with a free load until the 'mistake' was discovered at 
the last minute.
Independent observers largely dismissed these claims, pointing
out that no sailing permits had been issued to the company. It 
was further noted that, given the shortage of storage facilities, 
it was common for tankers to be loaded prior to the delivery of 
letters of credit. On CEPE's marketing strategy generally, Weekly 
Analysis, which covered the Essex story extensively, found that 
the allegations of incompetence were largely unfounded:
'What counts is that the state corporation 
will set a viable marketing policy that will 
bring to the State the best possible return on 
the sale of its most treasured non-renewable
resource. At present, it seems that CEPE is
succeeding at that.'20
The campaign against Carvajal gathered force when C&rdenas was 
replaced in August by C6sar Robalino, a member of Democracia
Popular. He had earlier been under-Secretary to Oil Minister 
Salazar, whose criticisms of CEPE and calls for a rapprochment 
with Texaco had brought him into open conflict with military 
nationalists in 1975. Robalino's appointment now brought the Oil 
Ministry and CEPE into open and hostile conflict. Determined not 
to share the same fate as his party colleague Mauricio D&valos, 
Robalino sought from the outset to clip the wings of the CEPE 
manager and re-establish Oil Ministry dominance over key areas of 
oil policy. In his first statement to the press, Robalino 
pointedly remarked that it was the cabinet and the Oil Ministry 
that formulated oil policy. CEPE's role was simply to implement 
these policies.21
Robalino made little secret from the outset that he wanted 
Carvajal removed from office.22 Within two months, he had
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successfully engineered Carvajal*s removal. According to one 
former CEPE official, the Oil Minister, irked by Carvajal*s 
continued habit of reporting direct to Roldos rather than to 
himself:
'informed Hurtado that, unless Carvajal was
removed, he would hand in his resignation. '23
Under pressure from the DP and his vice-president, Roldos 
dismissed Carvajal in October and replaced him with his private 
secretary Javier Vidal Maspon on 31 October 1980.
A mix of factors led to Carvajal*s removal. There were rumours 
that his close relationship with Roldos had turned sour, though 
how true this was is difficult to ascertain.2'* Robalino himself, 
when asked to explain Carvajal*s dismissal, merely suggested that 
'mi queridisimo amigo Pepe Carvajal' had 'lost the confidence' of 
the president.23 Even if this claim lacked substance, it is 
difficult to imagine a different conclusion to the conflict 
between Robalino and Carvajal. As a result of developments in 
May, the DP had managed to accumulate an impressive degree of 
political influence both in the cabinet and on the CEPE Board. 
Indeed, with the exception of the military representative, all of 
the Boards members were from the DP. Lacking any real autonomy 
in respect of cabinet and other appointments and anxious to avoid 
antagonising the DP and Hurtado, Roldos had little option but to 
dispense with Carvajal's services.
Personalities, revenge and conflict over bureaucratic turf were 
central to the dispute between Robalino and Carvajal. There were, 
however, a number of major policy differences between the two 
men. As was noted earlier, Carvajal had been in dispute with the 
Oil Ministry over the level of daily output in the consortium's 
fields. While Carvajal had called for output to be increased to 
220,000 b/d - primarily as a means to increase exports, reduce 
the budget deficit and provide additional finances for CEPE - 
this had been consistently rejected by the Oil Ministry. Robalino
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echoed DGH claims that output could barely be kept at the current 
level of 204,000 b/d without damaging the older oil structures.28
The two men also held differing views on the extent of the crisis 
facing the oil industry and CEPE's capacity to solve it without 
the collaboration of foreign oil companies. Even before Robalino 
became Oil Minister, the political and economic environment and 
the mood of optimism surrounding CEPE’s ability to boost the 
country's oil reserves had changed dramatically. CEPE's 
'successes' were being called into question, with suspicions 
growing that Carvajal was deliberately exaggerating the 
significance of CEPE's oil discoveries. This concern mounted when 
Carvajal described the discovery of the Pungarayacu field close 
to Tena as 'spectacular', claiming that this field alone could 
increase reserves by 136% to over 3 bn barrels.27 This provoked 
an outcry, with opponents dismissing Pungarayacu as 'a myth'.28 
Despite Carvajal's repeated condemnation of CEPE's past practice 
of unplugging wildcats previously discovered by foreign 
companies, there were indeed suspicions that this was just 
another 'political well':
'the heavy oil deposits concerned have been 
known to exist for more than 100 years. Shell 
carried out exploratory drillings at the site 
some time ago, and decided that the quality of 
, oil was such that exploitation of the deposits 
would not be worthwhile for many years.'23
Robalino's own view was that Carvajal was deliberately 
distorting the country's oil situation in order to block attempts 
to bring foreign companies into the exploration play.
For Carvajal's supporters within CEPE, the issue of foreign oil 
investment was central to the dispute between the two men. After 
his dismissal, CEPE officials issued a series of press statements 
claiming that a campaign had been orchestrated by domestic 
pressure groups and multinational companies to 'discredit CEPE's 
activities' and 'secure the dismissal of Carvajal.'30 CEPE's 
deputy head of Production Oscar G&rzon, one of over 100 CEPE
officials to resign in protest at Carjal's dismissal (others 
included Jorge Salazar, deputy head of Human Resources and Vilson 
Phstor, deputy head of Planning) was convinced that Carvajal's 
dismissal was part of a wider campaign to minimise CEPE's 
achievements in order to create a political environment more 
supportive of measures to attract foreign oil companies back to 
Ecuador.31
Carvajal himself rejected as 'a cheap fabrication' suggestions 
that his dismissal was the result of differences over production 
policy.32 He was convinced that his dismissal was part of an 
attempt to gain control of CEPE by the DP, with the support of 
'certain business interests and voracious transnationals' who 
'viewed with relish the multiple contracts worth up to S/50,000m 
($1.1 bn) that CEPE would be negotiating over the next few 
years.'33 This claim followed rumours that a number of projects 
earmarked for CEPE, including construction of a lubricants 
plant, a petrochemical complex in Santa Elena and a fertilizer 
plant close to Posorja, were to be undertaken by foreign
companies. These groups, Carvajal claimed, regarded his removal 
as essential in order to 'open up' the exploration sector to
foreign companies and make available certain areas that had 
previously been exclusively reserved for CEPE. Carvajal referred 
in particular to Blocks 15 and 17 and the Gulf of Guayaquil.
Developments following his departure appeared to confirm 
Carvajal's suspicions. Once Robalino was firmly established at
the Oil Ministry, he switched attention away from CEPE's 
exploration 'successes' and focused instead on the critical 
nature of the country's oil crisis and the urgent need to 
revitalise foreign exploration activity. The development of a
'crisis' atmosphere was seen as essential to bring the issue of
foreign oil investment onto the forefront of the political 
agenda. Vith the primary interest of Congress focused on
political exercises, little interest or attention had been paid
to the issue. In these circumstances, no steps had been taken to
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draw up the regulations required to cover the award of contracts 
of hydrocarbon operations.
Robalino also recognised that high oil prices and the string of 
discoveries announced by CEPE were hardly the conditions that 
would induce a sense of urgency among the political elites.3* 
Although insufficient to reverse the downward trend in the 
economy, the oil price hikes had provided sufficient financial 
resources to enable Congress to satisfy the demands of their 
local constituencies through salary and wage hikes, extensive 
public works projects in the regions and all manner of incentives 
for employers.3e With Carvajal claiming that the country's oil 
reserves were close to 3 bn barrels, the financial resources to 
fund patronage politics appeared assured.
Domestic factors were not the only obstacle facing Robalino*s 
attempts to bring oil companies back to the exploration play. As 
the following chapter will show, there was no certainty that oil 
companies would actually wish to invest in Ecuador.
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CHAPTER 7: OIL CQXPAJTY PERCEPT I PITS QP ECUADOR
A developing country's need for foreign oil capital will 
typically be greater than the priority assigned by oil companies 
to investing in that country. This is partly due to the nature 
of the oil industry itself. Given the capital constraints that 
most are forced to operate under, and risks and costs inherent 
in exploration, oil companies must of necessity be highly 
selective and cautious in their allocation of exploration 
capital. This need has been reinforced by developments in the 
oil industry over the last twenty years. With most of the 
'easily discoverable' reserves now found, the risks and costs 
attached to exploration have risen considerably. Companies have 
increasingly been required to explore for oil in remote areas, at 
great depth, onshore or offshore, and in geological formations 
and physical environments which require highly sophisticated and 
expensive technology.
The Competitive Environment.
Companies were required to be highly selective for another 
reason: most have available to them more exploration
opportunities than they can possibly avail themselves of. By the 
end of the 1970's, Ecuador was simply one of a number of 
developing countries seeking to attract foreign oil capital and 
expertise. Concern over the lack of, or depletion in, oil 
reserves; the increasing scarcity of economic resources; 
disappointing geology; the technical and financial limitations of 
the state oil company; and the risks and costs inherent in 
exploration - these factors had combined with political 
developments specific to each country to cause a general shift 
towards a more neo-liberal approach to the issue of foreign oil 
investment. In Latin America itself, a succession of countries 
either abandoned nationalist oil policies or dismantled long 
established state monopolies of the upstream sector in a bid to 
attract foreign investment.
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Ecuador was not simply in competition for foreign capital and 
expertise with other countries in Latin America and the Third 
World. It was also in competition with countries in the developed 
world, where most drilling activity has traditionally been 
concentrated. The United States alone accounted for 73% of the 
3.78m wells drilled in the period up to the end of 1981. A 
further 0.83m had been drilled in other developed countries, with 
just 0.2m wells having been drilled in the developing countries.1
A number of factors have accounted for the limited exploration 
undertaken by oil companies in Latin America and developing
countries generally. Many countries had, for instance,
established state oil companies with monopoly or near monopoly 
rights over exploration and production. Interest in Latin America
was further diminished in the 1950's and 1960*s with oil company
attention focused on the Middle East, where huge quantities of 
oil reserves had been found, capable of sustaining world demand 
for several decades into the future.
The Oil Potential of Africa
Company perceptions of Latin America's oil potential may also 
have accounted for the 'marginalisation* of the region in terms 
of global oil company exploration activity. All else being equal, 
it is clearly more logical for an oil company to direct its 
exploration activities towards areas that are believed to 
contain the largest quantities of undiscovered oil reserves. 
However, given the various methods used to evaluate the oil 
reserve potential of a particular area, estimates can vary 
widely. The oil potential of Latin America, in particular, has 
long been a source of dispute. In 1976, Dr B F Grossling of the 
United States Geological Service, placed Latin America's reserve 
potential at between 490 bn to 1,225 bn barrels, while other 
sources estimated a reserve potential of 620 bn barrels.2
Oil company assessments of the region's oil potential have 
generally been less optimistic. According to Odell, they had
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'largely written Latin America off as a habitat for future oil 
reserves on a large scale1 , with company estimates allocating 
Latin America between 7te and 12%, that is between 150 bn and 240 
bn barrels, of the world's 2,000 bn barrels of ultimately 
recoverable oil reserves.3
More recent company estimates have reaffirmed that, by world 
standards, Latin America's reserve potential is limited. 
According to Conoco, around 800 billion barrels of oil reserves 
are still waiting to be found, with 33% of these situated in the 
Middle East and a further 21% in the USSR. Latin America was 
thought to hold around 5% or 40 bn barrels. This proportion was 
the same as China, higher than South-East Asia (3%), Greater 
India (1%) and Australia (1%) but lower than North America (9%), 
Western Europe (8%), Africa <8%) and Central America (6%).A
The Oil Market Revolution of the 1970's
Events in the 1970's, when companies were either nationalised or 
forced to accept tougher contractual terms, served to further 
reduce the attractiveness of investing in Latin America. There 
was, in general, an increased reluctance to invest in what can 
loosely be termed 'politically difficult' areas:
' the very success of the OPEC countries in 
breaking the power of the major oil companies 
and their parent governments increased the 
difficulties of attracting such foreign 
investment.. there was a marked reluctance by 
the companies to enter particular countries or 
at least to explore thoroughly if the initial 
indications were unfavourable. ' e
Henceforth, the political risk factor assumed increasing 
importance in influencing ail company investment decisions. It 
was no longer sufficient for a host government or company 
officials to assure management that the country had good 
hydrocarbons potential, that contractual terms were acceptable 
and that fiscal terms permitted an adequate rate of return. Oil 
companies now had to be convinced that the political environment
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was relatively stable and favourable and, more to the point, that 
the sanctity of contracts would be respected by the authorities. 
According to a vice-president of Conoco:
’Economic and political considerations are now 
a more significant factor in evaluating 
exploration opportunities. Not only must we 
discover hydrocarbons, we must be able to 
develop and produce them at a profit over the 
longer term. Therefore, the explorationist 
needs the confidence that the terms applying 
today will remain favourable during the life 
of the contract. Rapid, unexpected changes in 
contract terms - much too common today - are 
one of the biggest concerns of the industry.'6
Some oil companies did continue to invest in Latin America and 
Third World countries. Nevertheless, it can generally be said 
that the oil market revolution and the resulting reluctance to 
invest in 'politically difficult' areas, led oil companies to 
redivert their exploration capital to their countries of origin 
and to developed countries generally.
Changes to tax legislation served to increase the reluctance of 
US companies to invest overseas. In this respect, Philip cites 
amendments to the petroleum tax system in 1975 which prevented US 
companies from writing off the costs of foreign exploration and 
development against their US income, and an Internal Revenue 
Service ruling in 1977 that:
'crude-oil-sharing contracts with host 
governments did not involve payments of 
taxation and that these payments could not 
therefore be offset against taxation in the 
USA.17
The Emergence of New Areas for Investment
The marginalisation of Latin America in oil company exploration 
activity was reinforced in the 1970's by the emergence of new 
exploration opportunities in the developed countries. OPEC's 
policies of sudden, sizeable price increases in 1973-74 and 1979-
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80, provided the industrialised countries with the financial and 
political incentive to channel increasing amounts of exploration 
investment into 'new* areas outside of OPEC countries. These 
included high-cost production areas in Alaska and the North Sea. 
The enormous amounts of profit and cash flow generated by high 
oil prices could not only justify investment in rather hostile 
and otherwise unviable producing areas, but also guarantee a 
speedy recovery of the large capital outlay.
For a variety of reasons, therefore, private oil investment in 
the 1970’s retreated to countries like the United States, Norway, 
Alaska and the United Kingdom, where geologically promising areas 
were known to exist and where the political risk was perceived to 
be minimal. The extent to which foreign oil investment continued 
to be concentrated in the developed countries at the very time 
that Ecuador was seeking investment was shown in a report issued 
by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). This found 
that almost 80% of oil company exploration expenditure in 1981 
had been sunk in the developed countries: over $64 bn, compared
with $18 bn in the developing countries. Out of a global total of
20.800 wells drilled in 1981, almost 19,000 were in the developed 
countries, with 18,300 of these in North America alone, and just
1.800 in the developing countries.8
Oil Company Activity in bat-in Amprina
Ecuador did not escape from the effect of these changes in oil
company investment strategy. The one consolation for Ecuadorian
officials, however, was that companies did not completely write­
off Latin America. Even Peru and Bolivia successfully attracted 
investment, despite having undertaken expropriations just a few 
years previously. The Velasco government, for instance,
persuaded a number of oil companies to explore in the Amazonia 
region on the basis of crude-sharing contracts. Interest,
however, waned as a result of disappointing drilling results and 
the US tax amendments in 1975. Although oil companies recognised 
that 'there's oil in the jungle1, few if any companies were
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inclined to explore there 'unless the government comes up with 
much, much more in the way of incentives.'9
Nevertheless, Peru's later experiences do highlight how company 
interest in a marginal exploration play can be revitalised if 
sufficiently attractive terms are offered. Although some steps 
were immediately taken to offer companies a more flexible method 
of payment, the key change occurred with Law 23231 in July 1980. 
This granted companies a tax credit for reinvestments in 
exploration and/or development work equivalent to 40-50% of total 
pre-tax profits. As a result, oil company interest was reawakened 
and three risk contracts signed in early 1982.
Other countries in the region also secured oil company 
collaboration in the exploration sector. In Brazil, attempts to 
lure the foreign private sector back to the country's exploration 
play on the basis of the 'risk' contract system began in 1975. 
Over the next 13 years, nearly all of the country's sedimentary 
basins not already earmarked for Petrobr&s were opened up in a 
succession of bidding rounds and numerous contracts awarded.10 
Similarly, during the Videla government in Argentina, a number 
of companies entered the country following the dismantlement of 
nationalist policies.11 Companies were also active in Colombia 
were they operated under association contracts which involved a 
50-50 production split.12
Oil Company Perceptions of Ecuador
The shift in company investment strategy, the increased 
reluctance to invest in countries deemed 'politically difficult', 
and the intense competition for foreign capital did pose problems 
for Ecuador. These were not, however, insurmountable, as the 
continued activity of some companies in Latin America indicated. 
Ecuador did have some advantages. The exploration results of 
those companies that had entered other Latin American countries 
in the 1970's had generally proved disappointing. Of the 17
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contracts signed in Bolivia, just two were in force by 1979 and 
only one company - Occidental - was producing crude. Similarly in 
Brazil, no oil had been found by the end of 1980.
The Geological Attractiveness of Ecuador
Ecuador also had the advantage of being located in a proven oil 
province, with company estimates placing the country's total 
undiscovered oil reserves at the bottom end of the 3 to 15 
billion barrel range. Nevertheless, there were 30 other 
countries in the world, including Brazil and Argentina, which, in 
terms of oil potential, offered more attractive exploration plays 
for oil investors.13
Ecuador was not therefore a priority investment target for oil 
companies. This judgement was reinforced by the knowledge that 
those companies that had followed Texaco-Gulf into the Oriente 
had, with one exception, all failed to find commercial quantities 
of oil. Although the rate of success in exploration work in the 
late 1960's had been one of the highest in the world, averaging 
around 90%, it had been highly irregular thereafter, falling to 
an annual average of 35% in the period 1972-79.1A
Table 7. 1: The Rate of Success in Exploration Work 1967-79
1967 100% 1975 33%
1968 - 1976 -
1969 96% 1977 40%
1970 70% 1978 26%
1971 33% 1979 38%
1972 36% 1980 100%
1973 50% 1981 -
1974 26%
Source: Ing Javier Espinosa Ter&n, La Objetivo Dimension del
Problema Central de la Politica Petrolera Nacional, in La
Estrategia Frente a La Crisis Petrolera Internaclonal,
(International Oil Symposium, 26-27 August 1986), p 19.
Not only had the rate of success been irregular, but the
discoveries that had been made in the 1970's and 1980 suggested 
that any new oil reserves waiting to be found were unlikely to
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be situated in large reservoirs. It was likely that they would be
distributed in small and medium sized fields, at greater depth
and containing heavier forms of crude than that currently being 
exploited in the Oriente.
The geological attractiveness of Ecuador was further reduced by 
the knowledge that the Roldos administration had reserved for 
CEPE (and in 1973, Texaco had reserved for itself) the least 
risky and thus most prospective areas. While Carvajal was head of 
CEPE, these referred principally to areas in the Hororiente, the 
Suroriente, the Santa Elena peninsula and the Gulf of Guayaquil. 
Foreign risk capital and technology, on the other hand, was to 
be confined to areas of high risk and cost or to areas requiring 
highly sophisticated and expensive equipment. As a result of the 
extensive exploration work that had been undertaken over the 
preceding 50 years, there were few areas in Ecuador for which 
seismic and other information did not exist. Without access to
some of the more prospective areas, for instance Blocks 15 and 17
in the Suroriente, and the Gulf of Guayaquil, it was unlikely 
that companies would accept an invitation to explore in the 
country.1s
The Acquisition rnnmpiyt.
For a number of reasons, companies did not believe that the 
economic rewards currently available for investors in Ecuador 
were sufficiently attractive to justify investment. Particular 
concern was expressed at the 87.31% tax rate, which compared 
unfavourably with the levels established in other countries, and 
the government's policy of maintaining non-market based prices 
for domestic oil products and deliveries to the refineries.16 
There was also a general disatisfaction with the terms of the 
contract model on offer.
The Roldos government had initially envisaged that companies 
would be invited to Ecuador on the basis of the contract of 
hydrocarbon operations drawn up in 1978 by the military junta.
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With, the return to civilian rule scheduled for August 1979, there 
had been no real expectation when this new contract model was 
introduced that interested companies would enter into serious 
negotiations until the political complexion of the new government 
had become clear.
A few months after the Roldos government had taken office and 
announced its intention to attract foreign oil investment, the 
International Herald Tribune reported that:
’a number of foreign oil executives have been 
in and out of Quito in the past few months, 
indicating that the government may be drawing 
some of them back into exploration.117
Such optimistic claims were misplaced. Indeed, in the meetings 
referred to by the Tribune, the government had been left in no 
doubt that unless more substantial incentives were offered, and 
until investors were convinced that the sanctity of contracts 
would be respected, no investment would be forthcoming.
Although nationalists in Ecuador had severely criticised the new 
contract form as over-generous, the response of the oil companies 
was, at best, lukewarm, while the specialist oil magazine ’World 
Oil' even went so far as to claim in 1978 that:
'the new petroleum law is nothing more than 
the same old hodge-podge of amendments to 
Decree 1459. Although this is a very complex 
document, its meaning is clear. No matter what 
the Junta and the petroleum minister say,
there is a strong feeling within CEPE and in 
the Ministry that foreign oil companies should 
be given their walking papers.',e
There were a number of elements in the contract model which, 
when set against the contractual terms offered elsewhere, 
concerned potential investors. As well as having to invest at
least 10% of their net profits in Ecuador, either in their own
businesses or those connected with other hydrocarbons activities, 
companies were required to pay yearly to the state after the
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start of the exploitation period an amount 'which shall depend on 
the production of the contract area' to fund energy research. 
Within six months after the start of operations, companies had to 
ensure that at least 95% of labourers, 90% of administrative 
staff and 75% of technical staff were native Ecuadorians. Concern 
too was expressed at the clause stipulating that a company which 
had entered into a contract for the exploration and exploitation 
of crude oil had no rights to any natural gas discovered. 
Additional contracts for the exploitation of gas could be signed, 
though only if the contractor had discovered what the law vaguely 
termed as 'commercially exploitable' fields.19
It is passible that the failure of the military junta to 
establish competitive contractual terms resulted from its own 
political weakness and the continued influence of military 
nationalists. Despite its bold talk, the military proved 
unwilling to accept the political and pyschological risks that 
could accompany any sharp break with the country's nationalist 
past. According to Weekly Analysis:
'Changes in oil policy which were too drastic 
could lead to attacks on the government from 
the left and nationalists who felt a sell-out 
had taken place. It was therefore necessary 
for Semblantes to preserve the present measure 
of control over the oil industry and 
participation in profits which were the 
plusses of the 'nationalistic* policy followed 
by his two predecessors.120
On the other hand, in a number of respects the contract terms 
had been substantially liberalised: companies were exempt from
the payment of royalties, surface duties and entrance fees and 
were no longer obliged to return equipment, machinery and 
installations. Moreover, the new contract decreed that the 
contractor would be paid in oil, not cash. It is difficult to 
find here any concern about provoking a nationalist 'backlash.' 
It is possible, then, that the military junta simply under­
estimated the increasingly competitive environment for foreign 
capital and expertise and the resulting need for Ecuador to at
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least match the incentives being offered elsewhere. After all, 
just a few years earlier a number of companies had signed 
contracts to operate in Ecuador under terms far more onerous than 
those which were currently on offer.
The Political Risk Factor
While World Oil may have undervalued the contractual changes that 
had taken place, the tone and content of its comments does 
highlight the concern among oil companies regarding Ecuador's 
recent history of acrimonious relations with foreign oil 
investors. According to a report in the Financial Times, 
companies claimed that previous governments had been 'too
haphazard and carefree' in setting and enforcing the conditions 
under which companies operated.21
Assessments of the political risks attached to investing in a 
particular country often vary from company to company. Some 
companies, for instance, were initially willing to renegotiate
their contracts with the Rodriguez Lara, while two - YPF and
Northwest - signed contracts in 1975 as most of the remaining 
companies in Ecuador left the country.Despite these exceptions, a 
general consensus did emerge that Ecuador was too politically 
risky to justify investment in what was, in any case, a marginal 
exploration play. There was, as chapter 2 highlighted, a wealth 
of evidence on which to base this view. The revision in contract 
terms, legal squabbles, the conflict between the state and
Texaco-Gulf and Gulf's call for its own nationalisation made 
Ecuador virtually a no-go area for foreign companies. What 
particularly puzzled potential investors was that, even when the 
country's nationalist oil policies were being dismantled in a bid 
to stimulate foreign investment, official treatment of companies 
operating in the country was at best inconsistent and unreliable, 
at worst downright antagonistic. Such, in the minds of potential 
investors, appeared to be the case in respect of the government's 
treatment of the Northwest company.
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The company proved reluctant to implement its work programme. 
Initially, Northwest claimed that the seismic data was difficult 
to interpret and, then, that it was finding it difficult to 
obtain the necessary rigs. A more likely reason for the delay 
was the ADA consortium’s continued claims over the concession 
area and its threat to intitiate legal action against Northwest. 
There were also strong economic reasons explaining the 
company's inactivity. The original plan had been for an ammonia 
and urea plant to be built to process gas from the contract area
into fertilizer. However, the subsequent collapse in the world
price of fertilizer made the project in Northwest's view 
unprofitable. The government nevertheless remained firmly 
committed to using the gas to develop the country's fertilizer 
industry. In these circumstances, Northwest, claiming that its 
contract permitted it to cease operations if they became 
uneconomic, suspended all drilling and exploration work.22 The 
dispute continued into late 1979, when CEPE eventually rescinded 
the contract, assumed all exploitation and drilling rights and 
took over the company's drilling equipment, machinery and 
vehicles. Following this decision - taken just a few months after 
the implementation of reforms to the country's Oil Law - Business 
Latin America commented that:
'the government's handling of the Northwest 
dispute is a discouraging reminder to all 
companies of the contrariness that can
sometimes surface in Ecuadorian policy-making, 
particularly where natural resources are
concerned. '23
This 'contrariness' was experienced at first hand by one oil 
major. A company official recounted how, after receiving an 
encouraging visit from one Oil Minister, a team of officials was 
sent to Quito at the Minister's request to study in detail the 
opportunities for investment. From the reception that the team 
received on its arrival, it was clear that the company was not 
welcome. The company official concerned was convinced that the 
Oil Minister had been soundly rebuked on his return to Ecuador, 
most probably by CEPE, and told that no further talks should take
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place.2,4 Humiliation of this order was not easily forgotten by 
the company concerned.
Improving the Investment Climate for Investors
It could be expected, therefore, that the government could face 
major problems in securing foreign oil capital. These problems 
could, however, be considerably eased by the government offering 
more geologically attractive areas and offering more attractive 
economic rewards and contractual terms that were at least as 
favourable as those existing elsewhere. If the government was 
serious in its intention to secure foreign investment, then there 
was no other option available but to significantly improve the 
investment climate for companies. Equally importantly, Robalino 
and the government had to convince potential investors that 
Ecuador was no longer a politically risky country to deal with 
and that the sanctity of any contract signed would be respected.
CHAPTER 8: THE PROPOSED OIL REFORMS OF 1981
Before turning his attention to the task of bringing foreign 
companies back into the exploration play, Robalino's first 
priority was to persuade Texaco to undertake a programme of 
secondary recovery work. Even if the swift return of foreign 
oil companies was achieved it was evident, given the time-lags 
involved in exploration, that the state would remain dependent 
on the oil revenue generated from the consortium's fields.
The 1980 Agreement with Texaco
Discussions between Robalino and the company began on 3 October. 
Three weeks later, Texaco was reported to have agreed to 
undertake secondary recovery and maintenance work. The 36 month 
programme was expected to increase recoverable reserves by 350m 
barrels. 1 Why Robalino had more apparent success in obtaining an 
agreement with Texaco is unclear. His version was that Texaco had 
been given the option of undertaking investment or selling its 
37.5% shareholding to the state2, though no independent evidence 
was found to confirm this. For reasons which were outlined 
earlier, it seems doubtful that the government would have 
seriously entertained the idea of expelling Texaco or risk 
provoking its departure. Given suggestions by Carvajal and 
nationalists that he was a 'good friend' or 'tool' of the oil 
multinationals, he may have been anxious to 'prove' otherwise by 
making such a claim.
Texaco was not averse to reneging on commitments to invest (none 
of the investment that it had promised to undertake in the 1977 
agreement had been carried out), but in this instance the 
agreement was eventually implemented.3 Why then the sudden change 
of heart? There appear to have been three reasons. One relates to 
the oil price hikes. There was evidence early in 1980 that these 
had served to renew the companies interest in a number of fields 
that it had discovered in the early 1970's, but whose development
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had not been considered commercial. Under the new market 
conditions, Texaco was now anxious to undertake development work, 
particularly in the Cononaco field which was thought to contain 
137m barrels. However, since the company had failed to develop 
these fields within five years of the discovery date, ownership 
had reverted to the state in line with article 43 of the Oil Law. 
Despite repeated efforts by the DGH and the Oil Ministry 
throughout 1980, no legal 'loophole' could be found to transfer 
ownership of the fields back to Texaco.*
In view of the role played by the level of oil prices in 
undermining Texaco's previous reluctance to undertake investment, 
the timing of the agreement at the end of October may, therefore, 
be significant. Just a few weeks previously, oil prices had 
received an unexpected boost with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq 
war. Despite attempts by Saudi Arabia to compensate for the 
expected shortfall in supplies by boosting production by 800,000 
b/d, fears remained regarding the vulnerability of export supply 
routes in the Gulf. These fears led consumers to initiate a 
massive stockpiling programme 'of such magnitude as has not been 
contemplated in the history of the market.. 's By December, oil 
prices had moved beyond $40.
The importance of the new market conditions on Texaco's 
investment strategy was further reflected by the company's 
hesitation in implementing the agreed programme when prices began 
to soften in the first few months of 1981. Nevertheless, the fact 
that the programme was eventually implemented, and that further 
work programmes were also carried out even when prices went into 
virtual free-fall, indicates that non-price factors may also 
have led to Texaco ending its investment boycott. In this 
respect, the most crucial factor was that the company's contract 
expired in June 1992. During the 1970's, Texaco could afford to 
maintain a boycott on investment, either in the hope of obtaining 
further improvements to its operating conditions, or until more 
favourable market conditions emerged. On the other hand, Texaco's 
own estimates suggested that over 500m worth of reserves could be
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extracted using secondary recovery methods. It would be 
surprising if Texaco was prepared to depart from the country 
leaving these reserves intact. In these circumstances, it was 
only a matter of time before Texaco itself dropped its previous 
reluctance to undertake secondary recovery work and sought to 
extract as many barrels as possible prior to 1992. The start of 
secondary recovery work could not be delayed into the late 
1980's, since there was a danger that it would not be in the 
country to reap the fruits of its investment. The most 
appropriate period would therefore be in the early part of the 
decade. It seems likely that the sharp rise in oil prices, and 
the need to ensure that as many barrels as possible were
extracted before 1992, encouraged the company to opt for 1981 
(when the investment programme was to begin) rather than 1982 or 
1983.
Texaco's agreement to undertake secondary recovery is unlikely to 
have been unconditional. The company would have sought assurances 
on a number of outstanding issues, for instance domestic oil 
prices (which were increased in 1981, 1982 and 1983), the price
received for each barrel delivered to the refineries (also
substantially increased in 1982, 1983 and 1984) and production
levels (which were also increased after 1980). Texaco would also 
have required a guarantee that the proposal for establishing
Petroamazonas was removed from the agenda and that no other 
proposals would emerge which could undermine the company's role 
as operator. Certainly, little was heard again of Petroamazonas. 
Vhen asked after the agreement if the joint operating company 
was to be established, Robalino was reported to be ' non- 
commital' on the issue.G Vith the progress of time, it became 
clear that the government had completely abandoned the idea of 
establishing a joint-operating company or of installing CEPE as 
operator.
Following his agreement with Texaco, Robalino turned his 
attention to the issue of foreign oil investment. Vith the oil 
companies having voiced their criticisms of the contract of
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hydrocarbon operations, the principal task was to draw up new 
contractual terms. However, even assuming that this could be 
achieved quickly - the initial deadline was the end of October - 
it was by no means certain that these would receive either the 
attention or support of a Congress locked in constant dispute 
with the Roldos government. A further problem facing Robalino 
was the ‘mood of optimism* generated by Carvajal and the hike in 
oil prices. The Oil Minister saw it as essential to create an 
atmosphere of 'crisis' in order to create a political environment 
more receptive to proposals to reform the country's oil 
regulations.
The Economy and the External Debt
Robalino was helped in this respect by developments in the 
domestic and international economy. Vith the boost in oil prices 
in the last quarter of the year, CEPE's average oil price for 
1980 reached $35.26. This was $12 more than in 1979, and helped 
crude export revenue to rise by 24% to $781.3m despite the 
exportable surplus falling by 16% to 33.4m barrels, the lowest 
recorded level since 1972. The average oil price, however, was 
still $2.50 pb short of the level on which government revenue 
projections had been based. Vith no measures taken to mobilise 
non-oil income sources, and with non-oil export revenue falling 
by 10%, the current account deficit rose to $360m, the public 
sector deficit to $221.7m and the state budget deficit to $93m. 
To finance these, the government contracted $617.9m worth of 
external loans, equal to one third of the total debt at the end 
of the year.
The use of extensive borrowing was to some extent understandable 
when loans were cheap, but the costs were rising dramatically in 
1980. In response to the US government's tight monetary policies, 
the nominal LIBOR rate topped 14%, while the US prime rate 
exceeded 15%. Finance available for public investment, already 
diminished by the explosion in current expenditiure, fell 
further with interest payments on the debt rising from $196. 8m to
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$286.2m. Total debt-service payments amounted to $789.9m, 
equivalent to 55% of export revenue. In respect of the state 
budget, one-fifth of total expenditure was required to service 
its debt.
The Impact of the November Decrees
CEPE's financial position was seriously undermined during the 
year, with the implementation of the decrees passed during the 
last days of the military junta and the imposition of the price 
ceilings introduced by Congress in November 1979. As table 8. 1 
shows, high oil prices had brought a dramatic boost to public 
sector oil income, which increased by 22.6% to $753.7m.
Table 8.1: Oil Income by Source. 1979-80 <$)
1979 1980 % Change
CEPE's Exports 271. 4 333. 4 +22. 8
Fuel Oil Exports 89.2 100. 2 + 12. 3
Income Tax 85.6 81.5 - 4.7
Royalties 157. 1 223. 8 +42. 4
Overliftings 4.3 - -
Superficiary Rights 1.4 1. 1
000 
CM1
Other 10.5 13. 7 +30.5
Total 619. 5 753. 7 +21.6
Source: Ministry of Finance, Estadfstlca de Ingresos Petroleros,
1978-83, (Quito, June! 1984), p 10.
Due to the decrees passed in 1979, the benefits of this
increased oil income were accrued almost entirely by the state
budget to meet current expenditure programmes. Overall its oil 
income jumped by 155.6% to $251.4m. The state budget's share of 
crude export income doubled to 46. 1%, its share of fuel oil 
export income increased from 17.1% to 29.8% and it gained access 
to one-fifth of royalty income. The councils, meanwhile, 
received 25% of Texaco's tax payment and a similar proportion of 
fuel oil export income. The military's share of oil income also 
increased substantially, by 20.5%, to $164.8m. It received 17.4% 
of CEPE's crude export income, 22.7% of Texaco's income tax and 
39.5% of royalty income. In all, just over one-fifth of the
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country's oil income was directed into the coffers of the armed 
forces.
Aside from CEPE, the main loser of the decrees was BEDE, whose 
overall percentage share fell from 18.2% to 8.3%, while its 
actual oil revenue was almost halved from $112.8m to $62m. 
Projections for 1981 suggested that its oil income would be a 
mere $42.6m 'and shall dwindle thereafter'.7 Although INECEL's 
oil revenue rose by 12.6%, the decision to allocate 21% of 
royalty income to the state budget cost the company over $20m, 
equivalent to just over one-third of the company's budget 
deficit in 1980.
The decrees had a dramatic impact on CEPE's finances. Even 
though the country's oil income rose in real terms by a fifth, 
CEPE's public sector oil income fell by 19% from $146.9m to 
$108.9m. The company's share of fuel oil export income collapsed 
from 82.5% to 46% while its share of crude export income dropped 
from 24% to 18.5%. After having received 23.7% of the country's 
public sector oil income in 1979, CEPE's share by the end of 1980 
had slumped to 14.4%.
Table 8.2; Distribution of Oil Income. 1979-80 ($)
1979 1980 % Change
State Budget 98.4 251.4 +155.5
JDN 136.7 164.8 +20.5
BEDE 112.8 62. 0 -45. 0
CEPE 146.9 108.9 -25.8
IJTECEL 74.9 84.3 +12.6
Councils - 44.9 -
Other 49.8 37. 4 -24.9
Total 619.5 753.7 +21.6
Source: Ministry of Finance, Estadistica de Ingresos Petroleros, 
1978-83, (Quito, June 1984), p 10.
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CEPE's gross sales income increased during the year by over 20%, 
but the state's increased 'tax' take meant that net income rose
by just 5.9% to $379.6m. Operational costs, on the other hand,
rose by 30%: by the end of the year these were consuming 68% of 
CEPE's net income, with a further 10% of income used to service 
the company's $161.6m debt. Squeezed by the state on the one hand 
and rising costs on the other, CEPE's investments in 1980 fell 
from $60.4m to $56.lm, their lowest level since 1976. At the end 
of the year, CEPE's budget deficit had reached $35.4m, with CEPE 
officials forecasting that this would rise to $172.3m in 1981 and 
then to $224.2m in 1982, pushing the corporation into a state of
virtual bankruptcy. Revised estimates were then produced pointing
to CEPE having an accumulated budget deficit of between $784m to 
$897m between 1980-84.°
CEPE's Search for External Funding
During the year, CEPE made the first of a number of approaches to 
the World Bank for loans to fund exploration and development 
work in the Oriente and along the Santa Elena peninsula. Since 
extending its energy-lending activities to include upstream 
activities in 1974, a number of Latin American countries had 
successfully approached the World Bank for funds.® These included 
Petroperu and the Bolivian state oil company YPFB, which received 
$32m each for exploration drilling, as well Ecopetrol and 
Petrobr&s. CEPE proved less fortunate, with its request for a 
loan rejected on the grounds that it had failed to meet the 
Bank's required policy conditions. A loan would only be 
considered when a more realistic - that is, higher - domestic 
pricing structure for gasoline and other oil products had been 
introduced and when there was clear evidence that the country's 
spiralling external debt was being brought under control.10
The Bank's reluctance to respond positively to CEPE's request 
also reflected concern that the company's lack of investment was 
partly, if not largely, due to operational inefficiency. This 
concern was reinforced by the explosion in the CEPE's operational
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costs. In 1980, these had increased to $172.6m, equivalent to 
68% of total expenditure, and were the key factor causing 
investment to fall in real terms by 7%.11
Although CEPE officials argued that the rise in costs resulted 
from the company's work in the lororiente, World Bank officials 
pointed to CEPE's highly bureaucratic system of centralised 
control as the key factor.12 In a report issued in 1979, the Bank 
had called for major structural reforms to be introduced which 
were similar to those proposed by Carvajal. It was essential, the 
Bank stated:
'to increase the corporations independence 
from standard government administrative 
regulation. While CEPE is probably too 
important to be given complete budgetry 
autonomy, the system chosen should allow for 
rapid implementation of decisions.. ' 12
To improve the efficient operation of CEPE, the report continued, 
the company must be allowed to operate along commercial lines 
and to be managed by 'technically-competent administrators' 
rather than 'political appointees'.13 A loan was therefore 
conditional on the government implementing major reforms to the 
corporation's structure and improving its efficiency. Far from 
improving, however, evidence suggests that the constraints on 
CEPE's ability to function efficiently actually increased during 
the first year of the Roldos government.
lew Bureaucratic Constraints
With the attention of the political elites concentrated on more 
pressing political matters, and with the legislative function of 
Congress remaining in a state of virtual paralysis, no steps had 
been taken by the government to reform CEPE. Some internal 
organisational changes had been made by Carvajal which were 
designed to ensure closer coordination between departments. As a 
result, Martz claimed, CEPE had been administratively 
strengthened, with work, responsibility and authority reorganised
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in functional terms, 'while planning took on a coherence of 
procedures previously foreign to the corporation.'1A Tinkering 
with CEPE's internal structure, however, had little measurable 
impact on CEPE's efficient functioning. Carvajal himself 
implicitly admitted the irrelevancy of his own reforms a few 
years later, when he claimed it was ' impossible' to work in 
CEPE.1S
Indeed, there are grounds for believing that CEPE's efficiency 
declined still further with the transition to a civilian 
government. The principal problem, it appears, lay in the 
presence of an overbearing system of control in the shape of the 
Controller-General. By virtue of the 'Ley Organica de la 
Administracion Financiera de Control' he was required to oversee 
the use to which public funds are spent. Although this law had 
been passed in the mid-1970's, the military dominance of CEPE 
during this period had served to reduce the need (or desire) for 
a rigid external civilian system of control. The situation 
changed markedly with the transition to a civilian government, 
with the Controller- General assuming a central role in the 
operations of CEPE. As a result, managerial authority was further 
undermined, the decision-making process slowed to a ponderous 
crawl and morale among CEPE officials reduced to perhaps the 
lowest level in the company's history.
At any time, for whatever amount, officials at CEPE were required 
by the Controller-General to justify payments they had 
authorised. Even former CEPE officials who had left the company 
some years previously could be called on to explain decisions 
that they had taken. As one former official remarked, 'you were 
assumed to be a thief unless you could prove otherwise. ' 1G
While some safeguards were necessary to guard against the misuse 
of public funds, the system as it stood served to freeze through 
fear the ability or desire of management to personally take 
decisions. For those matters that could not be pushed to the 
bottom of the ' In' tray, it was a case of safety in numbers. When
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contracts were to be signed or requisitions for equipment drawn 
up, it was necessary for a CEPE official to ensure that his 
signature sat alongside around twenty others. According to one 
former management official:
1 Nobody wants to sign a contract unless they 
have at least twenty signatures so that they 
can protect themselves. Even after five years 
following the signing of the contract the 
officials of the Controller-General at CEPE 
can still come and ask you to justify it. If 
you wish to go by the book it is impossible 
for you to make any concrete decisions: it
would for instance take 6-12 months to obtain 
drilling equipment for a particular site. Many 
managers prefer to do nothing rather than to 
take the risk of being accused of criminal 
activities like corruption.'17
Carvajal claimed that the 'highly damaging' activities of the 
Controller General created a sense of 'paranoia' among CEPE 
employees.18 Newly appointed managers of CEPE, he remarked, are 
forced to pursue one of two options: either respect to the letter 
all the legal and bureaucratic rules and therefore paralyse 
CEPE's work, or 'work for the benefit of the country and CEPE' 
and ignore these regulations. Force of circumstances often led to 
the choice of the latter. Faced with a four day deadline, 
Carvajal took the decision to move a drilling rig from one 
location to another without waiting to receive the required 
authorisation from the Controller-General. Same 37 days after 
the rig had 'illegally' been moved and made operational the 
authorisation duly arrived.18
Vith CEPE's efficiency and morale already badly undermined by the 
resignation of over 100 skilled and motivated staff, the 
activities of the Controller-General served to compound the 
company's existing problems. Two former officials (both now 
employed with international oil companies) recalled that their 
decision to leave CEPE was directly related to their frustration 
with having to justify every decision they made to people who had 
little understanding of the complexities of the oil market. One
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recalled how he was regularly required to explain why he had sold 
crude at a lower price in one month than, for instance, six 
months earlier.20
The Gravity of the Oil Crisis
CEPE's financial problems and the absence of measures to reform 
its structure served to increase the logic of drawing in private 
investment. To facilitate this shift, Robalino strove to paint a 
bleak picture of Ecuador's oil situation and the capacity of CEPE 
to make any significant contribution to improving it. In contrast 
to the praise previously heaped on CEPE, Robalino emphasised that 
the company could only carry out a 'small* part of the 
exploration work required. Some successes had occurred, but these 
would only have a minor impact on reserves and production, since 
the traditional fields in the Oriente were already showing signs 
of exhaustion. There was also a danger that, in the absence of 
more substantial and sustained investment, these discoveries 
would be developed slowly at a rate sufficient only to meet 
growing domestic demand and would therefore have no measurable 
impact on export levels.
The change in mood was illustrated by a report from the Comision 
Asesora de Politica Petrolera (CAPP). This claimed that 
Ecuador's proven, recoverable reserves at the end of 1980 were a 
mere 767. lm barrels. This was less than half that claimed by 
Texaco and significantly lower even than the DGH's own estimates. 
The situation was not expected to improve over the next six 
years, with CAPP suggesting that CEPE could, at best, incorporate 
just 150m barrels into production. Assuming an annual growth rate 
in domestic consumption of 7% and a production rate equivalent to 
10% of reserves, Ecuador would become a net oil importer by the 
middle of 1986. CAPP felt that even this scenario (considered the 
most pessimistic yet most realistic), was itself over-optimistic 
since 17 of the 21 fields waiting to be incorporated belonged to 
CEPE. CAPP went so far as to question whether CEPE had the
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financial and administrative resources to incorporate all or a 
significant proportion of these fields between 1980-87.21
While emphasising that the oil situation was 'desperate' rather 
than 'potentially optimistic', concrete steps were taken by 
Robalino to revitalise private sector investment in exploration. 
The following section outlines the various options that were 
considered in the process leading up to Robalino's proposals to 
reform the 1978 Oil Law. Despite his determination to secure 
foreign participation in exploration, it was surprising how 
little, if any, attention was given to the terms being offered to 
companies elsewhere.
Qnvprmnpnt Proposals to Reform the 1978 Oil Law
There were three principal forms of contract under which foreign 
oil companies could operate in Ecuador: the contract of
association, the joint venture contract, and the contract of 
hydrocarbon operations. None of these were considered 
appropriate, either for constitutional or economic reasons, by 
the government. Under the association and joint venture 
contracts, the contractor exploited, along with its associate 
CEPE, a non-renewable resource and was entitled to receive an 
agreed share of any oil produced from the contract area. This 
contract form was therefore deemed to contravene article 46 of 
the Constitution which reserved the 'economic exploitation of 
non-renewable natural resources' exclusively to the state. It was 
further considered that, since CEPE contributed its rights over 
the land, wells, and hydrocarbons in the contract area, article 1 
of the Oil Law was also contravened. This stated that hydrocarbon 
fields and all the substances which they contain belong 'to the 
inalienable and imprescriptable patrimony of the State'.
There were a number of economic aspects of the association and 
joint venture contracts which the government found to be either 
irrelevant or unacceptable. The payment of surface duties and 
entrance fees, for instance, were considered to be an archaic
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left-over from the 'concession1 era and of little economic value 
to the state. Significantly, the key economic objection was that 
both contracts allowed the contractor to receive oil, not only as 
part of his legitimate share in production, but also as 
reimbursement for his investments. 22
The contract of hydrocarbon operations overcame many of the 
constitutional difficulties, since the contractor was simply an 
operator with no rights over the land, wells or hydrocarbons in 
the contract area. Although the contractor had access to the oil 
produced, this was in the form of a payment and was not based on 
a concept of 'participation' that implied that the state would 
only exercise partial ownership of the oil discovered. 
Nevertheless, the government was wholly opposed to placing CEPE 
under any obligation to deliver crude to the contractor, either 
as reimbursement for his investments or payment for his services. 
To do so would be 'damaging' to the national interest, in view of 
the high level of oil prices and the expanding domestic oil 
market.23
The Proposed Service Contract
Having rejected all existing contract forms, Robalino drew up a 
new type of risk contract. Under the 'service contract', the 
contractor would undertake at his own risk and expense and at the 
service of CEPE, the exploration and exploitation of 
hydrocarbons. Only in the event of commercially exploitable 
hydrocarbons being found would the contractor be reimbursed for 
his investments and costs and receive a service fee plus a 
'reasonable' profit. Crucially, the government decided that both 
payments would only be made in cash, not oil. The proposed 
contract did, however, allow the contractor a preferential right
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to buy all or part of the exportable surplus. This was, in the 
government's view, a key incentive for foreign oil companies:
'since oil extracting companies are normally 
also involved in marketing and refining for 
which they need to rely on secure supplies of 
crude oil.'
The contractor would not be liable to the payment of royalties, 
superficiary rights, entry fees, or surface duties. However, he 
would be liable to an annual payment of S/600,000 (equivalent to 
$13,453 in 1980) during the exploration period and S/1,500,000 
($33,632) during the exploitation period, for the use of water 
and natural materials in the contract area. The contractor would 
also be required to pay an annual allowance to the state to 
finance oil research work.
Oil Tax Reform Proposals
A new method of calculating company taxation was also proposed. 
Under decree 2059 of 19 December 1977, oil companies had been 
subject to a fixed income tax rate of 87.31%. However, the Roldos 
government took the view that, since any wells found in the 
Oriente were likely to be small or medium sized, it would be 
'very difficult' to declare the commerciality of these new fields 
if income tax continued to be fixed at a uniform rate.25 In 
addition, since a company would merely be operatoring on behalf 
of CEPE with no rights over the oil extracted, it would be wrong 
to maintain the 87.31% tax since this included export taxes, 
which assumed that the contractor had some ownership to the oil 
produced. The government proposed a new income tax system, with 
the rate varying in accordance with the volume of recoverable 
reserves. The tax level was to range from 48% for fields 
containing up to 100m barrels, up to a maximum of 89% for fields 
with over 1,500m barrels of reserves.25
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The government appeared confident that the new contract contained 
sufficient incentives to attract companies to Ecuador. According 
to Robalino, it:
'would provide greater flexibility within the 
country's legal framework for foreign
companies with a proven record to finance and 
conduct exploration onshore and off. US firms 
are going to learn that Ecuador is no longer a 
difficult country to deal with. Vhat matters
to foreign oil companies is net profits and we 
shall be competitive on that score.'27
At the time, Oil Ministry officials claimed that the rate of
return would be between 20 to 30%, 'comparable with the best of
similar operations in other parts of the world.'20
When the reform proposals were sent to Congress on 9 April, they 
were accompanied by the government's latest oil reserve 
estimates. Sot for the first time in Ecuadorian oil history, the 
level of oil reserves was manipulated for political ends. The 
government was now claiming that reserves had fallen by 43% 
between 1972 and 1980, from 1.5 bn barrels to just 650m and that 
Ecuador would be importing oil within six years. By 1987, Ecuador 
would have to import, at international prices, between 40-50,000 
b/d of oil derivatives to cover domestic demand, at a cost to the 
state of $770m on the basis of existing (1981) prices.
The Oil Minister also emphasised again that CEPE lacked the 
financial and technical capacity to undertake anything more than 
a fraction of the required exploration work, pointing out that a 
minimum of $25m would be required to explore in an onshore block 
and $50m in an offshore block.29
If Robalino had wanted the proposals to become law as swiftly as 
possible, his timing could not have been worse. Within one month, 
the country was mourning the death of Roldos, while the private 
sector was mobilising to undermine the authority of the new 
president and 'closet Marxist' Osvaldo Hurtado. For the rest of 
1981, the political climate ensured that little that required
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the approval of Congress had much chance of being debated, much 
less implemented. Contrary to the claims of some observers, 
therefore, the delays that were to take place in revising the 
country’s oil regulations did not result from an 'increasingly 
nationalistic1 Congress.30 Indeed, when Robalino*s proposals were 
eventually the subject of debate they were rejected for not being 
sufficiently attractive to potential investors.
The * Convergencia Democrat ica1
While the bitterness that had surrounded relations between Roldos 
and Congress had largely dissipated when Bucaram failed to be 
elected as president of Congress for the 1980-81 session, the 
process of government remained in a virtual state of paralysis. 
This resulted not only from Roldos' inability to forge a stable 
pro-government majority, but from the constant political 
manoeverings of groups on the centre-left, most notably 
Democracia Popular and Izquierda Democratica. Faced with 
continued pressure from the former for more ministerial 
positions, another major cabinet reshuffle was ordered just a few 
weeks after Robalino's reforms were presented to Congress. On 16 
May, Robalino was transferred to the Finance Ministry and 
replaced by his under-secretary at the Oil Ministry, Eduardo 
Ortega Gomez, who was closely linked to Democracia Papular.
The leader of Izquierda Democratica, Rodrigo Borja, had continued 
to oppose any explicit involvement with the government. However, 
some senior ID leaders, notably Raul Baca Carbo, believed that 
the chronic paralysis of Congress threatened the future of 
democracy itself and were pressing for closer cooperation with 
the government. This more 'collaborationist' stance was to 
prevail in the crisis atmosphere that followed Roldos' death and 
the installation of Hurtado as president.
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The response of the private sector to developments in May verged 
on near panic, with many businessmen convinced that Hurtado was:
'some sort of Christian Communist, secretly 
bent upon the destruction of private
enterprise and committed to irresponsible 
social spending.131
This view was reinforced when Hurtado successfully constructed a 
pro-government majority composed of the DP,ID, Roldosismo 
pecidistas and the PD. The ' Convergencia Democratica' provided 
the opportunity to undertake a number of reforms. In June, tax 
reform returned onto the political agenda. Claiming that only 
19% (132,307) of the country's total tax liable population had 
paid income tax in 1980, Hurtado stated that steps would be taken 
against those found guilty of tax evasion. Robalino later 
announced that legal action was being taken against 4,300 tax 
evaders and that a bill was before Congress imposing new taxes on 
the middle and upper class to finance public investment projects. 
The Agriculture Minister, meanwhile, proclaimed that a new 
agrarian code was being elaborated to change the structure of 
land tenancy. To add to the business community's discomfort, the 
government announced that import tariffs on 500 items.32
The response of the private sector was predictable. With 'reform' 
back on the agenda, the Chamber of Industry launched a major 
publicity campaign 'without precedent' against a 'socialistic' 
government which was seeking to 'eradicate' free enterprise and 
private property.33 Within Congress, the offensive was led by 
the standard bearer of the business community, Leon Febres 
Cordero, who called on the Minister of Government, Carlos Feraud, 
to appear before Congress on 10 September. He had, according to 
Febres Cordero, committed legal ' irregularities' when purchasing 
Christmas gifts for the families of policemen.
Feraud had never made any secret of the fact that short-cuts had 
been taken to ensure swift delivery of the gifts at a time when 
the police force was threatening to go on strike.34* Nevertheless,
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Febres Cordero successfully turned a minor scandal into a 'cause 
celebre' which forced the Minister to resign. This was due 
largely to the fact that, despite its reformist rhetoric, the 
' Convergencia':
'could not in the end overcome the fundamental 
differences between its members and the 
political imperatives to which they responded 
before whichever ideological consideration or 
extra-party programme36
The fragility of the alliance had been evident as early as June 
when the PCD block, without the backing of Hurtado's DP party or 
Izquierda Democratica, mustered sufficient support to elect 
Roldos' brother Leon to the vice-presidency. Strained from the 
outset, relations between the president and vice-president were 
later to collapse altogether, when Hurtado suggested publicly 
that Jaime Roldos' greatest fault had been his tendency to
appoint friends and relatives to jobs for which they were not 
competent. Roldos subsequently counter-charged that Hurtado had 
committed 'treason', by decorating Peruvian officers and
presenting a book to President Belaunde just one year after the 
border conflict between the two countries. This attempt to 
embarrass Hurtado, however, backfired:
' By focusing on the award of Ecuadorian 
decorations of the military attaches in Quito, 
he [Roldos] impugned the honour, not so much 
of the President, but of the Armed Forces,
which were responsible for the awards. This 
had the effect of pushing the President and 
the Armed Forces closer together.'36
By the end of January 1982, the PCD had withdrawn from the 
government, Roldos excluded from Cabinet meetings and his role 
as head of COMADE ' reduced to nothing' .3-7
It was, however, Izquierda Democratica which precipitated the 
collapse of the ' Convergencia* . From the outset, the party had 
stressed that its participation did not signify unqualified 
support for the government. With its eyes still firmly set on
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the 1984 Presidential elections, it sought to avoid too close an 
association with a government facing mounting economic problems. 
As if to emphasise the party’s independence, 'idistas' Arturo 
Cordova and Rodrigo Borja announced their intention in August to 
call the Minister of Social Welfare, Alfredo Mancero, before 
Congress for questioning. A month later, when Feraud was called 
before Congress, the ID was 'happy enough' to join in the 
sniping.30 The collapse of the Convergencia and the departure of 
Feraud became complete when ID placed the full weight of its 12 
votes behind those of the opposition.
Although Izquierda Democratica maintained its independence and 
refused to accept ministerial posts, the party's influence in the 
policy-making process became increasingly significant. When 
Robalino had submitted his proposals to Congress in April, these 
had been passed to one of parliament's Permanent Commissions. 
Composed of representatives of different parties, their primary 
function was to scrutinise executive proposals and - if 
necessary - revise them before passing them to Congress for 
approval. This had apparently been done in respect of Robalino's 
proposals, though when Congress reconvened in August. no 
opportunity had arisen to debate the proposals. They therefore 
collected dust until October, when the chairmanship of the 
'Comision Legislativa de lo Economico, Agrario, Industrial y 
Comercial' , passed to the idista Hugo Caicedo.
Caicedo took the unusual step of inviting a wide spectrum of 
organisations and individuals to submit their views on: the
crisis facing the country's oil industry; the role that CEPE 
should play in solving it; the necessity or otherwise of securing 
foreign collaboration; and the oil reform proposals submitted by 
Robalino. In response to those critical of this decision, Caicedo 
argued that the legal, political and economic implications of the 
government's proposals were of such importance that discussion of 
the issue could not, as in the past, be confined to a small 
clique of government officials and oil experts.30 The behavior of 
Congress over the preceding two years may also have convinced
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Caicedo that a proper debate on the oil reforms could only be 
undertaken outside of Congress. Undoubtedly, the 'Consulta 
Nacional de Hidrocarburos* was an ideal vehicle for promoting 
not only Izquierda Democratica but the political ambitions of 
Hugo Caicedo, a man whose knowledge of the oil industry was 
derived almost entirely from the former CEPE official, Wilson 
P&stor. Nevertheless, the 1 depoliticisation' of the oil issue 
and the emergence of a 'national consensus' on the issue of 
foreign oil investment were clearly essential in view of past 
company concern over Ecuador's political 'reliability*. As Hugo 
Caicedo rightly recognised, the perceived political risk of 
investing in Ecuador could be substantially minimised if such a 
consensus could clearly be shown to exist:
'Foreign companies, particularly petroleum 
companies, are not going to invest in a 
country where public opinion and the main 
economic, political and social groups and the 
government present an image of instability and 
division. Events in the last decade have shown 
us that. . . companies will not invest in 
circumstances where the rules of the game may 
change overnight.'*0
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CHAPTER 9: CQHSULTA IACIQIAL DE HTPROCARBURQS
When the debate was initiated at the end of 1981, the country's 
economic situation was on the verge of crisis as a result of the 
continuing recession in the industrialised countries, trends in 
the world oil market and US monetary and fiscal policy. Before 
analysing the responses to the 'consulta nacional', the impact of 
these developments on the twin pillars of the economy - terms of 
trade and foreign loans - will briefly be assessed.
Hon-Qil Exports
In response to the downturn in world trade and the rapid 
appreciation of the US dollar, world commodity prices during 1981 
slumped by 15.5% after increasing by 13.4% in the preceding 
year.1 In Ecuador, the unitary price of banana exports fell by 
4%, coffee by 22.7%, granual coffee by 27.4% and processed coffee 
by 25.3%. With no steps having been taken to revitalise the 
agricultural sector, through land reform and other measures 
essential to improve productivity, the sharp deterioration in 
the terms of trade was compounded by lower export volumes in the 
case of bananas (-5.2%), and processed cacao (-21.3%). By the 
years end, the country's non-ail export revenue had fallen by 
22. 1%.2
Trends in the World 011 Warket in 1981
The situation in respect of oil prices was little better, with 
CEPE's average monthly sales price sliding from $40.40 in 
January to just $32.16 in October. Prices were being squeezed by 
pressures on both the demand and supply side. On the one hand, 
the deepening recession in the OECD countries was combining with 
oil substitution measures and the abolition of price controls in 
the United States to reduce demand from the main oil-consuming 
nations. By the last quarter of the year, OECD oil consumption 
and oil imports had dropped to a level 2m b/d lower than in the
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same quarter twelve months earlier.3 Oil supplies, on the other 
hand, remained in plentiful supply partly as a result of 
increased production from non-OPEC sources and partly as a 
result of the stock manipulation activities of the IEA member 
states.
OPEC proved unable to protect the interests of Ecuador, with the 
organisation bitterly divided on how it should respond to market 
developments, Saudi Arabia continued to pump oil in excess of 
market needs in order to pressurise OPEC into reaching an 
agreement on a long-term price and production strategy. When 
agreements were reached, they were either never implemented or 
were ineffective. In June, for instance, OPEC decided to reduce 
output by 10% to maintain the Marker crude price at a ceiling 
of $36, with a maximum OPEC price of $41 until the end of the 
year. However, this only had a marginal impact on prices since 
both Iran and Iraq were exempt from the cutback. In addition, 
the output reduction calculation had been based on the planned 
production levels of individual countries for the first half of 
the year rather than on actual current levels, which in several 
cases were already substantially below target.
It was not until October that OPEC attempted to regain control of 
a market that was becoming increasingly dominated by the stock 
manipulation activities of oil consumers and the price cutting 
activities of non-OPEC producers. A unified pricing structure was 
agreed, with the Marker crude reduced to $34. An agreement was 
also reached on a set of value differentials for the pricing of 
all other OPEC crudes, in accordance with their respective 
qualities and geographical locations. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, 
cut output to 8.5m b/d, warning that this could either be 
reduced to defend the new pricing structure against downward 
market pressures or raised to counter any fresh attempts by other 
OPEC countries to raise prices above their agreed levels.
The agreement helped push the price of Oriente crude back to 
around $34.50 for the remainder of the year, close to the
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average for the year as a whole. Although prices were lower than 
in 1980, crude export earnings managed to increase as a result of 
higher export volume. This reflected a slight fall in the amount 
of crude required for the domestic market and an increase in 
output from 74.8m to 76.8m. The boost in production was possible 
due to the 2m barrels produced by the Yuca field in its first 
full year and to increased output from the Sacha field. Crude 
exports (including royalties but excluding compensation exports) 
rose to 38.5m compared to 33.4m in 1980, while the value of 
the country's total oil exports (both crude and fuel oil) reached 
$882. 7m, unchanged from 1980.*
Domestic Politics and the External Debt
Vith total export revenue falling in real terms and imports 
continuing to rise, the current account deficit rose during the 
year from $360m to $512.2m, equivalent to 7.9% of GDP. Vith oil 
prices a full $3.50 lower than the price on which government 
revenues for the year had been based, the public sector deficit 
rose to $290.8m, equivalent to 4.1% of GDP, while the state 
budget deficit jumped from $98.2m to $344.3m, equivalent to 4.3% 
of GDP.S To help finance these deficits, the government drew 
heavily on the country's international reserves. Although these 
provided around $153.3m, the strategy left the Central Bank at 
the end of the year with reserves that barely covered two 
months of imports. In these circumstances, the government 
undertook further, substantial borrowing on the international 
money markets. In this year alone $767m worth of new loans were 
contracted: by the end of the years the public external debt had 
reached $2.2 bn. G
The substantial new debts contracted during 1981 - and since 
August 1979 generally - did not simply reflect the declining 
revenue-generating potential of the country's main exports. They 
were a direct consequence of the government's inability to forge 
a sufficiently cohesive majority to enact measures to reduce the 
negative impact of the deteriorating external situation on the
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economy. Confronted by a Congress in which he had no natural 
majority and under mounting political pressure from the business 
sector, Hurtado sought to avoid political confrontation by 
contracting loans to cover the current account, public sector and 
state budget deficits.
This strategy brought some degree of political peace and 
flexibility for the government. However, the steadily increasing 
cost of borrowing increased still further with the election to 
office in November of a Reagan government committed to sweeping 
tax reductions, increased military spending, and a strong 
dollar. Fearing that if it accomodated the predicted sharp 
increase in the fiscal deficit with any expansionary monetary 
policy, the Federal Reserve Board chose to counter loose fiscal 
policy with a further tightening of monetary policy. Vhile this 
helped to reduce US inflation from 12.9% in 1980 to 10.5%, this 
strategy sent interest rates spiralling. In 1981, the prime 
rate increased from 15.3% to 18.9%, while LIBOR rose from 14% to 
16.8%. More disturbing, was the dramatic rise in the level of 
real interest rates: in the case of the prime Rate they rose from 
1.8% to 8.5%, while in the case of LIBOR the rate increased from 
0.6% to 6.4%.7
As a result of US monetary and fiscal policy, interest payments 
on Ecuador's external debt rose in real terms by 12% in 1981 to 
$319.8. The country's total debt-servicing payments, meanwhile 
rose from $789.8m to $1.1 bn, equivalent to 71% of the country's 
export revenue. A further, related problem facing Ecuador was the 
increasingly short-term nature of the country's external debt. By 
the end of the year, over half of the total debt contracted with 
commercial banks had a maturity of less than 12 months, while a 
further $188m was payable within two to three years.® The link 
between the service cost of a loan and the income stream from the 
investment it had financed had thus been broken: new loans were 
now being obtained, not for investment purposes, but finance the 
service cost of short-term loans.
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Declining oil and non-oil export prices and the rising level of 
the country's debt-service payments were to emerge as major 
factors in moulding the views of those who participated in the 
'consulta nacional*. Another important factor was the rapid 
deterioration in CEPE's financial situation.
CBPB*s Finances in 1981
During 1981, the amount of oil income transferred to the public 
sector rose from $753.8m to $813.6m. This was partly because of 
the 'normalisation' of Texaco's exports but it was primarily due 
to the hike in domestic oil prices earlier in the year. Crude 
export income, however, slumped by 29%, despite the increase in 
crude export volume, from $333.4m to $236.9m. This affected all 
participants, none more so than CEPE, which saw its income from 
this source crash from $61.5m to $29.7m. Revenue from fuel oil 
exports also fell, by just 4% though that was sufficient to 
reduce CEPE's income by over $10m. The state budget, in 
contrast, more then doubled its income from this source by taking 
over the share that had previously been allocated to the 
municipal and provincial councils. In 1979, CEPE had received 
82.5% of fuel oil export revenue and the state budget 17.1%; by 
1981 CEPE's share had fallen to 36.6% while the state budget's 
share had more than trebled to 63.4%.
The rise in domestic oil prices in February 1981 generated an 
additional $219.9m for the public sector. The decision had been 
taken in December 1979 that income from this source would be 
transferred to the state budget. There was no indication, though, 
on whether this would be its final destination or whether it 
would be subsequently redistributed. It was not until March 1980 
that precise details became available. According to Ministerial 
Accord 054, the government stipulated that CEPE would be entitled 
to a maximum of S/3000m. The balance remaining was then to be 
distributed to: the JDN (33.9%), the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fishing (33.9%), 'frontier' zones and marginal urban areas 
(16.95%), the Ministry of Public Education, in order to to
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subsidise student transport (5.09%), the Ministry of Health
(5.08%) and state enterprises affected by the price increase 
(5.08%).9
The price hikes in 1981 brought CEPE an additional $53.3m. This 
was the primary reason for the 16.3% increase in CEPE's oil 
income, since its income from crude and fuel oil exports fell by 
51.7% and 23.4% respectively. Without this new income source, 
CEPE's oil revenue for 1981 would have collapsed and pushed its
deficit well over the eventual end of year figure of $37.4m,
equivalent to 0.5% of GDP.10 As a result of government decrees, 
$21.3m worth of unpaid bills owed by IMECEL and other
electricity companies and a decline in domestic oil demand, 
CEPE's overall income fell in real terms by 3.7% to $365.3m. 
Expenditure on the other hand rose by 21.7%. Although 
investment increased by 28.6%, operational costs rose by 20%, 
equivalent to 58% of total expenditure. The servicing of the 
company's debts increased by 13% to $28.2m, equivalent to 9% of 
total expenditure.11
The external debt and CEPE's financial situation were, in the 
minds of those who participated in the 'consulta nacional', two 
of the key factors that made the participation of foreign oil 
capital essential. There were, however, other factors, as the 
following analysis of responses will highlight.
The Level of Oil Reserves in Ecuador
Whether Ecuador needed foreign oil investment depended partly on 
the extent of the crisis confronting not only the economy, but 
the oil sector itself. There was a general consensus that the 
methodology used by Robalino to arrive at an oil reserve level of 
650m barrels was highly suspect. Having assumed that reserves in 
1972 stood at 1.5 bn, the government had then deducted for each 
of the following 8 years an average annual production rate of 75m 
barrels, in other words 600m barrels. That would have left 900m 
barrels, but the government - on the basis of 'new information'
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on the wells currently under exploitation' - deducted a further 
250m barrels, to leave Just 650m at the end of 31 December 1980. 
This seems rather odd, since the Oil Ministry had fixed a 
production rate of around 80m barrels, which on the basis of 650m 
barrels of reserves would have meant that within 8 years the 
country's reserves would have been completely depleted.
There were other indications which suggest that the government 
was being less than honest. Despite the availability of precise 
data, it managed to 'lose' 39.2m barrels of reserves. Average 
daily production between 1973-80 was 192,350 not 200,000 barrels 
and annual production averaged 70m, not 75m, barrels. More 
seriously, officials at CEPE confessed that they knew nothing of 
the 'new information' that, at a stroke, had reduced reserves by 
250m to 650m barrels.12
Closer inspection of the government's figures reveal that account 
was only taken of oil reserves discovered by Texaco-Gulf in the 
years up to 1972. No consideration was given to the reserves that 
could be obtained through secondary recovery in the consortium's 
fields, which Robalino himself had claimed would amount to 450m 
barrels, or to the reserves contained in the consortium's new 
fields. These were estimated at the time to be around 100-200m 
barrels. The government also excluded the reserves in CEPE's new 
fields in the Nororiente, which were estimated to be 120m 
barrels. In reality, therefore, the level of recoverable reserves 
in Ecuador was nearer 1.5 bn barrels, almost twice that claimed 
by the government.
Some participants, conscious of the way in which the level of 
reserves have been consistently manipulated for political 
purposes, remained sceptical of the government's projections. The 
former head of CEPE, Jos6 Carvajal, repeated his accusation
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that the Oil Ministry was deliberately exaggerating the 
country's energy problems,13 while the University Commission 
claimed that:
'the crisis and collapse that the government
predicts in its document are the same that
were announced in 1975, 1976 and in
1978..... Time has passed and these situations
have not occurred.'1*
These were very much minority viewpoints. Although there were 
disagreements over the size of the country's oil reserves, and 
the precise growth rate in domestic oil consumption, there was a 
clear consensus among political parties of the right, centre and 
non-Marxist Left: unless an extensive search for new oil reserves 
was carried out and measures taken to slow down the rate of 
growth in domestic oil consumption, Ecuador faced the prospect 
of becoming a net oil importer by the mid-1980's.
The Challenge Facing the Oil Sector
According to the College of Geological Engineers, even with 
the incorporation of CEPE's new fields in the Mororiente and the 
implementation of secondary recovery work, the country's 
reserve/production ratio would reach 'critical levels' between 
1985-90.1S This view was echoed by Wilson P&stor, who claimed 
that unless substantial quantities of new oil reserves were 
discovered, the average level of production would fall from
240.000 b/d in 1981-85 to 220,000 b/d in 1986-90. Vith domestic 
demand forecast to rise from 110,000 b/d to 170,000 b/d, the 
amount of production available for export would fall from
130.000 b/d in 1981-86 to 50,000 b/d in 1986-90.1G
To simply maintain the volume of exports at 130,000 b/d - which 
then represented around 50% of total output - production would 
have to be increased by 120,000 b/d to 340,000 b/d. For this to 
be achieved, at least 700m barrels of new oil reserves needed to 
be found between 1981-86. Based on the current cost of 
discovering and developing new deposits in CEPE's Nororiente
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fields, the total minimum investment required was placed at 
between $409m to $613m. 17
CEPE; a liable,Alternative to Foreign Investment?
Assessments on the ability of CEPE to undertake this task alone 
reflected the scale of the crisis, the high cost involved, and 
the company's technical and financial capacity. Izquierda 
Democratica, like other participants, believed that:
'in view of the financial situation of the 
country and CEPE in particular, and given the 
large sums of investment required far an 
extensive exploration campaign one can 
conclude that the country does not have the 
capacity to undertake said campaign alone.'10
CEPE was already overburdened, both financially and 
administratively. It's priority projects included exploration 
work in the Eororiente ($71.6m); the development of gas fields in 
the Gulf ($148m - $204m); programmes of secondary recovery 
($12.8m); exploration work in the Suroriente ($153.4m); drilling 
in the precretacic, where each exploratory well was estimated to 
cost $4. lm; and the construction of the Atahualpa Refinery 
($434.5m. )19 A totally domestic solution to the country's oil 
problems was, therefore, inconceivable:
'CEPE can support a third of the $511m worth 
of investment needed between now and 1986. It 
would be illusory to believe that CEPE can, by 
itself, start the exploration of the 14m 
hectares of potential hydrocarbon areas which 
the country possesses. In terms of the
investment needed between now and 1986, the
challenge the country must immediately
confront is this: more than $l,000m tin
nominal dollar terms].'20
The Cost of Exploration
It seems clear, however, that the investment figures cited by 
PAstor under-estimated the investment required since this
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estimate had been based on the cost of exploring and producing 
ail in CEPE's Nororiente fields. At that time, these were 
considered to be much lower than in other potential oil-bearing 
areas. At the start of 1981, drilling costs in CEPE's Nororiente 
fields amounted to $1.5m for an exploration well and Sim for a 
development well, while production costs were initially estimated 
to be $5 per barrel.21 A more realistic assessment of the amount 
of investment required would have to assume that production 
costs would increase since new oil discoveries were likely to be 
found at greater depths, onshore and offshore, and far from an 
existing infrastructure.
More specifically, the search for hydrocarbons in Ecuador was 
expected to be carried out at depths of between 4,500-6,000 
metres, both on-shore in the Oriente and in the Coastal areas of 
Manabi, and offshore in the Gulf of Guayaquil. Oil reserves in
these areas were expected to contain denser crude, of between 
12-18 API, compared to the lighter crude of 29 - 30 API that 
Ecuador had been producing since 1972. The estimated cost of 
drilling an on-shore exploratory well to a depth of 16-18,000 
feet in, for instance, Manabi was around $8m, with between $3m 
and $7m required for a development well. In the Gulf of 
Guayaquil, the estimated cost was even higher, at $10-$12m to 
depths of 16-18,000 feet and $4-6m to depths of 10-12,000 feet.22
Large sums of investment were also required to exploit the heavy 
crude deposits at Pungarayacu close to the Tena field. This was 
thought to contain around 10,000m barrels of heavy crude. As the 
National Polytechnic School pointed out, although there was no 
geological risk involved and drilling costs were similar to those 
of the Oriente, the high extraction costs and the specialised 
equipment required meant that foreign assistance was essential:
'Because of the volume of investment required 
to facilitate commercial exploitation of these 
deposits foreign financial and technological 
investment will have to be attracted ...even 
though we are dealing with investments that 
involve no geological risk.'23
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Other potential hydrocarbon areas that required investment 
(though their successful exploitation was not expected to 
radically change the country's oil situation) included the gas 
deposits in the Gulf, and areas in the ffororiente, Centroriente 
and the Suroriente region close to the Peruvian side of the 
border.
The leed for Foreign Expertise
The cost involved in exploring and developing new oi1-zones was 
not the only factor that necessitated extensive foreign 
collaboration. A number of respondents argued that even if CEPE 
had sufficient funds, foreign collaboration was still required 
since CEPE lacked the necessary technical expertise and trained 
personnel to undertake work in these areas:
'the oil reality that the country now 
confronts in respect of the new sub-soil zones 
that must be explored both now and in the 
medium term require technologies of which CEPE 
has not had experience: exploration in the
sea, the extraction of heavy crude and the 
exploitation of reserves using secondary 
recovery techniques.'
This argument was regarded as spurious by Marxist groups. Vhile 
accepting that CEPE had neither the technology or the necessary 
technological expertise, these groups maintained that CEPE could 
simply contract-out the necessary exploration and drilling work 
to specialist service companies. This was, after all, the usual 
procedure followed by private oil companies. As one oil official, 
explained:
'Each phase of exploration requires the 
assistance of outside contractors. Ve don't do 
seismic or drilling ourselves..[and].. when 
drilling has taken place the oil company needs 
the services of contractors to carry out the 
electric logging of the well to see if any oil 
has been found. If oil is believed to have 
been found another contractor is required to 
test the well for the quantity and quality of 
the oil.'2S
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The fact that CEPE itself did not have the necessary technology 
or expertise was not therefore regarded by some as a 
justification for the entry of new foreign oil companies or, for 
that matter, the continued presence of Texaco. The assumption 
underlying this argument, namely that technical expertise is 
relatively unimportant, has generally been regarded as, at best, 
misleading:
'the overall planning of a project involves 
contracting the right functions to the right 
people and coordinating a number of stages 
(making sure that all necessary inputs arrive 
in time, that drilling sites are selected when 
drilling rigs became available, that expertise 
is quickly on hand when there is a mechanical 
breakdown etc) in a way that requires a high 
level of managerial and technical talent.'2e
Conservative groups and Texaco had consistently argued that 
CEPE lacked the necesary managerial, technical expertise and 
administrative capacity to supervise efficiently work 
subcontracted out to specialist oil companies. This view was also 
echoed by Izquierda Democratica, which forcefully rejected the 
arguments of the nationalists:
'The argument that with financial resources 
CEPE could sub-contract every type of 
technology ignores the fact that in a business 
development of this sort a high level of 
experience is needed to ensure efficient 
control over the subcontraction of the 
technologies.
The lature of Oil Exploration
There was a general acceptance among many that private oil 
companies were better equipped to tackle the expensive and risky 
task of discovering reserves. This was not only because of their 
managerial and technical expertise but because, by operating in
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different parts of the world, failures in some projects could be 
compensated by successes in others. As one leading oil expert 
pointed out:
'Even if Ecuador had the financial resources 
to carry out its exploration programme, the 
risk would be fairly high and costly for the 
country.... It would not be worth taking it on 
when there is a much more advantageous 
alternative if we accept the collaboration of 
foreign risk capital.2®
The high risks and costs that could be involved were to be 
graphically illustrated in 1982 when, CEPE suspended exploration 
in the Gulf of Guayaquil. Over $18m was invested by CEPE in the 
first well, which failed to find commercial quantities of oil. 
Similar results were obtained from a second and third well, both 
of which consumed over $30m worth of investment. Together with 
the cost of hiring a rig from the Mexican firm Permago, the total 
amount of finance involved in CEPE's failed offshore drilling 
venture exceeded $90m.29 Such an expensive failure inflicted 
serious damage on CEPE's credibility and the policy that allowed 
it to undertake risky exploration ventures, particularly at a 
time when the country was in the midst of a mounting liquidity 
crisis.
The Future Role of Foreign Oil Companies
Vhile there was a consensus on the need to attract foreign oil 
investment, differences emerged on how much foreign collaboration 
should be sought. Vhile conservatives demanded the virtual 
'privatisation' of exploration work, groups on the centre and 
centre-left attached conditions to the involvement of oil 
companies. Apart from stressing the need to ensure that the 
'national interest' was safeguarded, there was a reassertion of 
the policy laid down in the National Development Plan. This had 
stated that foreign oil participation should be limited to 
zones of high risk and high cost and that it should merely
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complement, and not replace, CEPE's own exploration work. In the 
view of Democracia Popular:
'Exploration work designed to increase our 
reserves corresponds principally to CEPE...In 
a complementary form this must be reinforced 
with the participation of foreign companies, 
both state and private..'30
This view was also shared by Izquierda Democratica, which also 
stressed the need to ensure that a diverse range of foreign 
companies were invited to explore for oil, in terms of geographic 
origin and type of capital (private and public). Priority should 
be given to state oil companies, from Latin America and other 
friendly countries including members of OPEC. It was essential, 
in addition, to ensure that the political authority of the state 
was not undermined by the return of the oil multinationals. Any 
return had to be gradual and controlled:
'An uncontrolled return to the country of some 
of the most powerful oil companies in the 
world could have dangerous political 
implications for Ecuador. As in the past these
companies will inevitably seek to defend their
own interests by using their economic power to 
influence developments in the political 
sector. ... If' the most powerful and well-known 
companies enter Ecuador simultaneously, it is 
likely that they will unleash political and 
economic pressures that are beyond the control 
of the State.'31
To protect the interests of the state, it was essential to ensure 
that steps were taken to strengthen CEPE, prior to the return of 
foreign oil companies.
Measures to Restructure and Capitalise CEPE
Administrative reforms were regarded as essential to transform 
CEPE. It was necessary, Izquierda Democratica argued, to provide
CEPE with greater autonomy, insulate it from political
interference and allow it to develop along the lines of a normal
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business concern. Political concerns were also in the minds of 
some of those who sought major reforms to CEPE:
'The proponents of 'neo-liberalism' have not 
and will not cease from claiming that when an 
economic sector is in the hands of the state 
it becomes inefficient..This is not 
so. . C But]. . if CEPE in the short term is not 
transformed into a proper company the forces 
opposed to its existence will end up winning 
the ideological and political battle, 
dismantling its activities into various 
private companies.'32
Although the necessity of ensuring that CEPE had adequate 
financial resources was generally recognised, few participants 
offered practical suggestions on how this could be achieved. Of 
those that did, each stresed the need for legislative changes to 
ensure that in those areas exclusively under its control CEPE - 
like foreign oil companies - should be reimbursed for its 
investments and costs and receive a reasonable profit. The 
establishment of a fund to finance CEPE's upstream activities was 
also proposed, with the Partido Democrata suggesting that CEPE 
receive at least S3 from every barrel exported and SI for every 
barrel sold to the domestic market to be used exclusively for its 
exploration and exploitation activities.33
Izquierda Democratica called for the rechannelling of the 
country's oil income in favour of CEPE 'without harming the other
participants in oil income.'3'* This one statement implicitly
carried within it something that none of the centre and centre- 
left groups were willing to publicly concede. It effectively 
accepted that the capitalisation of CEPE, and thus its priority 
task of speaheading the search for new oil reserves, was not a 
viable possibility, certainly in the short-term and most probably 
in the medium term. The reason for this was that, since all
existing oil income sources had already been earmarked, the
capitalisation of CEPE could only occur by diverting income away 
from existing revenue sharers. This, however, would pose immense 
political problems, not least because any meaningful addition to
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CEPE's funds could only be achieved at the expense of the two 
main recipients of oil income: the state budget and the armed
forces.
Izquierda Democratica's proposal on how CEPE could be capitalised 
confirms this interpretation. The party proposed that part of 
the income generated from the future activities of companies 
operating under 'service' contracts should be placed into a fund 
to finance CEPE's exploration and exploitation work. Even 
assuming that contracts were signed with oil companies in 1982, 
this would effectively delay the capitalisation of CEPE, until 
the late 1980's at the very least.
The establishment of an exploration fund for CEPE was outlined in 
greater detail by Vilson P&stor, who had criticised the 
government's oil reform proposals for concentrating exclusively 
an foreign ail companies:
'without taking into parallel consideration 
the even more urgent tax reforms that CEPE 
requires..to guarantee it the income that can 
be reinvested into petroleum exploration and 
exploitation. 136
P&stor proposed the introduction of a tax system that would 
divert part of the economic surplus generated by foreign oil 
companies into a 'Permanent Fund of Reinvestment' that would be 
used to finance CEPE's own exploration and exploitation work. 
Under the distribution system proposed by P&stor, CEPE would 
receive in the worst of cases (when income is lowest) l/15th of 
the annual value of production at international prices and in the 
best of cases (when income is highest) 2/15's.36,
Although there was general agreement that the government should 
take steps to encourage foreign oil investment, not all of those 
involved in the 'consulta nacional' were convinced that the 
changes proposed by Robalino would stimulate investor interest 
in Ecuador. Initial company responses appeared to confirm this.
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Oil Company Responses to the Proposed Service Contract
Most companies responded cautiously when Robalino first sent his 
proposals to Congress. Mo doubt they were mindful of the 
'haphazard and carefree' way in which previous governments had 
set and enforced the conditions under which oil companies 
operated in the country. At the time, the Petroleum Economist 
wrote that:
'there is some question as to whether the 
industry would respond to them meaningfully 
in any event, given the unfortunate long­
standing record of discord between the 
government and the private sector.'37
There was a general view that the proposed revisions were 
'disappointing' and that the Peruvian contracts were 'more 
attractive.'33 Donald Kiefer, who coordinated negotiations for 
Mobil's exploration units, was certainly unimpressed. In the 
third week of April 1981 he, together with representatives from 
four other oil companies, had met with Robalino. Clearly 
disappointed by what he had heard, Kiefer left the meeting 
claiming that Mobil still needed some 'positive reason' to invest 
in Ecuador, though he added that the company would 'wait and see 
what comes out of Parliament' before passing any final 
judgement.33
The principal concern was the absence of any certainty that a 
company would have access to any of the crude produced from its 
contract area. A director of Clyde Petroleum's Ecuadorian 
operations, Esteban Serrano, felt that this 'has been a major 
stumbling block' for a number of companies interested in 
returning to Ecuador.AO Ren6 Bucaram similarly warned that 
unless companies were allowed to receive payment in oil, no
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company would be interested in coming to Ecuador:
'no matter how good the profitability that it 
offers it... Oil companies...require secure 
access to the crude in order to ensure 
supplies to their installations outside the 
country.'41
Domestic Responses to the Proposed Service Contract
The government's argument that the new service contract 
substantially overcame the technical and legal problems that 
characterised existing contract models received wide support, 
except from groups on the Marxist left and the labour movement. 
According to the CTE, the proposed reforms were 'illegal' and:
'seek to create a new legal, economic and tax 
framework favourable to the monopoly interests 
of oil companies to the detriment of the 
sacred interests of the people and the nation.
The approval of these reforms will lead to the 
decapitalisation of the country and an 
increase in the benefits for foreign 
monopolies. '
As most participants recognised, and as the comments of the oil 
companies highlight, the proposals were sufficiently unattractive 
to ensure that no foreign companies would wish to invest in 
Ecuador. The editor of Weekly Analysis Valter Spurrier, echoed 
the views of most when he declared that:
'the main danger [that the proposed contract] 
faces is being excessively favourable to the 
state and thus find no takers. . E since].. there 
does not seem to be a certainty that the 
company will get access to crude, which must 
be the reason why any important oil company 
may choose to bid in the first place.'A3
Payment in cash rather than oil was considered to be a major 
disincentive to potential oil investors. Conversely, few accepted 
the government's view that the preferential purchase option was a 
'key' incentive, since this option was currently available in 
most countries seeking to attract oil investment. One such
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example was the contract signed in March 1979 between Ecopetrol 
and Sunray Colombia Oil company in which production from the 
contract area was to be shared equally between the two companies 
once royalties had been deducted. More recently, in the contract 
signed between Petroperu and the Superior Oil company in March 
1981, clause 7 stated that 'the contractor will receive as 
compensation for his service...a part of the total volume of 
hydrocarbons produced in the contract area.''*'4- Moreover, under 
the proposed Ecuadorian contract the preferential option was not 
considered to be a particularly significant incentive for another 
reason. As both Spurrier and the economist Eduardo Santos pointed 
out, it would presumbably be sufficient for another company to 
offer a cent more per barrel than the contractor was prepared to 
match, for the latter company to lose its option to buy the crude 
that it had found.
On the other hand, fears were also expressed that the 
preferential option could increase the country's economic 
dependence on particular economic blocks, by undermining the 
state's ability to diversify the geographic destiny of its crude 
oil exports. To negate this possible danger, Wilson PAstor
recommended that:
'When awarding blocks for exploitation the 
state must establish a policy of 
diversification, not only in terms of the
geographic origin of the contractors but also 
on the type of foreign capital, private or 
public. This means that the negative aspect to 
the country of the preferential purchase 
option can be partly neutralised in the 
awarding of the blocks to be explored. '
Views on the Oil Tax Reform Proposals
Aside from restricting payments to companies to cash, the main 
criticism directed at the government's proposals was the 
decision to link income tax to oil reserve levels. Most rejected 
the implicit assertion that the profitability of a well was
directly linked with the volume of reserves and that there was a
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direct relationship between reserves and the investments and 
costs incurred by the contractor. The situation was a great deal 
more complex than the government supposed. A multitude of factors 
influenced the level of costs and thus net income, for instance: 
the depth and location of the oil; the distance of the oil field 
from an existing infrastructure; and the quality of the crude 
found. Since oil wells with similar volumes of reserves could 
have completely different production costs and, therefore, 
different levels on income, most respondents felt it was 
'absurd and unjust' to apply the same level of income tax.
Others pointed out that under the government's tax system, 
companies would have little incentive to focus their activity on 
those areas likely to hold the largest quantities of oil 
reserves. In the view of the College of Geological Engineers, 
such a tax system would act 'as a brake on the exploitation of 
certain wells' and stimulate exploration activity towards those 
areas with least oil-bearing potential.
The third criticism was that the tax proposals had been based on 
false assumptions: namely, that the tax would be applied to
reserves containing crude of 20-30 API, and located onshore at a 
depth of around 10,000 feet. It was shown earlier, however, that 
the country's hydrocarbon potential was situated in the 
Suroriente, which was far from an existing infrastructure; 
precretacic zones in Manabi at depths of 4-6,000 metres; offshore 
zones, where investments were several times higher than on­
shore; and in zones containing heavy crude and requiring highly 
sophisticated and costly extraction methods. In these 
circumstances, the government's tax system would result in many 
of these fields classified as 'uncommercial'. Under the 
aforementioned conditions, there were likely to be wells with 
limited volumes of oil which would generate larger quantities of 
income per barrel than others containing greater quantities of 
oil but which are situated at greater depths or offshore or which 
contain heavy density crude.
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Revised Package of Reforms
On the basis of these comments, the Economic and Budget 
Commissions drew up a revised package of reforms which were later 
to be presented to, and passed by, Congress in August 1982. One 
of the key changes was that the company would be paid for its 
services and be reimbursed for its expenses and investments in 
cash, oil or a combination of both. Any payments in oil could 
only be made on part of the exportable balance of the production 
from the contract area. Where the contractor was reimbursed or 
paid in cash, he would have a preferential option to buy up to 
50% of this exportable balance.
The changes to the Tax Law advocated by the government were 
considered by the Permanent Legislative Commission for the Budget 
which presented its own proposals on 24 June 1982. According to 
its president Vifredo Lucero, these contained a number of 
incentives, one of the most important of which was:
•to make the contracting companies subject to 
the general regulations of the Tax Law, thus 
enabling them to avail themselves of tax 
credit, eliminating at the same time double 
taxation for which they are liable under the 
present law.'
The Commission also adopted a progressive tax system. The tax 
increment - that is the rate over and above the ordinary 
(maximum) income tax rate of 44.4% - would be linked to the 
volume of production and not, as the government had proposed, to 
the size of oil reserves. Under the formula to be used, tax would 
be zero on production below 30,000 b/d and 3% at 30,000 b/d, 
plus 1% for every 10,000 barrels in excess of 30,000 barrels up 
to a maximum of 30%. Crude oils of less than 15.0 API were to be 
excluded from this tax.
The revised reforms also stipulated that a maximum of two 
contracts could be signed, one of which had to cover an offshore 
area of not more than 400,000 hectares, while the maximum
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onshore area was set at 200,000 hectares. Contractors would be 
required to commit themselves to an annual minimum investment of 
$120 and $180 per hectare, for onshore and offshore blocks 
respectively. Given the size of the blocks, this was equivalent 
to a minimum investment of $24m onshore and $72m offshore during 
the first three years of exploration. The exploration period was 
four years, extendable for another two, while the exploitation 
period could last up to a maximum of 20 years. (Full details of 
the Ecuadorian 'service* contract are contained in Appendix 6.)
The Award of Service Contracts
Differences did emerge over the procedures governing the award of 
'service' contracts. While the government was reported to be
seeking a free hand to pre-select firms and negotiate with them 
directly, Izquierda Democratica successfully argued in favour of 
imposing 'a lengthy bidding procedure for contracts.' In the 
proposed Oil Law, the authors stipulated that the award of 
Service contracts to companies 'of proven experience with 
adequate technical and financial backing' would be carried out 
through 'a special system of bidding.' This was necessary to 
'guarantee the interests of the country'; avoid the chaotic 
manner in which concession areas had been distributed in the 
1960's; and ensure 'the diversification in the award tof service 
contracts] to private and state concerns.' Under the proposals, 
a Special Bids Committee was to be established, composed of the 
Oil Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Trade and 
Commerce, the State Controller and the general manager of CEPE 
who would act as secretary.
Distribution of Future Oil Income
The final matter that required attention before the revised 
proposals were placed before Congress concerned the allocation of 
the income generated from 'service' contract areas. Having taken 
for itself over 20% of the country's ail income from existing 
sources, pressure was exerted by the military to ensure that it
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received a sizeable chunk of revenue from future oil income 
sources. For 'national defence* purposes, therefore, 12.5% of 
gross production from each contract area was to be sold on the 
international market by CEPE, with the income accruing entirely 
to the Junta Defensa Nacional.
It is worth reiterating a point made earlier that neither Roldos 
nor Hurtado were likely to undertake 'nationalistic' policies 
towards Texaco, since the finances of the state and the health of 
the economy was dependent on the continued inflow of oil revenue 
from the consortium's exports. Similarly, as a result of its 
major share in the country's oil income, the military itself had 
no financial interest in policies that threatened to interrupt 
the continuous inflow of oil income. With this new allocation, 
the military now had a direct financial interest in the 
participation and success of new foreign oil companies in the oil 
sector.
This was also the case for CEPE. From the net revenue generated 
from 'service' contract areas operated by foreign companies, the 
draft Oil Law stated that 'the president of the Republic will 
designate the necessary resources in order to form a permanent
fund to finance the search for new reserves of hydrocarbons. ' No
percentage figure was given, but CEPE officials later claimed 
that 25% of net income was to be transferred to this fund.eo The 
policy of confining foreign collaboration to a supplementary role 
had effectively been abandoned. Wilson Pastor, who advised 
Izquierda Democratica on oil matters, was clear in his own mind 
on the meaning of this decision. For the remainder of the 1980's:
'foreign investment will be the priority. CEPE 
will be left to develop known fields which 
carry minimal risk. After 1990, CEPE will
begin to make risk investments, using the
revenue generated by foreign oil companies.'®1
As part of the continuing commitment to use the country's oil 
wealth to fund social development projects, the draft Tax Law 
stressed the 'urgent need for rural development in the Amazon
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region and in the frontier provinces' and for 'promoting economy 
in fuel consumption in transport. ' From the income tax 
originating from the new contracts, 6% was to be used for 
infrastructural and rural development programmes, mainly in the 
Amazon Region, Carchi and Esmeraldas but also in El Oro Province 
and Loja Province, while 4% would be used for the same purpose 
in other provinces. A further 2% would be used to finance a 
'Fund for the Promotion and Development of the National 
Electrified Interprovincial and Urban Transport System. '
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CHAPTER 10: THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1982-83
The increased emphasis on attracting foreign oil investment and 
improving the contractual terms under which companies would 
operate in Ecuador had, therefore, taken place prior to the
economic crisis that enveloped the country in 1982-83. Events 
during this period thus merely served to reinforce the urgent 
need to bring foreign companies into the exploration play.
CEPE's own role in risk investment came under mounting criticism 
during the year following the company's drilling failures in the 
Gulf of Guayaquil. The Gulf had been classified as 'low risk'
and had therefore been exclusively reserved for CEPE. When
drilling work had first begun, there was an expectation that the 
Gulf could provide an oil discovery of a size that could
radically change the country's oil situation. Government 
statements after drilling had started increased this expectation. 
At the beginning of April, Oil Minister Ortega announced that 
CEPE had struck oil.1 Two weeks later, Finance Minister Jaime 
Morillo informed a group of bankers and businessmen in London 
that the 'successful' discovery in the Gulf could enable Ecuador 
to double its crude exports to over 200,000 b/d.2 This claim, 
which was based more on guessswork than hard data, was clearly 
designed to improve Ecuador's credit rating at a time when bank 
lending had slowed considerably. However, as late as June, Ortega 
was still talking of 'highly positive results' from CEPE's 
drilling work.3 In the event, CEPE's first venture into offshore 
drilling proved to be the company's most expensive failure in its 
history. Some crude oil had been discovered, but the quantity 
found was 'meagre' and not in amounts sufficient to justify 
commercial exploitation.'* No commercial discoveries were made in 
two other wells.
CEPE's failure in the Gulf not only highlighted once again the 
need for officials to adopt a more cautious approach when 
intepreting incomplete data. It also showed that even in
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allegedly 'low risk' areas, there was no certainty that oil would 
be found in commercial quantities. Moreover, the Gulf failure 
highlighted the high costs that could result from the failure to 
discover oil. CEPE's offshore venture consumed over $90m, with 
CEPE required to pay Permago $60,000 a day for leasing the 
drilling platform.
Expensive drilling failures are rarely acceptable, but what made 
CEPE's even more unacceptable was that this failure occurred 
during a year when the twin pillars of economic growth - terms of 
trade and foreign borrowing - eventually crumbled and pushed the 
economy into deep recession.
m i  lfaT-ket Trends
Central to the crisis of 1982 was the deepening recession in the 
industrialised countries, in particular the United States where 
GDP fell by 2.5%. One immediate consequence of this was a 
further downward trend in oil consumption. By the first half of 
the year, OECD oil consumption was running at 34.4m b/d, 3.1% 
down on the average for the preceding year and 16% lower than in 
1979. Met oil imports fell by 2m b/d to 18m b/d, just one-third 
of the average level for 1979.® With non-OPEC countries 
continuing to pump oil in excess of market needs and oil 
companies making substantial reductions to the large stockpiles 
that had been accumulated since 1979, oil prices fell sharply.
OPEC's response to the high output, low price strategy of non- 
OPEC producers and the subsequent decline in its market share 
was often belated and inadequate. There was, for instance, no 
OPEC response to the price reductions that followed Mexico's 
decision in January to reduce its oil price by $2 to $26.5.® It 
was only in March, when further reductions followed BITOC's $4 
price-cut, that OPEC attempted to defend the existing marker 
price of $34 by introducing a production ceiling 17.5m b/d. It 
proved impossible to implement from the outset. Iran, which was 
already producing in excess of 600-700,000 b/d, reaffirmed that
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it intended to increase output to 3m b/d in order to finance the 
war against Iraq. Other OPEC members also continued to produce 
in excess of their quotas. Four months after the agreement, 
Venezuela announced that the quota system had collapsed and that 
it would therefore increase output by 20%.7
It was already clear from the start of April that Oriente crude 
was being sold below $34. The first public indication of this 
came on 3 May when an Oil Ministry official 'admitted' that CEPE 
had sold 1.82m barrels in the previous week at between $31.10 and 
$33 a barrel.® Two months later, the Oil Minister was enveloped 
in political controversy following reports that Petrobrhs had 
paid $32.50 for crude purchased in July. The Oil Minister 
initially denied that Ecuador had broken with the OPEC pricing 
agreement, claiming that distance and carriage costs had required 
a price reduction of $1.50 to ensure that Ecuador's crude 
remained competitive.® It soon became clear that sales under $34 
were increasingly the rule rather than the exception following 
the refusal of a number of CEPE's clients to renew long-term 
contracts unless the $34 price level was reduced. By the middle 
of July just two contracts, each for 15,000 b/d, had been renewed 
forcing the corporation to sell the bulk of its crude on the spot 
market at an average price of just $31.21.10 On 21 July, Ecuador 
officially broke with the OPEC pricing structure and cut the 
price of Oriente crude by $1.75, effective from the start of 
July.11 This decision led the Head of Energy Studies at the 
Permanent Secretariat of OPEC to call on Ecuador to explain the 
reasons behind this move.12 Following what Ortega described as 
this ' impertinence' , the Oil Minister demanded - and received - 
an apology from the Secretary-General of OPEC who claimed that 
the official had merely been expressing 'personal views'. The 
conduct of oil policy, he added, was a sovereign matter over 
which OPEC had no jurisdiction.13
In March, the Hurtado government had made a belated attempt to 
grapple with the sharp fall in oil prices. In a bid to stimulate 
non-oil exports, a 'disguised' devaluation was introduced on 5
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March with the introduction of multiple exchange rates. The 
official exchange rate remained at S/25. However, a rate of S/30 
was established for non-oil exports while, in a bid to protect 
industry, an exchange rate of between S/28 to S/30 was 
established for importers of non-essential products. These 
measures were unlikely to have any significant affect on non-oil 
exports, however, given the current state of the world economy. 
As a result of the downturn in the volume of world trade and the 
substantial appreciation in the dollar, world commodity prices 
(including those for Ecuador's traditional exports) were to 
continue to fall sharply during the year.1A
Two months later, in May, an economic stabilisation package was 
introduced which included a 32% devaluation of the sucre - from 
S/25 to S/33 - new tariffs on imports and the abandonment of 
numerous capital projects, including the Atahualpa refinery and 
the Toachi hydroelectric plant.ie Some indication of the 
ineffectiveness of these measures came just a few months later 
when the Central Bank announced that international reserves had 
fallen to just $154.3m equivalent to just two months of imports 
and projected that the current account deficit would reach 
$573.8m by the end of the year.1G
Political Constraints on Meeting the Crisis
Hurtado's ability or willingness to take tougher measures to deal 
with the economic situation continued to be heavily constrained 
by his weak political position within Congress and by the 
uncompromising hostility of the business community. Even though 
government policies after the collapse of the ' Convergencia' were 
highly favourable to the private sector, increasingly so as the 
country's economic crisis intensified, Hurtado was the subject of 
a constant barrage of criticism by the business community. 
Following the May measures, which were denounced as an attempt to 
'demolish' the private sector, calls were made for a strike by 
industrialists, while the Guayaquil Chamber of Agriculture went
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further by suggesting that military rule might be preferable to a 
government headed by Osvaldo Hurtado.
Rumours of a military coup were rife during 1982. According to 
Hurtado, 'there wasn't a cocktail party or social get-together' 
where military officers were not approached by civilian leaders 
to stage a coup.19 Catherine Conaghan has suggested that the 
primary source of this antagonism lay, 'not in the substance of 
economic policy' but in the business sector's 'fixation' on the 
issue of access to influence and policy-making style. Like 
Rodriguez Lara before him, Hurtado consciously sought to insulate 
economic policy-making from the direct pressures of business 
organisations. 19 This interpretation was acknowledged by Hurtado 
himself when he remarked that the main reason for the hostility 
of the business sector was that:
'they knew they couldn't pick up the phone and 
give me orders in a country where the 
government traditionally ruled in consultation 
with the Chambers.'20
Determined to fulfill his priority objective of stabilising the 
democratic system and transferring power to an elected government 
in 1984, Hurtado gradually succumbed to private sector pressure. 
To calm the opposition, legislation protecting consumer rights 
was dropped, together with a proposal to stamp out 'illicit' 
personal enrichment. By September, government threats to take 
legal action against tax evaders had also been shelved. By the 
end of the year, the Quito Chamber of Commerce was able to 
report that the 'frontal attack' against the business community 
by the government had ceased.21
Whether Hurtado would have succeeded in obtaining Congressional 
approval for these, or any other measures, was in any case 
doubtful. Throughout 1982, he remained beholden to constantly 
shifting alliances in a Congress concerned more with political 
exercises than with the pressing task of developing and 
implementing policies to tackle the economic crisis. After the
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collapse of the 'Convergencia' and the withdrawal of the PCD, 
Hurtado had successfully manufactured a pro-government coalition 
consisting of three PD delegates, the 12 Roldosista delegates 
and the CFP. When the PCD had been created it was seen by the 
executive as a useful instrument to combat the 1bucaramistas' 
and to establish a political base of support for the government. 
The process had thus been reversed, with the government 
regarding the CFP as a counterweight to the PCD. After Assad 
Bucaram's death in Hovember 1981, the party's key figures (with 
the important exception of Averroes Bucaram) were inclined to 
adopt a more postive and less obstructive role in Congress: at 
the end of January, the CFP entered government and received two 
ministeries and a variety of other posts in the state apparatus, 
as well as the presidency of Congress.
The Impeachment of Oil Minister Ortega
The fragility of the alliance with the CFP became apparent 
immediately after Congressional approval for the reforms to the 
Oil and Oil Tax Laws on 6 August 1982. After CEPE's expensive 
failure in the Gulf of Guayaquil, the search had immediately 
begun for a scapegoat. It was found in the shape of Oil Minister 
Ortega. He was ordered to appear before Congress to be questioned 
by Hugo Caicedo, who focused on the Permago contract, and Febres 
Cordero, who questioned the Minister on his 'illegal' decision to 
increase electricity tariffs. The questioning of Ortega, which 
took place between 18 August and 7 September, illustrates how 
effective the strategy of calling 'ministers to account' could be 
in bringing the legislative process to a standstill. In the case 
of Ortega, the questioning:
'occupied more than 50 hours of replies, 
counter-replies and debates and was converted 
into a major confrontation between the 
government and the opposition, a confrontation 
which concerned not simply one ministerial 
post but the prestige and administrative 
integrity of a regime that faced an 
increasingly stubborn opposition.'22
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Most independent observers believed that the enquiry had thrown 
up a 'few trivial procedural irregularities' which should not 
have been enough to impeach a minister.23 There were some 
suggestions that the decision to drill in the Gulf had been taken 
after pressures from Guayaquilian business groups,2”* though it 
does seem as if detailed seismic studies had been undertaken and 
that the decision to drill had been backed by local and foreign 
oil experts.2B
If the pro-government alliance had remained intact, Hurtado would 
not have found it necessary to appoint the country's fifth Oil 
Minister in 33 months. Ortega's fate was sealed when the deputy 
head of the CFP, Averroes Bucaram, seized the opportunity to 
undermine the 'collaborationist' faction within the CFP and break 
the alliance with the government. His unilateral announcement 
that the CFP would vote to censure Ortega for illegally raising 
electricity tariffs proved sufficient to tip the balance against 
Ortega, who lost the vote of censure by 39 votes to 26 votes. 
Following Ortega's impeachment, the CEPE manager Jorge Pareja 
resigned in disgust at this 'absurd' vote of censure.
The drawing-up of regulations covering the award of service 
contracts and the opening of the first bidding round, were 
consequently delayed. Parejo's replacement at CEPE was Rear- 
Admiral Raul Jaramillo who had a thorough grounding in the 
country's oil industry having served as the military's 
representative on the CEPE Board. The same, however, could not be 
said for the new Oil Minister, Gustavo Galinda. He was a civil 
engineer who had taught at Guayaquil Polytechnic, and had little 
knowledge of the oil industry. Further delays in bringing in 
foreign oil investment were, therefore, bound to occur while 
Galinda developed his knowledge of the industry and built up 
those personal contacts which are essential when seeking 
business with outside investors. It was not, therefore, until 
February 1983 that the detailed regulations covering the award of 
service contracts were eventually published, with the date for 
the first bidding round set for 13 June 1983.
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The Remaining Pillar of Growth
The Ortega affair served to illustrate the continuing inability 
of the executive to assert its authority over a Congress that 
remained preoccupied with the pursuit of short-term political 
gains. After nearly three years, virtually no steps had been 
taken to mobilise alternative sources of non-oil income. Moves 
had been made to Increase domestic oil prices, though the 
economic benefits had been limited by devaluation and Inflation 
and by the decision to transfer a third of this new revenue to 
the military. Few steps either had been taken to reduce the 
deficits of the state budget and the public sector or the 
mounting deficit on the current account.
There was, in fact, a virtual continuation of the economic 
strategy pursued by the military junta in the late 1970's. Rather 
than adopt the adjustment policies that were needed when the 
second oil boom had come to an end, the current account and 
public sector deficits continued to be financed by extensive 
borrowing. In 1982, over $1 bn worth of loans were contracted, 
with two-thirds of these carrying floating rates of interest and 
maturity terms of just 12 months. With the tight monetary 
policies of the Reagan government pushing the real interest rates 
to an average of 8% in 1982, one-third of Ecuador's export 
revenue was earmarked to cover interest payments. Total total 
debt-servicing payments, meanwhile, were equivalent to 72.6% of 
total export revenue.2®
The maintenance of high levels of imports and public expenditure 
and the ability of Ecuador to meet its debt-servicing obligations 
was sustainable, however, only for as long as Ecuador found 
willing lenders among the international banking community.
Trends In Bank Lending Activities
A slowdown in the growth rate in bank lending had been apparent 
in 1980, when the rate of increase slowed from 24% in 1979, to
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19% in 1980 and then to 17.2% in the following year.27 This 
slowdown was partly attributable to the global economic 
recession which reduced the supply of credits and savings 
available in the international financial markets. A further 
factor was the decline in world oil prices. With the subsequent 
reduction in the current account surpluses of oil-exporting 
countries, an important source of liquidity in the international 
financial markets disappeared. After registering surpluses of 
$35.8 bn and $56.9 bn in 1979 and 1980, the OPEC current account 
surplus dropped to $20.6 bn in 1981 and then actually turned into 
a deficit of $5.5 bn in the following year. OPEC as a group - and 
the high absorbers in particular - thus became a net borrower 
itself from the international banking system.20 Vith the growing 
fiscal deficits in the OECD economies, in particular the United 
States, absorbing an ever larger portion of the dwindling OPEC 
surplus, the excess supply of funds available to the developing 
countries after 1981 steadily shrunk.
Two events in 1982 specific to Latin America served to cause new 
lending to the region to fall sharply. US support for Britain in 
the Falklands/Malvinas conflict exploded the assumption that the 
United States could be depended on to rescue Latin American 
countries which fell into a serious payments crisis. By July, 
the OECD reported that the rapid rise in the real burden of debt 
service was:
'intensifying lenders' concerns about credit 
worthiness, inducing a more cautious attitude 
towards increased bank lending. .'20
Concern on the part of the international banking community turned 
to panic when the Mexican government ran out of foreign exchange 
in August and declared a 90 day moratorium on the repayment of 
the principal due on its external debt. Mexico was not alone: 
faced with rising interest payments, declining commodity prices, 
an appreciating dollar and weak export markets - each of which 
arose largely from the monetary-fiscal policy mix pursued by the 
Reagan government - an increasing number of Latin American
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countries found it impossible to meet their debt-servicing 
obligations. How classified as a credit risk, the growth in bank 
lending to the region slowed to just 9% in 1982 and then 
virtually ceased in 1983.30
The Debt Crisis in Ecuador
Changing bank perceptions of Ecuador's credit worthiness combined 
with the crisis situation affecting other Latin American 
countries to virtually curtail all further bank lending. By 
October 1982:
•commercial banks, increasingly worried about 
Ecuador's high level of public and private 
debt, the possible collapse of oil prices, and 
the financial plight of other Latin American 
countries, decided to limit net lending to 
Ecuador drastically.'31
Vith oil and non-oil exports in the doldrums and foreign 
borrowing curtailed, the economic strategy that had enabled 
successive governments to maintain growth, investment and high 
levels of imports and public expenditure crumbled. The most 
immediate problem facing the Hurtado government was the knowledge 
that around $482m worth of short-term loans fell due between 
November 1982 and the end of 1983. At the end of October, the 
Finance Minister Pedro Pinto announced that Ecuador would be 
suspending all capital payments on the public sector foreign 
debt. The government then quickly opened negotiations with its 
major creditor banks for the rescheduling of this portion of 
debt. How the banks responded to Ecuador's request would largely 
depend largely on the IMF conferring its seal of approval on 
Hurtado's attempts to grapple with the economic crisis.32
The Prograirap nf Economic Adjustment
The IMF emerged as a key player in the drama that was unfolding 
throughout Latin America. One country after another was informed 
by commercial banks that agreements on debt rescheduling and
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fresh loans would be tied to the implementation of an austerity 
programme drawn up and monitored by the IMF. While the precise 
details of the programmes established varied from country to 
country, each were geared to sharply reducing the current 
account deficit, through stimulating exports and restricting 
imports. These were combined with austerity measures to reduce 
consumer demand and public expenditure and steps to channel local 
production away from the domestic market into exports. This 
strategy inevitably required a devaluation of the local currency 
to enable locally produced goods to become cheaper on the world 
market.
In order to reschedule its short-term debt and receive fresh 
loans from commercial banks in 1983 - which had been limited to 
just $431m, equivalent at 1972 prices to $208m - Ecuador was
required to balance the public sector and current accounts by 
drastically reducing expenditure and imports. At the same time, 
measures were required to stimulate non-oil exports and increase 
public sector revenue. The main purpose of these measures was to 
ensure that the country generated a sufficient financial surplus 
to cover the repayment of interest. The fresh loans, it should be 
noted, carried even higher rates of interest than those that had
been advanced just a few months earlier. According to one
report, banks involved in 'rescue packages' were 'doubling, 
sometimes trebling their normal commission rates and margins.133 
According to ECLA, during the first round of reschedulings in the 
region, spreads averaged 2.25% above LIBOR, with commissions of 
1.25%. In other words, the banks had doubled the cost of their 
new loans, compared to 1980-81, and earned around $1.7 bn in 
profits.3* The tough stance adopted by the banks prompted the 
Financial Times to comment:
'So we get reschedulings, with the
accompaniment of vast telexes, higher interest 
rates, spreads and other fees, which make the 
whole problem in the long run just a little
more unmanageable. The banks of course know 
this very well.'33
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The terms that Ecuador was eventually forced to accept when 
agreement was reached in January 1983 were similarly harsh, with 
the interest rate set at LIBOR plus 2.25% (or the US Prime rate 
plus 2 1/8%), with the rate of commission fixed at 1.25%, 
equivalent to $13.75m. In the case of the $431m worth of fresh 
loans in 1983, the interest rate was even higher, at LIBOR plus 2 
3/8%.36
The first package of austerity measures was introduced in 
October. This included the removal of the wheat subsidy, a 53% 
increase in bread prices and a doubling in the price of gasoline 
super extra and regular to S/40 and S/20 respectively. Absolute 
prohibitions were introduced on some imports which, while 
helping to limit the outflow of foreign exchange, also served to 
put a further brake on economic activity and push the country 
deeper into recession. Plans were also drawn up to increase 
taxes on non-essential goods including beer, cigarettes and cars 
and reductions in tax exemptions for industry. Response to the 
government's austerity measures from the labour movement came 
in the form of a rash of riots and strikes in September and 
October. The FUT condemned the government's earlier devaluation 
measures and demanded a 75% increase in the minimum wage, a 
freeze on transport fares and water rates and the extension of 
state control of the economy. To add to the government's problems 
strikes broke out in the transport sector as bus and truck 
drivers pressed for substantial increases in fares, demands which 
the government met half-way by announcing increases of 50%.3-7
The London Agreement
As the government began implementing the IMF programme, the 
economy was further undermined as oil prices spiralled downwards. 
OPEC itself remained in a state of virtual paralysis, with
members still unable to agree on the allocation of production
quotas. Reports were circulating, meanwhile, that Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE were considering a $4 per barrel cut in
their oil prices unless 'renegade' members refrained from price-
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discounting activities and adhered to new production quotas. This 
move was opposed by, among others, Venezuela and Ecuador.33 
OPEC's continuing failure to reassert its control over the 
international market and to protect its weaker members was 
reflected at the start of February. In that month, the Hurtado 
government abolished CEPE's minimum contract price of $31.50 
and ordered the company to float the export price of its crude 
'according to world market conditions.'3® Saudi Arabia then
announced on 10 February that a cut in the Marker price was 
'inevitable' and that it would no longer play the role of 
defending the benchmark and 'will let others bear the 
responsibility of their mistakes. ' *° A few days later, BNOC
added to the pressure by reducing the price of North Sea crude 
by $3 pb, to $30.50. This move was matched by Norway, while
Nigeria responded by warning that it would match any further 
reductions 'cent for cent.' Gulf producers, meanwhile, renewed 
their threat to implement drastic price cuts if no agreement was 
reached on production quotas.
An imminent price war thus threatened to add to Ecuador's
economic problems. The threat, however, proved sufficient to 
cause OPEC to make a concerted attempt to bring a semblance of 
stability back to the oil market. Meeting in London on 14 March, 
OPEC agreed to reduce the price of the Marker crude from $34 to 
$29 and to establish a production ceiling of 17.5m b/d. Quotas 
were allocated to each country, with the exception of Saudi 
Arabia which was to act as 'swing producer' to supply the 
balancing quantities to meet market requirements. Member 
countries also undertook to avoid giving discounts and to refrain 
from dumping oil products on the market at prices which would 
jeopardise the new pricing structure. The choice of venue for the 
meeting was significant, reflecting OPEC's declining influence 
in the market and the recognition that only an informal 
understanding with the key non-OPEC producers - the UK, Mexico 
and Norway - could ensure that the agreement was fully 
implemented and respected. After the London Agreement, Mexico 
brought its prices into line with new OPEC prices, announced
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that it would be limiting its exports in 1983 to 1.5m b/d and 
indicated that it would cooperate closely with Venezuela on 
pricing matters. The BNOC, meanwhile, brought Brent crude into 
line with Nigerian crude.
Although Ecuador officially accepted the decision to introduce 
production quotas, there was little likelihood that the 
government would introduce a production quota of 200,000 b/d. 
Stagnant levels of production, declining oil reserves and rising 
domestic consumption had, in the past, restricted Ecuador's 
ability to compensate for price declines by boosting crude export 
volume. That position had to some extent now changed. With the 
start-up of production in September and October 1982 from the 
Shushuqui, Secoya, Shuara and Charapa fields in the Nororiente, 
total output had been averaging around 243,000 b/d by December 
1982. There was, in addition, the expectation that the 
incorporation of the Bermejo, Cuyabeno, Sansahuari and Tetete 
fields - planned for the middle of 1983 - would provide an 
additional 20,000 b/d.*1 Three further fields were to be brought 
on stream during the early part of 1984.
With recession and domestic oil price hikes reducing the amount 
of production required for the domestic market, these production 
increases were expected to translate into higher export volume. 
In view of the country's acute liquidity situation, compliance 
with the ceiling made little economic sense. Nor indeed would it 
have met with favour from the IMF and Ecuador's creditors.
Although the government publicly accepted the quota, it 
preferred to express the 200,000 b/d ceiling in millions. This 
enabled Ecuador to round off output in excess of this figure to 
0.2m b/d, and in this way allow output to rise to a maximum of
250,000 b/d and still appear to be within its production quota.
This had, according to one report, 'apparently been accepted in 
OPEC circles.' Thus, in the first quarter of 1983, output
averaged 228,842 b/d, in the second 229,800 b/d, in the third 
242,500 b/d and in the fourth 245,600 b/d. The average daily 
level for the year as a whole reached 237,500 b/d. With an
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additional 8 million barrels of crude from CEPE's Nororiente 
fields boosting total production by 11% to 86.345m, and the 
amount of crude required for the domestic market actually falling 
by 20%, the country's crude export volume jumped from 32.9m to 
50.9m.
Austerity and Recession in 1983
In the same month that production ceilings were introduced, 
Hurtado introduced a further package of austerity measures which 
included raising the price of gasoline extra from S/15 to S/30. 
The sucre was devalued by a further 21% to S/33 per US dollar and 
a programme of automatic 'mini-devaluations' instituted trimming 
the official exchange rate by four centavos per working day in 
order to reach a rate of S/50 to the dollar. Further tight
restrictions were imposed on public expenditure and imports, 
while commercial interest rates were increased by 2% to 16%.
Given the depressed state of world trade and low commodity
prices, there was little likelihood that the elimination of the 
current account deficit, which reached nearly $482m in 1982, 
could be achieved through stimulating non-oil exports. With
prices for Ecuador's main non-oil exports, in particular bananas 
(down 0.7%) and processed cacao (down 54.8%), remaining 
depressed, Ecuador was faced with having to export a 
substantially larger volume of goods in order to simply earn
the same number of dollars as in 1982.
Vhile such a massive increase in export volume would have been 
difficult in normal circumstances, it became an impossibility 
when heavy floods followed in the wake of 'El Nifio* . Extensive 
damage was caused to the physical infrastructure and crops,
causing real agricultural output to fall by 14%. Export volume 
subsequently collapsed, by 27.8% in the case of bananas, 43.8% in 
the case of processed cacao and 86% in respect of coffee. Far
from non-oil exports being stimulated, revenue from these
sources collapsed by 25%.*3 In these circumstances, the only,
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and most painful, option left to balance the current account 
was through a drastic reduction in imports. By the end of the 
year, these had been cut by 34% and the current account
deficit reduced to just $64.5m, less than 1% of GDP. With
imports cut and external financing for the public sector reduced 
from 4.5% of GDP to just 0.8%, investment for the year fell by 
28%, consumption by 6%, and real GDP by 2.8
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CHAPTER 11: THE DEMISE QF CEPE. 1982-84
Events in 1982-83 coincided with, a sharp deterioration in CEPE's 
financial situation. After falling from $379.6m in 1980 to 
$301.8m in 1982, CEPE's income slumped to just $228.2m in 1983. 
The company's investment capacity fell accordingly, from $101.6m 
in 1981 to $60.1m two years later. The accomplishment of CEPE's 
$1.4 bn investment programme for 1984-88, which was published in 
1983, appeared fairly hopeless. With projected income estimated 
at $1.63 bn, $1.1 bn of which would be required to cover 
operational costs, CEPE was expected to be able to fund, at most, 
a third of its priority investment projects from its own 
resources, leaving the remainder to be covered by loans and joint 
venture arrangements. At the time, CEPE officials projected that 
the company's budget deficit would rise from $42. lm in 1984 to 
$204.2m in 1988, with the accumulated budget deficit totalling 
$679. 8m. 1
Declining Investment in Exploration
Investment in upstream activities fell after peaking at $84.7m in 
1981. By 1983, it had fallen to $51.2m; one year later investment 
had dropped to just $44.8m, equivalent to 16.3% of expenditure.2 
Official acceptance that CEPE would only be able to undertake a 
fraction of the exploration and development work needed was 
evident from the start of 1983. The first indication of this was 
when the government decided to offer 11 blocks to companies in 
the first bidding round - scheduled for June 1983 - covering
1.4m hectares onshore and 1.6m offshore. The blocks on offer 
included a number of those which had previously been reserved 
exclusively for CEPE, including the highly prospective Block 15. 
A few months later, Oil Minister Galinda announced that ownership 
of the disputed Dureno, Coca, Culebra and Cononaco fields would 
be transferred from CEPE to the consortium. The discovery after 
three years of the 'legal loophole' followed a meeting with
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Texaco on 14 July where the company had informed Galinda of its 
plans to develop the most important field, Cononaco.3
CEPE's existing exploration activities were also cut-back. After 
its failure in the Gulf of Guayaquil, CEPE had turned its 
attention to the Suroriente. Five wells had been drilled since 
the start of 1982, with oil found in all but one. However, the 
crude was of high density, in insufficient quantities to be 
commercial and far from an existing infrastructure. Following 
the conqpletion of the fifth well in March 1984, amid mounting 
claims that CEPE was indulging in another 'adventure', drilling 
was suspended for four months. This 'suspension' was taken in the 
full knowledge that the decision on whether CEPE should continue 
operations in the area would be taken by the incoming president 
Febres Cordero, whose hostility to CEPE in general, and the 
company's involvement in exploration work in particular, was 
legion.A There was little surprise, therefore, when the new 
government brought CEPE's drilling activity in the area to an end 
and reserved the area for foreign oil companies. The meaning of 
these decisions was clear, if not publicly acknowledged: CEPE was 
in no position to spearhead the search for new oil reserves; 
indeed it was scarcely in a position to perform any significant 
supplementary role. Henceforth, the main burden of exploration 
would be assumed by foreign oil companies, with CEPE 
concentrating the bulk of its depleted resources and efforts on 
developing its fields in the Fororiente.
The Background to CEPE's Financial Crisis
To what extent can the collapse in CEPE's finances and investment 
capacity be linked to the oil price slump and the curtailment in 
bank lending? Although the timing might suggest otherwise, the 
decline in CEPE's financial situation cannot be directly linked 
to developments in the international environment, in particular 
the world oil market. The thesis has sought to show that the 
reasons for CEPE's financial and other problems are rooted in
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the domestic political sphere and, in particular, in the nature
of the company's relationship with the state.
The first point to note is that CEPE's financial problems cannot 
be directly linked to the fall in the export price of crude and 
fuel oil. As a result of the decrees passed in November 1979, it 
was largely immaterial from CEPE's own perspective as to whether
the price it was receiving for its exports was $40, $30, or $25.
A link between the depressed oil market and CEPE's finances would 
only have been established if crude prices had fallen to below 
$23.50, or fuel oil prices fell below $17.50.
The importance of domestic political factors can also be seen 
from the data contained in table 11.1 below.
Table 11.1: % Distribution of CEPE's Gross Sales Income. 1979-83
Sales Costs Operational Taxes/ Surplus/
Expenditure Public Sector Profit ($)
1979 15.9 19.9 44.2 20.0 (97.6m)
1980 14.1 15.8 58.3 11.8 (69.3m)
1981 10.2 10.3 71.4 8.1 (63.7m)
1982 22.7 6.9 67.4 3.0 (22.1m)
1983 22.4 2.4 70.3 4.9 (39.3)
Source: CEPE, Reporte Flnanciera, (Quito, 1985), p 32
The table shows that CEPE's profit margins began to narrow 
significantly, not in 1981 when the oil price decline was 
underway, but in 1980. In this year, CEPE's average export price 
was $35.2, a full $12 higher than in the preceding year, its 
gross sales income increased by 21% and the proportion of gross 
income used to over operating costs fell, albeit marginally. 
Nevertheless, the proportion of CEPE's gross income available for 
investment actually fell from 20% to 11.8%. This apparent paradox 
was also evident in 1983. In the year when the economy severely 
contracted and CEPE's income and investment collapsed, the 
company's gross sales income actually rose to its highest 
recorded level, to $794.8m. Although this was nearly double that 
of 1979, just 4.9% of this was available for investment. As table
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11.1 indicates, and as the following analysis will confirm, the 
fundamental factors leading to the decapitalisation of CEPE in 
the early 1980's was the substantial increase in the proportion 
of CEPE's gross sales income diverted to central government and 
the public sector.
CEPB*s Tur.niap from Crude and Fuel Oil Exports
It was shown in chapter 4 that the oil price hikes of 1979 had 
brought sizeable financial benefits to an historically 
undercapitalised company. Although CEPE's crude exports fell in
1979 by 25%, the oil price hikes and the start-up of fuel oil 
exports boosted CEPE's public sector oil income from $40.3m to 
$146.9m. In percentage terms, CEPE in 1979 received 24% of its 
crude export income and 82.5% of total fuel oil export income: in 
all 23.7% of public sector income was allocated to CEPE, over 
twice the peak percentage level achieved in 1978.
However, the beneficial affects of high oil prices proved even 
more temporary for CEPE than for the economy as a whole. In the 
midst of OPEC's second price offensive, a succession of decrees 
were passed during the last days of the military junta. These 
alone would have seriously eroded CEPE's financial situation from
1980 onwards. However, CEPE's finances were further undermined 
by the Roldos government, which froze the price levels on which 
CEPE's share of crude and fuel oil export income was calculated 
at $23.50 and $17.50. This decree not only prevented CEPE from 
gaining any further financial benefit from high oil prices, but 
it also virtually eliminated any possibility of CEPE being 
capitalised from traditional oil income sources.
As a result of these decisions, CEPE was deprived of substantial 
quantities of revenue that might otherwise have been used for
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investment purposes. The following table summarises the downward 
trend in CEPE's share of public sector oil income.
Table 11.2: CEPE's Public Sector Oil Income by Source ($m)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Superficiary Rights 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4
Crude Exports 37.6 65. 1 61.5 29.7 62.2 51.9
Income Tax 1.9 1.2 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.3
Fuel Oil Exports 
Derivative Price
73.6 46.1 35.3 26.9 16.7
Increases - - - 53.3 48.2 31.6
Royalties - 2. 0 - 3.4 - -
Pipeline Tariff - - - 1.5 - -
Overlifting — 4.3 “
Total 40.3 146.9 108.9 126.7 139. 0 101.9
Source: Ministry of Finance, Estadistlca de Ingresos Petroleros, 
1978-83, (Quito, June 1984), pp 22-27.
During this period, CEPE's share of oil income fell from 23.7% 
in 1979 to just 12.7% in 1983. As a direct result, not of oil 
price fluctuations, but of government decrees, CEPE's percentage 
share of crude export income fell to 12.5% in 1981, while in 
monetary terms it fell by 54% from $65. lm to $29.7m. This was 
despite crude export income between these two years falling by 
only 12.7%. Although CEPE's income from its crude exports 
rose to $62.2m in 1982, its percentage share was still seven 
percentage points down on the 1979 level, at 17.7%.
Fuel oil export income between 1979-81 increased from $89.2m to 
$96.3m. However, the amount channelled to CEPE fell by half from 
$73.6m to just $35.3m, while its percentage share slumped from 
82.5% to 36.6%. By 1982, CEPE was receiving a mere $26.9m (41%) 
of fuel oil export income.
It is possible to make a rough estimate of the income lasses that 
CEPE incurred as a result of the decrees passed by the military 
and Congress in 1979. If CEPE had received the 28% share of its 
crude export stipulated in 1974 and if its share of fuel oil 
export income had remained fixed at the 1979 level of 82.5%,
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CEPE’s accumulated income from these two sources between 1979-82 
would have amounted to $623.4m. Instead, CEPE received just 
$400. 4m, representing an income loss of $223m.
CEPE was not the only state enterprise which was denied the 
opportunity to benefit from the oil price hikes. BEDE’s 
percentage share of oil income fell from 18.2% in 1979 to 10.4% 
in 1982, while in quantitative terms its real oil income fell 
from $112.8m to $92.6m. And this despite the volume of Texaco and 
CEPE's crude exports - on which BEDE's revenue was largely based 
- increasing by 14.6%. INECEL also saw its share of oil income 
decline, from 12.1% to 8.3% following the government's decision 
to transfer part of the income from royalties to the state 
budget.
Domestic Dll-Prices
Although the November decrees effectively ruled out the 
possibility of the government capitalising CEPE from traditional 
oil income sources, other options were available. CEPE had 
exerted pressure on the government to raise domestic oil product 
prices. This would have reduced the losses it incurred in the 
domestic market and, depending on the size of the price hike, 
provided CEPE with additional funds for investment. An 
opportunity to do just this occurred in 1981-83, when prices were 
raised on three separate occasions. The sums involved were 
substantial, even though the new price levels were still 
insufficient to cover CEPE's costs. In total, increases in the 
price of domestic oil products generated $519.3 worth of 
additional income.
The manner in which this additional finance was used neatly 
summarises the political priorities of the government and the 
manner in which the pursuit of these contributed directly to 
CEPE's financial crisis. Aside from CEPE, the income was used to: 
help finance the budget deficit; fund development projects in the 
frontier zones; fund the Ministry of Agriculture; and subsidise
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student transport fares. Apart from financing ’social' and
'social development' objectives, a sizeable chunk of the income 
was channelled to the armed forces, presumably to ensure the 
goodwill of the officer corps.
The method used to calculate CEPE's share was also 
unsatisfactory, since the establishment of a ceiling of S/3,000m 
effectively ensured that this would be whittled away by inflation 
and devaluation. This method also disadvantaged CEPE in another 
way, as an analysis of table 11.3 below suggests.
Table 11.3; Distribution of Income from Domestic Oil Price
Increases. 1981-83 ($m)
M l  12fl2. 19.&3- Total
CEPE 53.3(32.0) 48.2(26.8) 31.6(18.3) 133.1(25.6)
JDN 38.4(23.0) 44.6(24.8) 47.8(27.7) 130.8(25.2)
Min. of Agric. 38.4(23.0) 44.6(24.8) 47.8(27.7) 130.8(25.2)
Frontier Zones 19.2(11.5) 22.3(12.4) 23.9(13.8) 65.4(12.6)
Other 17.4(10.5) 20.2(11.2) 21.6(12.5) 59.2(11.4)
Total 166.7 179.9 172.7 519.3
Note: The figures in brackets represent the income received as a 
percentage share of the revenue generated in each year by 
domestic price hikes.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Estadistica de Ingresos Petroleros, 
1978-1983, (Quito, June 1984), pp 25-27
The imposition of a sucre ceiling created a paradoxical 
situation: the higher the price increase and the revenue
generated, the lower the proportion of the total allocated to 
CEPE. Thus, although the income generated by the price hikes 
increased to $179.9m in 1981, CEPE's income declined, both in 
real terms, to $48.2m and, in percentage terms, to 26.8%, and 
then fell further in 1983 to $31.6m, equivalent to 18.3%. All 
other participants saw their income rise, both in real terms and 
as a percentage of total income, since their shares were 
based on a fixed percentage of the income generated less CEPE's 
share of S/3, 000m.
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For these reasons, the hikes in the price of oil products did 
little to reduce the losses that CEPE incurred on the domestic 
market let alone provide it with additional finance for 
investment purposes.
The maintenance of non-market based prices for the crude 
delivered to domestic refineries also served to deprive CBPB of 
substantial quantities of revenue. For instance, while CEPE 
exported 24.2m barrels of crude in 1892 for $383. lm, it 
delivered 26m barrels to the refineries and received just $33.9m. 
As the table below also shows, despite the price per barrel 
delivered increasing from S/36.48 to S/81.84 in 1982 and then to 
S/156.75 in 1983, the potential benefits in dollar terms were 
largely offset by devaluation and inflation.
Table 11.4; CEPE's Income from Deliveries to Domestic Refineries
Barrels Price .per Total Income
(millions) Barrel 1$) (in $ million)
1979 22.2 $0. 90 $19.8
1980 24. 0 $0. 80 $19. 6
1981 23.6 $0. 70 $17.6
1982 25.8 $1.30 $33.9
1983 19.6 $1.65 $32.3
ffote: The following exchange rates were used: 1979-1981 S/25;
1982 S/30; 1983 S/44.12. The dollars are expressed in constant
1972 price terms. The table relates only to the crude delivered 
from the Oriente fields.
Source: CEPB, Informs Estadistico de la Actlvidad
Hldrocarburifera del Pals, 1972-1984, (Quito), pp 216 and 218.
The Bechannel 1 ing of Public Sector Oil Income
The chief feature of the period was the massive rechannelling of 
the country's oil income away from CEPE and other investment- 
orientated public sector entities and into the coffers of the 
state budget. In 1979, oil income had represented 15.9% of state 
budget income; three years later it had trebled to 45%. e The 
state budget's percentage share of oil income tripled from 15.9% 
in 1979 to 39% in 1982, while in monetary terms it rose from
- 207 -
$98.4m to $346.4m, equivalent to almost half of its total 
budgetry income. In terms of specific sources of oil revenue, the 
state budget’s share of crude export income during 1979-82 rose 
from 22.1% to 50.2%, while its share of fuel oil export income 
Jumped from 17.1% to 58.6%. In 1979, none of the royalty income 
was channelled to the state budget; by 1982 one-tenth. Only in 
the case of oil income tax revenue did the state budget's 
percentage share fall, and that as a result of a new participant 
in the form of the municipal and provincial councils.
The second largest recipient of oil income was the military. 
Although the military's share of oil income remained at around 
22% in 1978-80, the amount of income it received during this 
period jumped in real terms from $78.2m to $164.8m. Its income 
from crude exports subsequently fell, partly as a result of 
declining oil prices though primarily because of the introduction 
of new participants in royalty income (the state budget), oil 
income tax (the municipal councils) and crude exports (the 
municipal councils in 1981 and again in 1983). By 1982, the 
military was receiving 7.3% of CEPE's crude exports, 12% of 
income tax and 39.4% of royalty income.
The decline in the military's crude export income, however, 
was largely offset by the income it received from domestic oil 
price increases. By 1982, the military's share of oil income had 
recovered to reach $145.8m, equivalent to 16.4% of total public 
sector income. One year later, when CEPE moved to the verge of 
financial collapse, the military enjoyed a veritable 'windfall*. 
As a result primarily of the $47.8m it received from the domestic 
price hikes in March, the amount of oil income channelled to the 
armed forces increased by 73% to $175.3m, equivalent to over one-
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fifth of total oil income. This was the largest amount of oil 
income that had been channelled to the military in the country's 
history as an oil exporter.
Table 11.5: Oil Income of the Armed Forces. 1978-83 Clml
Crude
Exports
<CEPE>
Income Tax 
(Texaco)
Royalties Domestic 
Oil Price 
Increases
Total
1978 15.2 13.8 49.2 - 78.2
1979 34.8 24.4 77.6 - 136.7
1980 57.9 18.5 88.4 - 164.8
1981 13. 0 9.6 82.0 38. 4 140.8
1982 25.7 15. 0 60.3 44.6 145.8
1983 23.8 16.3 87.4 47. 8 175.3
Source; Ministry of Finance, Estadistlca de Ingresos Petroleros, 
1978-83, (Quito, June 1984), various pages. Mo direct reference 
is made to the military's share of oil income in the Finance 
Ministry statistics. It is euphemistically described as 'other.'
The military's future position as the second largest recipient of 
the country's oil income was also assured when a law was passed 
granting the military legal entitlement to a substantial portion 
of the income generated from the future operations of foreign 
companies: 12.5% of gross production from each contract area was
to be sold on the international market by CEPE, with the income 
accruing entirely to the Junta de Defensa Hacional.
CEPE's Finances in 1983
Developments in 1983 further highlight the importance of 
domestic, rather than international, factors in the 
decapitalisation of CEPE. In this year, CEPE's net income slumped 
by 24.3% to just $228.2m, only 75% of the level on which CEPE's 
1983 expenditure plans had been based. In view of the country's 
economic crisis this may not have been surprising - except for 
the fact that CEPE's gross sales income actually rose in real 
terms by 8% to $794.8m, the highest level reached at that time 
in the company's history. This rise can largely be attributed to 
a further hike in domestic oil prices.
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A second point to note, is that while total public sector oil 
income fell by just 8.7% to $887.8m, CEPE's share slumped by 
26.7% to $101.9m. Indeed, without the $31.6m that CEPE received 
from the price hikes, its share of public sector oil income would 
have fallen by 49.4% from $139m to $70.3m. Even with this 
additional income, CEPE's percentage share fell by three 
percentage points to 12.6%, the lowest level since 1978 and half 
that for 1979.
Two political decisions were taken in 1983 which affected CEPE's 
financial situation, the second of which proved to be one of the 
most damaging in CEPE's history and largely accounts for the 
rapid deterioration in CEPE's finances during the year.
The * Ley de Regulacion Bcononica v Control del Gasto Publlca
The start-up of production from CEPE's fields in the Nororiente 
represented a further opportunity to channel additional income to 
CEPE that, at the very least, would help compensate for the 
drastic decline in its share of income from other sources. The 
additional production involved was not insignificant. In 1983, 
output reached 8 million barrels, enabling the country's total 
production to rise by 11.1% to 86.3m barrels and, with domestic 
oil demand falling, CEPE's exports to jump by 45.6% to 30.5m
barrels. Here too government interference served to limit the 
financial benefits for CEPE. Just under one-third (3.lm barrels) 
of CEPE's production from the Nororiente was required for the 
domestic refineries. CEPE received S/330 per barrel, equivalant 
in nominal dollar terms to $7.47 pb, around $3 less than the 
production cost per barrel.
The potential financial benefits accruing to CEPE were further 
reduced by a government decree issued on 17 March 1983. The 'Ley 
de Regulacion y Control del Gasto Publica*, which outlined 
measures to control public expenditure, included clauses covering 
the distribution of income from CEPE's Nororiente fields. 
Article 6 did contain one important benefit to CEPE. This stated
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that before distributing income from the Nororiente fields CEPE 
would be reimbursed for its production, marketing and transport 
costs and receive what it termed a 'reasonable' profit. Only 
when this had occurred would the military receive its legal 
entitlement to 8% of the value of exports, with the universities 
and polytechnics also receiving their, albeit small, share. The 
revenue remaining was then to be used to help service the public 
debt.7
In 1983, CEPE received $13.5m of the $30.7m of revenue generated 
from the fields, with smaller quantities going to the 
universities ($0.1m>, the Treasury ($0.2m), the military <$0.4m) 
and, from the S/5 tax imposed on each barrel exported, the state 
budget ($0.1m).In other words, $16.4m - over 50% - of the export 
income from the Nororiente fields was channelled towards the 
financing of the external public debt.®
Ley de Desarrollo de Yialidad Agropecuarla y de Fomento de Mano 
de Qbra (Law 138)
The marginal financial benefits that CEPE received from its 
Nororiente fields was more than wiped out on 10 June 1983, when 
Congress passed the Izquierda Democratica-inspired 'Ley de 
Desarrollo de la Viabilidad Agropecuaria y de Fomento de la
Mano. ' Of all the government decrees that have reduced CEPE's
income share, this was potentially the most damaging. Law 138 
represented a further stage in the process of reducing in real 
terms the income of all revenue sharers - with two notable 
exceptions - and redirecting these funds to the state budget. It 
froze the exchange rate used to convert the country's dollar
income from petroleum exports to sucres for distribution to oil
income participants - with the exception of the JDN and 
universities - at S/44.9 In practical terms, therefore, a 
ceiling had thus been placed on the sucre oil income of revenue 
sharers, allowing it to be whittled away through inflation and 
devaluation.
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The sucres generated above this exchange rate ceiling were to be 
used to fund road and bridge construction projects to open up 
frontier zones to agricultural development, provide new 
employment opportunities, improve the sanitary conditions of the 
rural poor and to finance a campaign of reforestation. Three 
funds were created for these purposes. The first, and largest, 
was the ' Fondo Nacional de Viabilidad Agropecuaria' (FGNAVIA), 
which was to receive 70% of the oil export revenue generated 
above S/44 to improve the infrastructure and open up at least 
lm hectares of new fertile land for agricultural development. A 
second fund, the 'Fondo Nacional de Saneamiento Ambiental' 
(FONASA) was to receive 25% of the sucres generated above the 
S/44 exchange rate ceiling to improve sanitary conditions in 
rural areas and extend the provision of drinking water 
facilities. The remaining 5% was to be channelled to the 'Fondo 
Nacional de Forestacion y Reforestacion' <F0NAF0R) to reverse 
the process of deforestation that had been taking place at an 
annual rate of 180,000 hectares each year.10
The financial Implications of Law 138 for CEPE
The decision to convert CEPE's share of oil income at a fixed 
exchange rate was not applicable to all of its sources of 
revenue. It did not apply, for instance, to the revenue from 
CEPE's Nororiente fields nor did it apply to CEPE's domestic 
sales, which farmed the major part of the company's total 
income. The principal impact was on the revenue CEPE received 
from its share of the consortium's exports, fuel oil exports 
and from the $0.20 it received on every barrel of crude exported 
by Texaco, Nevertheless, the proportion of income affected was 
not insignificant, representing around 17% of total income.
How damaging the law would be for CEPE naturally depended an the 
movement in the exchange rate. In these circumstances, the 
progressive weakening of CEPE's financial situation became 
inevitable with the decision of the Monetary Board in March to 
implement a daily devaluation of S/0.05. By the third quarter of
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the year, the official rate stood at around S/50 to the dollar; 
by the end of the year it stood at S/55. As a result $26.9m was 
generated for FONAVIA in 1983, rising to $54.2m. 11
The amount of oil income diverted to the three funds was expected 
to rise substantially over the next few years as the sucre 
progessively weakened against the dollar. In June 1983, the 
idista Hugo Caicedo predicted that from 1984 'probably around 
half of all the sucres income originating from oil exports' would 
be channelled to these three funds.12 FONAVIA was expected to 
receive 10% of oil income, equivalent to $105.3m in each year and 
$526.5m in 1984-88. FONASA's income was expected to be $39.5m 
per annum, with total income during the five year period 
amounting to $197.4m. The smallest fund, FONAFAR, was expected to 
receive $42.lm during 1984-88. In other words, a total of $766m 
worth of oil income was to be diverted to finance these three 
funds from 1984 to 1988.13
Law 138 did not simply affect CEPE's income; it was also expected 
to lead to a significant increase in the company's costs, as the 
CEPE manager was at pains to stress:
' It is essential to indicate the 
disadvantageous situation in which CEPE finds 
itself..On the one hand, its income is 
converted [into sucres] at a fixed exchange 
rate..On the other hand, it has to obtain 
foreign exchange at the official and free 
market rate in order, .[to purchase inports of 
equipment and materials]..to carry out its 
operational duties.. '1A
The combination of declining income and rising costs was expected 
to push CEPE into virtual bankruptcy over the next four years. 
The income and expenditure projections for 1984-88 cited at the 
start of the chapter were gloomy enough. However, they had been 
based on a fixed exchange rate for CEPE's income of S/44 and an 
exchange rate of S/55.05 for its expenditure. No account was 
taken of the progressive devaluation of the currency. While the 
exchange rate for calculating its income remaining fixed at S/44,
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the daily devaluations ordered by the Hurtado government were 
projected to result in the value of the sucre relative to the 
dollar progressively falling from S/62.275 in 1984 to S/99.775 in 
1988. As a result, CEPE's deficit was projected to be, not 
$679.8m, but five times that level.1®
As a matter of urgency ( but with no success) CEPE called on the 
government to:
'exclude from Law 138 the share of oil income 
available for allocation to CEPE..to remain 
faithful to the provisions within the Oil Law 
and the Law on Public Expenditure to ensure 
that CEPE can recover its production costs and 
the refining, transport and storage costs 
involved in supplying derivatives to the
domestic market plus a reasonable 
profit. . [ and]..to revise the legislation 
covering CEPE's participation in the 
consortium's exports to also ensure that it
can recover its production costs and receive a 
reasonable profit for its operations.'1®
The Funding of Investment from External Sources
The inability of CEPE to finance investments from its own 
resources was not new. In the 1970's, only around one- third of 
the investments undertaken were financed from CEPE's own funds. 
At that time, however, access to credit was easy, particularly 
for an oil exporter, and interest rates low. The early 1980's, 
however, not only saw interest rates spiral but the availability 
of credit tighten to the point where lending by 1982 had been 
virtually curtailed. In the case of CEPE, the use of credit to 
fund investment work ground to a halt after 1980, when the 
company contracted $25.3m from commercial banks. No new loans 
were contracted in 1981-84, aside from a $0.9m loan in 1982. This 
largely explains why CEPE's external debt actually fell (in 
nominal dollar terms) from $145.7m in 1979 to $112.lm in 1983.17 
CEPE was not entirely insulated from the rise in interest rates, 
since the loans contracted in the 1970's carried floating
interest rates, which ranged from 1-1.25% plus LIBOR.
- 214 -
Nevetheless, after 1979 when one-fifth of expenditure was 
required to service its debts, the proportion fell to an average 
of 9%. ,e
The market for credit to the oil industry has generally reflected 
the overall state of the world capital markets. However, CEPE's 
failure to obtain credit from the Vorld Bank also resulted from 
its failure to satisfy the policy conditions attached to such 
loans. Since 1980, CEPE had sought to secure funds from the Vorld 
Bank to finance its share of investment in field development 
work, expand the TransAndean pipeline and construct a liquid gas 
plant. These requests were refused, despite domestic oil prices 
being increased on three separate occasions and despite the 
adoption of a series of other economic measures that had, by all 
accounts, 'found favour' with the Bank.19
International factors may have helped shape the Bank's response 
to CEPE's requests. At this time, the oil-lending policies of 
both the Vorld Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank were 
the target of increasing criticism by the Reagan government. 
According to a National Petroleum Council Report, commissioned by 
the US Energy Secretary, their lending activities 'were competing 
directly' with private oil companies in upstream activities.20 
The essential message of the Reagan government was that both 
Banks should stop funding exploration and development work in 
Third Vorld countries.
How effective this pressure was is difficult to determine. But, 
for whatever reason, the amount of funding available for lending 
fell sharply. In 1982, the Vorld Bank reported that lack of 
financial resources ruled out any signficant increase in oil and 
gas funding in the short-term.21 In respect of the IADB, energy- 
lending for oil and gas projects fell, in nominal dollar terms, 
from $147m in 1981 to $31.4m in 1982, with the last representing 
a loan to Bolivia for an exploration and production project. In 
1983, just $21.6m worth of loans to the petroleum sector were 
approved, the lowest level since 1979.22
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In these circumstances, and with both Banks receiving numerous 
requests for funding from other Third World countries, it is 
likely that the conditions attached to Vorld Bank loans were 
substantially tightened. Ecuador was denied a loan until further 
steps were taken to introduce market-based prices for domestic 
products, reduce the public sector deficit and, crucially, 
improve the efficiency the CEPE. A key concern of the Bank was 
that, like a number of other Third Vorld state enterprises was 
in danger of becoming 'a fossilised Institution that was a
burden on government and society as a whole..'23
This overview has so far looked at the collapse in CEPE's 
investment capacity by focusing on the constraints placed on its 
ability to generate sufficient revenue to fund its priority 
investment projects. However, as the statement of the Vorld Bank 
implies, lack of investment capacity may reflect not only 
financial starvation but also operational inefficiency.
The Escalation in CEPE's Costs
The proportion of CEPE's expenditure used to cover operational 
costs increased significantly, from 55% in 1979 to 72% in 1984. 
Why this occurred was the subject of intense political debate 
within Ecuador in the early part of 1983. Attention centred in 
particular on CEPE's high production costs in the Bororiente - 
estimated in nominal dollar terms at $10 - and those of the 
Texaco-CEPE consortium, which were just $2.34. Conservatives 
seized on this as evidence of CEPE's inefficiency, a claim 
vigorously denied by the former CEPE manager Jorge Pareja:
'All the investments made by Texaco and which 
reflect todays costs were made between 1967 
and 1972 when the costs of equipment, 
drilling, imported materials and salaries were 
substantially less than today. .We would have 
to reduce the costs of today to those of 1972 
or 1968 to be able to compare them. . . I am 
convinced that the current costs incurred by 
CEPE are perfectly comparable with those 
incurred by Texaco-Gulf in the years 1967-68 
and 1972.'
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Even the Oil Minister felt it necessary to emphasise that specfic 
production factors, rather than the level of company efficiency, 
largely determined the level of production costs. Costs, for 
instance, in the JTorth Sea, exceeded $20 'not because English 
companies that have accumulated over 100 years of experience are 
inefficient* but because of the specific production conditions in 
which they were required to operate.2®
There was some substance to this argument, nevertheless, even 
CEPE recognised that its efficient development had been hampered 
by the imposition of a highly bureaucratic system of centralised 
control and by the overbearing presence of the Controller- 
General. As one future idista Oil Minister remarked, CEPE was in 
many respects 'an oil company in name only', which more closely 
resembled a bureaucratic appendage of the state.2®
External Perceptions of CEPE's Efficiency
In a report issued in 1983, the Vorld Bank expressed concern 
that CEPE's institutional structure could be conducive to 
increasing expenditures and disregarding efficiency. It was not 
required to pay dividends, or pressed to generate profits; its 
tax bill declined as its expenditures increased; and its domestic 
sales were controlled by government fiat. There was, the Bank 
concluded:
'no profit incentive to reduce costs and no 
fear of competition. The incentives for 
running an efficient and lean operation, then, 
are practically non-existent..Higher income 
may simply result in higher expenses.'27
The rise in CEPE's costs could not, in the Bank's view, be 
explained by inflation or increased oil production. While 
operational costs trebled between 1973-78 so too did CEPE's 
production, while its refining capacity more than doubled. The 
Bank concluded that real unit costs had not increased. However, 
in 1979-82, when there was little increase in its production or 
refining capacity, CEPE's real production costs more than
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doubled. Although the Indices in table 11.6 'are obviously quite 
rough one's', the Bank suggested that 'they do point to a drop 
in CEPE's efficiency.' If CEPE had saved even a quarter of its 
inflated current costs in 1982, 'it would have reduced the total
public deficit by more than 15% - over 1% of the GDP.120
Table 11.6: CEPE Efficiencv Indices (1975=:1QQ)
Operating Costs Crude Refining Real Operating Costs/
Nominal. Real Output Capacity Crude Output
1975 100. 0 100.0 100.0 100. 0 100. 0
1976 122.9 110.0 116.6 100. 0 94.3
1977 216.5 168.5 284.1 226.2 59.3
1978 422.7 307.4 312.4 226.2 98.4
1979 621.0 387.2 318.6 226.2 121.5
1980 958.6 506. 1 315.9 226.2 160.2
1981 1185.0 554.8 324.1 226.2 171.2
1982 1625.2 650.0 322.8 226.2 201. 4
Source: Vorld Bank, Ecuador: An Agenda for Recovery and Sustained 
Growth, (Washington, 1984), p 35.
Proposals to Itestructure CEPS
Although the restructuring of CEPE had been regarded as a key 
policy objective by the Roldos government, the attention of the 
political elites since 1979 had been focused on more 'pressing' 
matters. A belated opportunity to raise the issue was provided by 
the oil reforms of 1982. During the 'consulta nacional' Izquierda 
Democratica had argued that, prior to the return of foreign oil 
companies, steps should be taken to develop CEPE into a strong, 
efficient oil company. This was seen as essential to ensure that 
the state had at its disposal an effective counter-weight to the 
oil multinationals. Only when this had been achieved, it was 
argued, should foreign oil companies be permitted to return.
In early 1983, a draft law containing proposals to reform CEPE's 
Constitution and enable CEPE to operate along the lines of an 
autonomous public sector corporation was presented to Congress.2® 
The CEPE Board was to be 'depoliticised' with ministers replaced 
by individuals with at least five years experience in the oil
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Industry who would work for CEPE on a full-time basis. Measures 
to allow the head of CEPE and his management team more autonomy 
were also proposed. These included allowing the CEPE manager to 
agree contracts up to a maximum of 0.2% of CEPE's budget. As 
part of a continuing move to enable CEPE to become self- 
financing, the draft law proposed that prior to the distribution 
of the income originating from CEPE's business activities - 
with the exception of royalties - CEPE would first deduct all 
the costs it had incurred and receive a rate of return 
equivalent to 15%.
In the event, no Congressional debate on the proposals took 
place. The idista representative Raul Baca Carbo blamed 
conservatives for 'blocking the approval of said law' and 
anything else 'that represents the intervention of the state in 
the economy. 130 However, it seems likely that, with the attention 
of the political parties focused on the first round presidential 
elections in January 1984, few regarded discussion of the 
proposals as a matter of great urgency. Moreover, although the 
concept of a state oil company had not been entirely discredited, 
CEPE's image had been badly tarnished over the preceding years. 
Far from being the embodiment of national sovereignty, by 1983 it 
was viewed by many as a burden on society which was consuming - 
often wasting - scarce resources which could be better employed 
elsewhere. One might even go so far as to question whether there 
was any real concern as to whether CEPE developed into a 
successful company or not. After all, with foreign companies on 
the point of returning to the country and Texaco continuing to 
operate the consortium's fields the future of the country's oil 
future was hardly dependent on CEPE,
CEPE's Role in the Consortium
The debate over CEPE's efficiency appears to have been directly 
related to renewed calls to increase state control of the Texaco- 
CEPE consortium. With Texaco now undertaking secondary recovery 
work, and with the issue of Petroamazonas a distant memory, CEPE
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was destined to remain the 'junior* partner in the consortium. 
However, in May 1983 the head of CEPE, Rear-Admiral Raul 
Jaramillo, suddenly announced that CEPE would replace Texaco as 
operator of the consortium from 1 January 1985. In support of 
this demand, Jaramillo pointed to a provision in the Rapo 
Accord which had been signed between Texaco and Gulf in 1965. 
This stated that they would alternate as operator of the 
consortium every ten years. Gulf itself had decided not to take 
up its option in 1975. However, when CEPE acquired Gulf's share 
in 1977 it had apparently been agreed that the provisons of the 
Rapo Accord would henceforth be applicable to CEPE. This would 
allow CEPE, if it so wished, to replace Texaco as operator from 
the start of 1985. In one sense, Jaramillo was merely 
implementing a policy objective laid down in the Rational 
Development Plan.
It was this demand that led conservatives to initiate a campaign 
to discredit CEPE as being inefficient and lacking the technical 
and managerial capacity to assume operational control of the 
consortium. Aware of the likely response to his demand for the 
implementation of the Rapo agreement, Jaramillo claimed that:
'CEPE has undertaken exploration work, it has 
successfully developed fields, successfully 
constructed an oil infrastructure and
successfully exploited its own fields..CIn 
addition!. . more than 95% of the professional
staff and workers in the consortium are
Ecuadorians, the same that will continue
working efficiently in the consortium. '31
There was, he argued, a practical as well as a legal and moral 
reason why CEPE should become operator. With just seven years to 
go until the termination of its contract, Texaco was unlikely to
be interested in making any investments which it would be unable
to recover before this date. Moreover, its primary objective
would be to extract as much oil as possible in the shortest 
possible time, at whatever the price, 'since the only barrel of 
oil that is not profitable to Texaco is the barrel that remains 
in the fields after 1992.132
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Jaramillo1 s letter to Texaco had been written 'without the
knowledge of either the energy minister or of the President33
The response of Hurtado was decidely lukewarm. According to one
report he 'decided' that CEPE, on the basis of the Napo Accord, 
was 'legally entitled' to become operator.3-* This however should 
be seen as a statement of fact, not a statement of intent. Texaco 
would undoubtedly have regarded such a move as unacceptable.
Quite apart from the risk of Texaco halting any further secondary 
work, a dispute with the company would have badly damaged the 
country's international image at the very moment when the first 
round of bidding was underway. The final decision would, as 
Hurtado realised, lie with the next government. It was therefore 
the conservative president Leon Febres Cordero who took office in 
August 1984 who announced that CEPE would not be taking up its 
option to become operator. Nevertheless, aside from the labour 
movement, there was at the time little firm support for 
Jaramillo's demand among centre-left groups. Where support was 
indicated, as in the case of Izquierda Democratica, it was 
heavily qualified. In June, the party's spokesman Hugo Caicedo, 
emphasised that CEPE should only be permitted to become operator 
if it could show that it was in a position to be able to:
'administer the consortium as or more 
efficiently than Texaco. . . [and]..to operate 
the system of secondary recovery that was 
being implemented in the consortium's wells.
Under these conditions ID will support CEPE 
becoming operator of the consortium.'36
The implication was that such a situation had not been reached. 
Texaco's dominance of the consortium, apparently under threat 
from a government elected five years earlier, remained intact.
While Texaco was left in peace in the Oriente and oil policy was 
directed towards stimulating investor interest in the first round 
of bidding in June, CEPE's priority objectives in the upstream 
had narrowed considerably by 1983. With its role in 'risk' 
investment virtually ended, CEPE was left to concentrate its 
limited resources on developing its fields in the Nororiente. The
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The marginalisation of CEPE in the country’s upstream sector was 
mow complete. Whether CEPE again undertook extensive exploration 
work would depend an the exploration results of those companies 
which decided to invest in Ecuador on the basis of 'service' 
contracts.
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CHAPTER 12: OIL CQMPA1Y RESPONSES TO THE FIRST BIDDIIG RQUMD
With the first round of bidding set to open on 13 June 1983, 
Ecuadorian officials travelled to Western Europe and the United 
States to generate oil company interest. When Hurtado himself 
went to the United States in March to discuss Ecuador's debt 
crisis, he took the opportunity to meet or, more accurately, 
'avidly pursue' US oil company officials.1 As this phrase 
suggests, Ecuador's need for foreign oil capital was somewhat 
greater than the desire of the companies to invest in Ecuador. 
The cautious response of companies was perhaps understandable, in 
view of the country's past history of acrimonious relations with 
oil companies. However, there were other factors that threatened 
to reduce any potential enthusiasm among companies to 
participate in the first bidding round. As one company spokesman 
explained:
'It's oil country, so 1 expect there will be a 
lot of oil company interest. But given the 
present oil market... we' 11 have to wait until 
we see the geological characteristics of what 
they offer.'2
The government had hardly chosen the most opportune moment to 
invite companies back into the exploration play. With oil prices 
sharply declining, potential oil investors were having to re­
examine their capital expenditure plans and investment strategy.
Trends in Oil Company Income and Expenditure
The decline in oil prices that had begun in 1981 had caused oil 
company earnings to fall sharply. In the case of BP, Exxon, Gulf, 
Mobil, Royal Dutch/Shell and Texaco, their combined earnings fell 
by 24.9% in 1981, from $11.6 bn to $8.7 bn, and then dropped by 
a third to $5.9 bn in 1982.3 Capital expenditure, after growing 
only marginally in 1982, dropped sharply, by 25% in 1983. 
Particularly badly hit by the depressed oil market were the 
independents. The experience of Texas International was not
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atypical. Texas had been 'caught up in the euphoria of the oil 
boom,' and borrowed heavily in the confident expectation that 
oil prices would continue to rise.1* In 1981, for instance, the 
company's capital expenditure had totalled $102.2m, equivalent to 
137% of income in that year. Two years later, the company's debt 
had topped $176.5m and capital expenditure fallen to just $23.2m. 
In the short term, the company president James Kishpaugh 
predicted, 'all of us are going to be a little gun-shy for a 
while.'s
The Slowdown In Exploration Activity
Particularly worrying for Ecuador was the scaling down, in many 
cases drastically, of exploration expenditure. After rising by 
39% and 16% in 1981 and 1982 respectively, the combined 
exploration expenditure of the six majors slumped by 21% in 
1983.® A more detailed survey covering the top 22 oil companies 
revealed a similar picture.7 Another, perhaps more accurate 
indication of trends in exploration activity, can be obtained by 
looking at the number of drilling rigs in operation. After 
peaking at 5,821 in non-OPEC countries, the number of rigs in 
operation fell in 1982 to 4,099.® Early evidence for 1983 
suggested that the slowdown in exploration activity was 
continuing, with Parker Drilling reporting in April that Just 
one-third of its 78 rig-fleet was currently operational.®
Other factors may have encouraged the reduction in exploration 
work. Sagging demand, over-supply and the emergence of a buyer's 
market may have given rise to a 'glut pyschology. ' There was also 
evidence at the time suggesting that a number of companies were 
opting to increase their proven oil reserves not through 
exploration but through acquisitions, production enhancement and 
development drilling.10
Towards the end of 1982, however, increasing pressure was being 
exerted on companies to give fresh impetus to the search for new 
oil reserves. The International Energy Association in particular
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called for vigorous energy policies to prepare for the expected 
shortfall in supplies at the end of this century.11 This call was 
echoed by the Petroleum Economist:
‘Though oil is at present a buyer's market, 
the common belief that fears of a coming 
shortage can now be set aside is a dangerously 
short-sighted one. While demand is temporarily 
constricted by severe economic depression, it 
will pick up before long - and it continues to 
eat into the world's oil reserves. What is 
consumed must be replaced if the future is to 
be safeguarded. In view of the length of time 
required for exploration and development there 
should be no slackening of exploration effort.
We need new oilfields...'12
The Potential Benefits of Low Oil Prices
The depressed oil market was not regarded by Ecuadorian officials 
- publicly at least - as necessarily a disincentive for companies 
to invest in the country. After all, it was argued, the decision 
on whether to invest would be based not on the current price
level but on the expected price level in six to eight years 
following the signing of a contract. Indeed, some officials were 
convinced that the country had in fact chosen an 'opportune 
moment' to attract foreign oil investment.13 With oil prices
falling, companies could be expected to direct investment away
from high cost areas and towards areas - like Ecuador - with low 
to medium exploration and operating costs. There was also a 
belief that the search for new oil reserves would be increasingly 
directed away from developed countries, where large-scale 
investment had failed to significantly increase OECD reserves, 
and towards potential oil-bearing zones in the the Third World.
This was not an altogether unconvincing line to take, for two 
reasons. Since exploration activity had historically been 
concentrated in the developed countries, particularly the United 
States, there was a strong possibility that the petroleum still 
to be discovered might be largely situated in the Third World. No 
definitive figure exists on the size of their ultimate
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recoverable reserves. However, Grossling suggested in 1985 that 
they could range from 1,000 to 3,000 billion barrels, with Latin 
America holding between 336 to 960 bn, Africa and Madacascar 350 
to 1,000; South and South-East Asia 224 to 640; and China 75 to 
220.
Moreover, the evidence suggested that oil company exploration in 
the ten years to 1981 had consistently been more successful in 
the developing countries. According to one report, the amount of 
oil and gas (measured in terms of oil equivalent) discovered
averaged 52.6m barrels per wildcat in the oil exporting
developing countries, 5.2m barrels in the oil imparting
developing countries and only 0.7m in the industrialised
countries. The same report also concluded that the cost per
added barrel of oil or gas in the three categories worked out
respectively (in nominal dollar terms) at $0.24, $1.15 and
$4.48.1S There were, therefore, major commercial incentives for 
switching the search for new reserves to the developing
countries.
In the early part of 1983, however, there was no real evidence
that a shift in investment strategy of the type that could 
benefit Ecuador was taking place. On the contrary, major cut­
backs were taking place in company exploration activity in Third 
World countries. For instance, Peru and Colombia, which had
signed a number of contracts with foreign oil companies in 1979- 
81, now found themselves two years later struggling to
maintain oil company interest. Both were to recognise that those 
countries which were able to adjust their contractual terms in 
line with the changes in the world oil market would be far better 
placed to maintain or attract the limited amounts of exploration 
capital available for non-priority investment targets.
Foreign Exploration Activity in Peru and Colombia
Peru's experience in 1983 showed that, under existing market
conditions, the 'liberal' oil regulations that had initially
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attracted companies were no longer adequately attractive to 
maintain, let alone attract, investment. In the first part of the 
year, the momentum of exploration activity slowed considerably, 
with a number of prospective deals with oil investors falling 
through. In mid-1983, Superior Oil company decided to abandon its 
wells in the northern jungle after having spent $70m in two 
years.ie Occidental announced a two-thirds reduction in drilling 
plans in the jungle and cancelled all drilling in the 
northwestern coastal fields.17 And yet, just over a year 
earlier, the company had claimed that its Peruvian operations 
were the company's most profitable world-wide, owing to a 
production sharing agreement that yielded better returns than, 
for instance, Libya and the North Sea.1®
Overall, foreign oil investment in Peru was expected to fall from 
$241m in 1982 to around $162.5m in 1983. 19 Vith Petroperu in 
deep financial problems and with new reserves urgently needed, 
the government had little option but to:
'face up to the same challenger confronting all 
lesser developed countries: how to exercise
flexibility in the adjustment of contract 
terms to keep pace with changing world market 
conditions..'20
By September 1983, reports were circulating that the government 
was planning to introduce a more flexible exploration contract. 
This was expected to include a seismic option under which 
companies would not lose their bank guarantee if they felt that 
seismic surveys did not justify drilling exploratory wells. Steps 
were also to be taken to allow companies to participate in blocks 
originally assigned to Petroperu. 21
Exploration activity in Colombia at the start of 1983 also fell 
sharply, by around 50%, following the drilling of a record 73 
wildcats in 1982. This occurred despite a number of highly 
promising discoveries by Occidental in the Llanos.22 However, a 
significant degree of oil company interest in Colombia was 
maintained and, in the closing months of 1983, actually
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strengthened. Of the 25 association contracts signed between 
Ecopetrol and private companies in 1983 - an increase of 17 on 
1982 - 10 were signed in the closing weeks of the year.23
Colombia had a number of advantages over other Latin American 
countries. The economic and political situation was reasonably 
good, it had a manageable external debt and was generally 
regarded as being one of the best credit risks in the region. 
Oil-specific factors also played a key role in revitalising oil 
company interest. A number of oil discoveries had been made in 
the Llanos and, more particularly, in Cano Limon. This was 
described by Armand Hammer as Occidental's 'most significant' 
discovery since the 'Claymore' and 'Piper' fields in the Sorth 
Sea.2* Company interest was also maintained by offering more 
attractive terms that included allowing companies up to two 
years to conduct geophysical surveys prior to the start of 
drilling. This was one of the features:
'that have made the Colombian association 
contract preferred by the private sector 
compared with terms offered by other Latin 
American countries.'23
The contractor could also relinquish an area after seismics, 
without any obligation to drill if the prospects were not 
considered promising.
The examples of both Peru and Colombia provided good and bad news 
for Ecuador. On the positive side, it was clear that oil 
companies had not entirely written off Latin America as a target 
for investment. On the negative side, Colombia in particular was 
successfully attracting scarce capital resources that might 
otherwise have been available for investment in Ecuador.
Priority Targets for Exploration
The problems likely to face Ecuador were compounded by the clear 
evidence that the main focus of company interest during this 
period was not on Latin America or developing countries in
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general. Attention instead was centred on China, which had 
opened an international bidding process covering 150,000 km in 
the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea. There was, in the words 
of one oil expert, 'an almost hysterical interest' in the oil 
potential of China.26 By the close of bidding in August 1982, 102 
tenders had been received from 12 consortia and eight companies 
that bid independently. One year later, a number of these 
including BP, Occidental, Exxon-Shell, Hispanoil and Idemitsu 
had signed risk contracts. Although exploration results were to 
prove disappointing - initial estimates had pointed to reserves 
in the South China Sea ranging from between 14 to 25 bn barrels - 
it was estimated at the time that as much as $10 bn worth of 
foreign investment would be channelled into exploration and 
development in the period up to the end of the century.2:7
Oil company interest was also maintained in Alaska and the Gulf 
of Mexico. A succession of highly successful licensing rounds 
were held during 1983 for exploration rights in the Gulf. At the 
end of May, Just under $2 bn worth of bids were received from 78 
companies.20 Three months later, a further $1 bn worth of 
bids were received from over 100 companies for 436 blocks 
covering 6m acres.
Meanwhile, in one of the highest cost-producing areas in the 
world oil exploration was 'back in fashion.120 Interest in the 
British sector of the North Sea had shown signs of waning in 
1982, with some companies openly talking of diverting more of 
their exploration and production investment to other regions of 
the world - notably China - where costs were lower. The reason 
for this was lay in the maintenance of a tax system which, at a 
time of falling oil prices, served to reduce cash flow to an 
inadequate level and diminish any incentive to invest in small 
or medium sized fields which contained the bulk of unexploited 
reserves.30
There appeared, then, to be some evidence to support Ecuadorian 
claims that low oil prices would force companies to redirect
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their oil investment towards low cost regions. However, this 
argument implicitly assumed that governments in high cost 
regions would not revise their tax regulations to take account 
of the depressed oil market conditions. In the case of the 
British sector of the North Sea such revisions did take place. In 
March 1983, the British government responded to oil company 
pressure by issuing a series of tax amendments which were 
expected to save oil companies operating in the North Sea £800m 
in the period to 1987.31 As a result, the number of exploration 
wells drilled rose to a record 128 in 1983, resulting in 21 new 
oil and gas finds, only slightly lower than the record 28 
discoveries made in 1975.
While priority investment targets in North America, the Gulf of 
Mexico, the North Sea and China were largely unaffected by the 
squeeze on profits and expenditure, the price declines did reduce 
the attractions of committing limited finance to more marginal 
exploration plays, particularly in countries noted for political 
instability. Whether Ecuador, as a proven though 'marginal' 
exploration play, secured a share of this limited finance 
depended on the terms on offer being as, if not more, attractive 
than those existing elsewhere and of potential investors being 
convinced their investments would be secure.
Ecuador: A Favourable Knvi rrrmaPTit for Foreign Oil Companies
Government officials believed that Ecuador was well placed over 
other Third World countries in offering favourable investment 
conditions to foreign oil companies: production costs were
situated in the low to medium range; the policy of reserving 'low 
risk' areas for CEPE had been dropped and a number of these, 
including Block 15, made available to companies; Ecuador was 
situated outside of the main areas of world conflict; its 
geographic position provided good access to the main oil 
consuming nations; major revisions had been made to domestic oil 
prices; and border tension with Peru substantially reduced. Most 
importantly, there was clear evidence of a consensus within
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Ecuador on the need for foreign oil capital and on the 
contractual terms under which companies were being invited to 
explore.
These terms were, in the government's view, 'in line with the 
most up to date and progressive of their kind applicable to the 
petroleum industry.132 Artificial barriers of entry in the form 
of superficiary rights or entry fees had been eliminated; and a 
more flexible payment system had been introduced which gave 
companies a secure access to crude oil supplies. The tax system 
was also regarded as a key incentive for companies. This, 
according to Vilson PAstor, ensured that incentives to explore 
for and develop fields were unaffected by adverse changes in the 
operating environment, either in terms of reduced revenues or 
increased costs. The tax system in particular was expected to 
give Ecuador the competitive edge over other developing 
countries.
The tax system was devised to offset oil company reluctance to 
invest when market conditions were depressed.33 According to 
PAstor, oil income tax in other countries was generally imposed 
on the difference between prices and real costs. This meant that 
if prices fell and costs increased, separately or together, 
company profitability would also fall. In these circumstances, 
there was a possibility that lower oil prices could be 
accompanied by higher income tax, which in turn would lead to 
wells that had previously been commercial becoming 
uncommercial.3*
Under the Ecuadorian system the profitability of a field was 
determined independently of income tax and related instead to the 
volume of non-amortized investment. It was on this basis that 
the contractor would receive a rate of return equivalent to the 
Prime Rate and to the level of risk involved in the block 
awarded. In addition, a premium was paid which was dependent on 
the size of income and the quantity of reserves found: the
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greater the income and reserves, the larger the premium. In this
way, PAstor concluded, the profit of the oil company:
' is guaranteed according to the rate agreed
within the contract, regardless of income tax 
and, to a large extent, the movement in oil 
prices.'3S
Other features of the Ecuadorian 'service' contract appeared, at 
the very least, to be representative of what was on offer in
other Third World countries. Clearly, from the contractor's 
perspective, oil contracts which provide for a smaller government 
take of the total revenue from the contract area will be more 
attractive. As the following table shows, the state's share in 
Ecuador would be higher than that obtained under the Australian 
Resource Rent Tax and the British Concession contract. It would, 
however, be lower than the share available under the Angolan and 
Indonesian production sharing contracts. Under the 'service' 
contract, the state's share was 75% compared to 80% in Indonesia 
and 76% in Angola.
Table 12.1: Analysis of Government Take (in nominaLlml
Indonesia Angola Ecuador Australia U.K
Total Revenue 2529 2529. 2529. 2529 2529
Government Share 2014 1912 1894 1632 801
Contractors Share 306 408 426 688 1519
Investments 115 115 115 115 115
Expenses 94 94 94 94 94
Rote: The figures are based on a 50 million barrel field with
$5,000/peak daily barrel development costs and an oil price of
$29 per barrel and expressed in nominal dollars.
Source: J C Patterson, International Petroleum Investment - Why 
Australia?, The Australian Petroleum Exploration Journal, (1985), 
p 13.
The size of the contractor's take in Ecuador was even more 
favourable vis a vis Indonesia and Angola as the level of
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development costs increased for particular sizes of field, as 
table 12.2 shows.
Table 12.2; Estimated Government Take by Size of Field (in %)
Development Costs/ Peak Daily Barrel ($000)
5. lfiL 15. 20 25. ao.
MEEELS.
50 Million
Ecuador 75 68 62 55 47 40
Indonesia 80 75 68 62 55 50
Angola 76 70 62 54 46 44
1QQ Million
Ecuador 76 72 64 60 52 46
Indonesia 80 76 72 65 60 50
Angola 82 76 70 60 52 44
200 Million
Ecuador 80 76 72 66 60 56
Indonesia 84 78 75 70 66 62
Angola 88 82 75 68 62 54
Source: J C Patterson, International Petroleum Investment - Why
Australia?, The Australian Petroleum Exploration Journal, (1985),
p 12.
The Political Risk Factor
The government recognised that economic incentives alone would 
be insufficient to persuade oil companies to invest in Ecuador. 
There were reports that some companies had 'expressed concern' 
that:
'having signed a contract and been working for 
two or three years someone or other will 
appear and rescind the contract for missing a 
comma or something of this kind.'3S
Oil company fears can only have been heightened with the 
impeachment of Oil Minister Ortega and the cancellation of the 
Permago contract. In the view of the former head of CEPE Jorge
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Pareja, the 'absurd' decision to dismiss Ortega was 'a political 
act unconnected to oil matters' which would prove highly 
damaging to Ecuador's attempts to attract foreign investment:
'As a result of this sad comedy foreign 
companies are going to think twice before 
coming to Ecuador because one of the basic 
concepts that multinationals require, be they 
state or private, is the security and sanctity 
of their contracts. . '3-7
Ecuadorian officials sought to assure potential investors that 
the 'rules of the game' would remain unaltered during the 
lifetime of the existing government and specifically pointed to 
the results of the 'consulta nacional.' They were also left in no 
doubt that the general state of the economy left Ecuador with 
little alternative but to seek an external solution to the 
country's energy and economic problems. Burdened by huge debt- 
servicing payments, with markets for its principal exports 
depressed, international reserves low and access to new loans 
virtually closed, the state was in no position to fund an 
extensive programme of exploration.
Moreover, the revitalisation of the oil sector represented the 
key to economic growth and recovery. Although non-oil exports 
were expected to recover from the effects of 'El Nifio' in 1984, 
no further growth was expected with external demand remaining 
depressed. Manufacturing exports were expected to 'only fare 
moderately well' given the depressed nature of the Andean Market 
which remained - and was likely to remain - the primary market 
for these products.33 In these circumstances, Ecuador's future 
prosperity rested almost entirely on the ability of the 
government to maintain and increase the volume of crude oil 
exports. This, in turn, depended on dampening domestic oil 
consumption through further oil price hikes and boosting the
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country's production capacity by intensifying exploration and 
development work. Time, according to the World Bank, was fast 
running out:
•With internal demand for petroleum products 
increasing at about 6% per year, oil 
production in Ecuador must be increased 
annually by at least 2 million barrels to 
maintain crude oil exports at the same level 
as 1983. Thus, sufficient reserves exist to 
permit slight increases of oil production 
through 1988: thereafter, a rapid decline of
oil production will occur unless new fields 
are soon developed to offset the decline after 
1988, to supply internal demand, and to 
increase oil exports.'39
Aware that companies might be reluctant to bid with just one year 
of the Hurtado government's term of office to go, officials 
stressed that, given these economic realities, the new government 
would have no alternative strategies available to it other than 
to seek a massive infusion of foreign investment. Both 
candidates with the most significant chances of forming the new 
government in August 1984 were committed to securing foreign oil 
investment. Leon Febres Cordero, the champion of the business 
community, was strongly attached to neo-liberalism and the 
principles of the free market. Together with his close ties to 
the United States and foreign capital and his belief that state 
companies (in particular CEPE) were by definition inherently 
inefficient, Febres Cordero was favourably disposed ideologically 
towards foreign investment. That major economic imperatives 
necessitated the infusion of foreign investment was largely 
incidental: even in a more favourable economic climate, a
government headed by Febres Cordero could be expected to attract 
substantial quantities of foreign oil investment.
Any concern at the future direction of oil policy under a new 
government thus centred on the Izquierda Democratica candidate 
Rodrigo Borja. He was expected to be more vigilant in ensuring 
that contractual obligations were carried out. However, concern 
at the prospect of a centre-left government was substantially
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reduced by the knowledge that Izquierda Democratica itself had 
played a central role in drawing up a more attractive package of 
oil regulations for foreign investors.
Oil Company Responses to the First Round_Qf Bidding
Within a week of the first bidding round opening, CEPE officials 
were reporting that 12 companies had expressed interest in 
participating in the bidding process. By the close of bidding in 
October, 25 oil companies had purchased the $50,000 information 
packages giving details of each of the 11 blocks on offer, seven 
of which were onshore. The degree of apparent interest was such, 
that Oil Minister Galinda suggested that contracts might be 
signed for all eleven blocks. Following the success of this 
bidding round, he fully expected that the next government would 
put up further blocks and initiate a second bidding round.4*0
Others adopted a more cautionary attitude, with former Oil 
Minister Ortega warning that the depressed state of the oil 
market had led companies to restrict their operations 'everywhere 
in the world, which also means a need to select the areas to be 
explored more carefully than ever.'4*1 A similar view was taken by 
Hugo Caicedo, who argued that, if just 3 or 4 contracts are 
signed during the present government, 'one can then speak of 
total success..'4*2 He was similarly opposed to Galinda's 
suggestion that the new government should open a second bidding 
round, though this stance presumably assumed that contracts would 
eventually be signed for the blocks currently on offer. It was, 
he said, 'preferable to wait four or five years to see the 
results of the first bidding round and then proceed from there'. 
It should not be forgotten, Caicedo added, that 'the opening to 
foreign capital is not unlimited but that it was conceived in 
order to complement our national effort through CEPE.'*2
The number of actual bids received by 17 October 1983 was modest. 
Of the 11 blocks on offer, just four blocks (two onshore and two 
offshore) attracted bids. Belco was the only bidder for the two
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offshore areas (blocks 1 and 2) immediately to the north of its 
Peruvian offshore fields. Block 15, situated alongside the giant 
Shushufindi field, drew competing bids from two consortiums, 
Conoco-Husky-Home and Idemitsu-Hispanoil, and from Occidental 
which finally won first option. The company had proposed to 
carry out 1,413 km of seismic lines and to drill four 
exploratory wells. A joint bid was made by Exxon and Hispanoil 
for Block 8, with the consortium offering to carry out 1,000 km 
of seismic lines and to drill two exploratory wells.
Table 12.3: Analysis of Oil Company Investment (in nominal $m)
Occidental Exxon Belcu(l) Belco
Prospection 12.0 9. 0 1.8 1.8
Drilling 20. 0 11.6 6.0 12. 0
Evaluation - 3.8 - -
Admin. Expenditure 5. 1 3.6 0.6 1. 1
Training 2. 0 2. 0 0.4 0. 4
Other 0.3 — - -
Total Investment 39.4 30. 0 8.8 15.3
Source: CEPE, Exploracion Petrolera en El Ecuador: Objetivos
Alcanzados, (June 1987), p 25-26.
The lukewarm response to the tender was understandable given the 
existing international market conditions and the major investment 
opportunities that were developing in other regions of the world. 
Although the political risk was considered small by many 
companies, it would be surprising too if Ecuador's acrimonious 
relationship with foreign companies in the past had not caused 
many potential investors to refrain from bidding. More recent 
events, most notably the conflict between Carvajal and the Oil 
Ministry, the dismissal of Ortega and Jaramillo's letter to 
Texaco could only have increased company concern.
The patchy response does highlight how assessments of the 
political risk, the geological attractiveness of the blocks on 
offer and even the contractual terms themselves can differ from 
company to company. One oil major, which purchased an 
information pack but did not bid for a block, still did not
- 237 -
believe the terms were sufficiently attractive. There was, in its 
view, no certainty that a company would get access to any oil 
discovered. The company claimed that the law still allowed the 
state to keep a sizeable portion of the oil discovered and 
limited a foreign investor's access to cash profits rather than 
to crude oil supplies. Concern was also expressed with the 
pricing concept on which cash payments were to be based. The 
valuation of the oil, it claimed, would be dependent on the 
'whim' of CEPE and its ability or otherwise to sell its oil on 
the world market at good prices.** Some concern was also 
expressed that the Oil Minister - and thus the head of the CEPE 
board - would arbitrate in any conflicts that arose between the 
contractor and CEPE.*e
State-Company Negotiations. 1983-85
Negotiations with Occidental and Exxon-Hispanoil initially 
proceeded at a brisk pace, with the Oil Minister predicting 
that contracts would be signed in February 1984. Occidental's 
first exploratory well was expected to be drilled in July, with 
Exxon's following one month later. However, a further year was to 
pass before the first contract was signed. Although the draft 
contract with Occidental was agreed in early 1984, any prospect 
of the contract being signed during Hurtado's term of office 
disappeared on 2 July 1984 when the Attorney-General objected to 
the draft contract. Some of the objections 'betrayed little 
understanding of tax legislation', with the report objecting 
to the fact that income tax was to be levied only on income and 
not on expenses.*6 The key objection, however, was that the 
Special Bid Committee should not have accepted the bid from, or 
signed the contract with, Occidental Petroleum since exploration 
and development work was to be undertaken by a subsidiary company
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Occidental del Ecuador. It was a point that was shared by a 
number of CEPE officials, one of whom offered the following 
parallel:
' Take the case of a father who describes his 
son to another father as having good 
professional qualifications and good prospects 
saying that his son would like to marry his 
daughter. It is a proposition that is mutually 
attractive to both sides. However, on arriving 
at the church the father finds that he is 
giving his daughter away to another son, who 
r has no prospects and is generally 
unsatisfactory. The subsidiary issue was the 
same. While everything necessary to know about 
the parent company was known, nothing was 
known about the subsidiary or its financial, 
technical or managerial set-up.'
Hurtado could have overrun these objections since the Attorney- 
General' s report was not legally binding but merely an opinion 
albeit one that could not easily be ignored. His administration, 
however, was already under fire from the government-to-be for 
signing too many last minute contracts. The resolution of the 
problem was therefore left to the Febres Cordero administration. 
Further delays were thus inevitable once the new government took 
office. According to one CEPE official:
' delays were bound to occur both during the 
elections and during the early period of rule 
by the new government when major changes in 
personnel are being implemented, for instance 
in the negotiating committees, the Oil 
Ministry and CEPE. The new Oil Minister 
himself would be suspicious of what his 
predecessor had been doing during the 
negotiations and would need a great deal of 
time to familiarise himself with what had been 
going on.'
The first step of the Febres Cordero government was to seek the 
new Attorney-General' s opinion on the contract. He repeated the 
same criticism levelled by his predecessor. The impasse was 
eventually broken when Occidental announced that the company that 
had bid and signed the contract, namely Occidental Petroleum,
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would undertake the agreed work programme. Soon afterwards, on 25 
January 1985, the contract was signed.
Occidental's rate of return ranged from 24.9% for production of 
less than 10,000 b/d to 15.9% for over 30,000 b/d. *9 The 
government itself appeared confident that Oxy would be able to 
extract around 30,000 b/d within two years of exploration work 
beginning, rising to around 50,000 b/d thereafter.®0 At the
request of Occidental, the service fee was to be paid in cash not
oil, a decision that reflected the cash flow problems the
company was experiencing following its take-over of City 
Services.S1
The signing of the contract with Exxon-Hispanoil consortium was 
also delayed, mainly it appears because of the consortium's 
decision to receive the service fee in oil rather than cash. 
This had not been opposed by the government, but it did involve 
the inclusion in the contract of clauses governing the delivery 
of the oil which the Occidental contract did not need.®2 The
contract was eventually signed on 3 April 1985. Exxon's rate of 
return had a six step ladder compared to Occidental's three, and 
ranged from 35% for under 10,000 b/d to 20% for over 100,000 b/d. 
The rates of return were higher than those accepted by 
Occidental, due to the more risky nature of Block 8.®3
Negotiations with Belco, which began in March 1984, were also 
prolonged, with the company seeking considerably higher rates of 
return than Occidental or Exxon. There was, as the government 
itself agreed, some justification for this. Although exploration 
and development costs were expected to be little different to 
those in the Oriente, offshore exploitation costs were projected 
to be almost three times higher.®41 The fields that could be 
expected to be found in Belco's contract areas were also likely 
to be far smaller than in the Oriente. Belco's request for a rate 
of return of between 25-27% - another source placed it at 30% - 
was considered excessive by CEPE, which was prepared to offer 
between 20-25%.®® Nevertheless, a few weeks after a meeting in
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April between Febres Cordero and Robert Belford, the president of 
Belco, it was reported in 'Hoy' that an agreement had been 
reached, with the rate of return set at 31%.S6
Following the successful conclusion of these negotiations, the 
Febres Cordero government attempted to accelerate the influx of 
foreign ail capital by calling a further four rounds of bidding. 
By the middle of 1987, contracts had been signed with Texaco- 
Pecten, British Petroleum, Conoco, Elf, Braspetro, Tenneco and 
Petrocanada. A total of 43 exploratory wells were to be drilled, 
with total investment amounting, in nominal dollar terms, to 
$300m. The fact that all these contracts had been signed by a 
government deeply attached to neo-liberal ideology and dominated 
by representatives of the agro-exporting elite was, as 
developments in 1979-84 suggest, less significant than might 
initially have been thought. It is difficult to imagine, for 
instance, how the overall direction of oil policy could have 
been fundamentally different under another government, given the 
gravity of the oil situation, the lukewarm response of companies 
to the first bidding round, and the financial problems affecting 
CEPE and the economy. Disappointing exploration results by 
Occidental, Exxon and Belco, reinforced the necessity of 
attracting further large infusions of foreign capital. Indeed, 
the essential continuity in government oil policy, and the 
difficulty of explaining the 'open door' policy in party, class 
or ideological terms, was apparent when the Febres Cordero 
government appointed Wilson PAstor, oil advisor to Izquierda 
Democratica in 1979-84, to coordinate the opening of new bidding 
rounds and negotiations with oil companies.
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CQICLffSIQB
It would be difficult to overstate the extent to which the 
attempt to give fresh impetus to the state-led development of the 
oil industry failed. Far from spearheading the search for new oil 
reserves, CEPE by 1983 was barely in a position to perform the 
supplementary role that was to have been assumed by foreign oil 
companies. Plans to restructure and capitalise CEPE were 
abandoned, the proposal to strengthen its role in the consortium 
were dropped and exploration activity in a number of highly
prospective areas suspended and made available to foreign 
companies. There was no public acknowledgement that the main 
burden of exploration would be assumed for the remainder of the 
decade by foreign oil companies. This was, however, the implict 
meaning of the decision in 1982 to link CEPE's capitalisation to 
the future revenue generated by companies operating under service 
contracts. This effectively ensured that CEPE would play, at 
best, a marginal role in exploration, at least until the 1990‘s.
Oil policy thus swung sharply in favour of drawing foreign oil 
capital into the country, with a succession of contracts being 
signed with oil companies during and after 1985. Although these 
were signed by the Febres Cordero government, the 'opening up' of 
the exploration sector to foreign capital cannot be explained in 
terms of the class or ideology of the Febres Cordero government. 
It resulted from the nature of oil policy-making during 1979-84, 
in particular the failure of both the Roldos and Hurtado 
governments to strengthen CEPE and provide fresh impetus to the 
state-led development of the oil industry.
The question that the thesis sought to answer is why attempts to 
give fresh impetus to the state-led development of the oil 
industry failed. The thesis points to a mix of geological, 
economic and political factors.
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The Vagaries of Ecuadorian Geology
For a state oil company 'geology is often destiny.11 In the case 
of Mexico, the oil discoveries of the early 1970's transformed 
the fortunes of the Mexican economy and the state oil company 
Pernex, and effectively ruled out any future need for foreign 
investment.
CEPE proved less fortunate. Prior to 1980, it failed to make any 
significant oil finds, leaving the country totally reliant on 
discoveries made by Texaco-Gulf in the late 1960's. Although CEPE 
made a string of discoveries in the Mororiente over the next 
three years, the major oil find that could have transformed the 
fortunes of CEPE and render obsolete the need for large-scale 
foreign investment failed to materialise. CEPE may simply have 
been unlucky. However, exploration results since the late 1960's 
suggested that any oil left to be found was likely to be 
concentrated in small or medium sized fields, containing heavier 
crude and situated at deeper levels both offshore and onshore. A 
number of expensive exploration failures in highly prospective 
low-risk areas - most notably in the Gulf of Guayaquil - served 
to confirm that there was no 'easy' oil left. The realisation 
that Ecuador had no option but to pursue a fast-moving, 
extensive, and sustained programme of investment effectively 
ruled out a largely domestic solution.
The Economic Climate
Economic realities reinforced the logic of seeking extensive 
foreign collaboration. Plans for CEPE to assume the main burden 
of exploration may have been overly optimistic from the outset, 
but they certainly became so once CEPE was denied the financial 
resources necessary to accomplish this task. Despite initial 
indications, the international climate proved highly unfavourable 
to a costly and ambitious programme of investment. OPEC's price 
offensive and the shift in US monetary policy set in motion a 
chain of events that pushed the economy to the verge of economic
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collapse. Under the economic conditions prevailing in the early 
1980’s, few governments would have been willing to transfer 
scarce resources to a costly activity in which there was no 
guarantee of success. The government's level of toleration in 
respect of exploration failures was probably never high, given 
CEPE's own poor past performance in the 1970's. Expensive 
failures of the type that occurred in the Gulf of Guayaquil 
undoubtedly pushed this tolerance to breaking point.
Beyond these general observations on the influence of the 
economic situation, there seems to be little direct link between 
the collapse in CEPE's investment capacity and the deteriorating 
international and domestic economic situation. As a result of 
decrees passed in November 1979, CEPE remained unaffected by the 
decline in crude and fuel oil export prices. Nor can CEPE's
financial problems be linked to the rapid rise in interest rates. 
Indeed, its debt-service payments fell sharply during the 
period, both in real terms and as a proportion of total
expenditure. The sudden curtailment in bank lending also affected 
CEPE only marginally. For the rest of the public sector, events 
in late 1982 led to the evaporation of a key income source. Not
so CEPE, which contracted virtually no new loans after 1979. It
does seem likely, however, that CEPE's attempts to obtain loans 
from the World Bank were adversely affected, not only by its 
failure to satisfy the policy conditions laid down by the Bank, 
but by US government opposition to the Bank's policy of advancing 
loans for exploration activities.
The Nature of State-CEPE relations
It was suggested in the introduction that an indirect link may 
have existed between the economic crisis and the decapitalisation 
of CEPE. During the early 1980's, even state oil companies whose 
financial and managerial autonomy had largely been respected by 
the state found their resources under increased pressure from 
governments struggling to cope with mounting economic problems. 
CEPE's resources similarly attracted such unwelcome political
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attention. However, this cannot be linked to a particular time 
nor to a particular set of circumstances.
Like other Latin American state oil companies, CEPE has been 
required to carry out a multiplicity of functions, one of which 
was to provide funds to the state. However, in contrast to the 
more successful state companies in the region, CEPE’s 
entrepreneurial functions have always been subordinated to wider 
political or macroeconomic objectives. Every government in 
Ecuador, military and civilian, progressive and conservative, 
has required CEPE to sell oil on the domestic market at a loss 
and regarded the company as an easy source of revenue to fund 
fiscal deficits, macroeconomic objectives and maintain the 
goodwill of the armed forces. To ensure compliance with these 
'external' goals, the state imposed a highly bureaucratic 
structure of centralised control which subjected CEPE to constant 
political interference, stifled managerial initiative and reduced 
the decision-making process to a ponderous crawl. The resulting 
inefficiency - together with a number of costly operating errors 
- undoubtedly encouraged the spiralling increase in the company's 
operational costs and consequently served to reduce its 
investment capacity.
CEPE's misfortune was that the nature of its relationship with 
the state remained unchanged throughout the early 1980's. Both 
the Roldos and Hurtado governments, like their military 
predecessors, appropriated CEPE's funds with little, if any, 
regard for the corporations investment needs or rising 
operational costs. The economic crisis of the early 1980's thus 
merely distracts attention from the domestic political origins of 
CEPE's failure to develop into a well-capitalised and efficient 
state oil company. Given the oil policy of the Roldos 
government and urban middle-class parties and their awareness of 
CEPE's problems and the solutions to them, why then were the 
company's needs still largely ignored?
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Domestic Politics
The primary reason it seems lay in the domestic political 
sphere in the sense of concerning political priorities. These 
served, in the first instance, to divert attention from the needs 
of CEPE. That these needs were ignored by conservative groups 
and the business community was hardly surprising given their 
traditional hostility to CEPE and the state-led development of 
the oil industry. Their chief preoccupation was to protect the 
welfare of the private sector. In pursuit of this objective, all 
manner of strategies (including calls for military intervention) 
were used to undermine the authority of both Roldos and Hurtado 
and bring the policy-making process to a virtual halt. With 
neither president able to form a stable, pro-government coalition 
of centre and centre-left groups, conservative groups proved 
highly successful in ensuring the virtual absence during this 
period of anything dramatic or new in terms of policies. Viewed 
from this perspective, the absence of policy initiatives in 
respect of CEPE - and indeed the delay in creating a more 
attractive investment climate for foreign companies - can be 
attributed to the collapse in the process of policy formation 
and implementation generally. It is important to reiterate, 
moreover, that the primary concern of Roldos and Hurtado was not 
to effect radical change, but to consolidate multi-party 
democracy in Ecuador. The first, important step in this process 
was to ensure the smooth transfer of power to a democratically 
elected civilian government in 1984. This required the 
maintenance of amicable relations with the military and the 
avoidance of outright conflict with the business community.
As well as diverting attention away from the needs of CEPE, these 
priorities together with patronage politics and the government's 
emphasis on social welfare policies, also resulted in CEPE 
receiving political attention of a more unwelcome, but 
predictable kind. Rather than risk the political unpopularity (or 
worse) that would have accompanied tax reforms or substantial 
rises in domestic oil prices, the political elites opted to fund
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welfare politics and current expenditure by siponing funds from 
CEPE and other investment-orientated state enterprises dependent 
on oil revenues. In so doing, the political elites effectively 
deprived CEPE of the resources necessary to fulfill its priority 
objectives.
The Obstacles to Strengthening CEPE
There was, it should be noted, no politically easy way in which 
CEPE could be capitalised. A particular problem was the extensive 
manner in which the country's oil income was earmarked. This not
only reduced the latitude for flexibility or the prioritising of
public funds to meet particular needs or changing circumstances. 
It also meant that any transfer of additional funds to CEPE, from 
whatever oil income source, could only be achieved at the 
expense of other public sector entities. As Philip states:
'Once a government agency has been confined to 
the status of a Cinderella there will be 
considerable resistance on the part of others 
to any attempt# to improve its position,
because such improvement will involve the 
diversification of financial or political
resources away from themselves.'2
In the case of Ecuador, the problem was heightened because the 
bulk of the country's oil income was channelled to the state 
budget and the armed forces. A reduction in the first would have 
substantially reduced the latitude for patronage and welfare 
politics, while a reduction in the second would have antagonised 
a conservative-dominated military which was not unwilling to
raise the spectre of military intervention when Congress or the 
executive pursued policies that were regarded by senior officers 
as a threat to the interests of the military institution. In 
other words, the capitalisation of CEPE could only be achieved at 
the expense of other revenue sharers and the priority policies 
and objectives of the political elites.
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As the concentration of the country's oil income in the hands of 
the state budget and military suggests, political power - actual 
or potential - rather than 'need' has determined the 
distribution of oil income. CEPE was hardly equipped to compete 
on equal terms with other pressure groups seeking additional 
funds from the state. Hot only was it subject to tight political 
control from the centre, but it had no external political 
constituency which could have exerted pressure on the government 
on its behalf. Carvajal attempted to overcome CEPE's 'dependency' 
status by seeking, and finding, outside political support in the 
shape of Jaime Roldos. In different political circumstances, this 
might have brought important benefits for CEPE and its manager. 
The strategy failed, however, due to Roldos' weak political 
position. He had neither the power to dictate on his own the 
policies of the government, nor the power to choose the 
individuals to carry them out.
CEPE's lack of political clout vis a vis other groups in society 
not only prevented the company from increasing its share of 
income from existing oil income sources. It also prevented the 
company from accruing any significant financial benefits from new 
oil income sources. The $519.3m generated from domestic oil price 
hikes 1981-83, for instance, could have significantly reduced the 
losses CEPE incurred in the domestic market and provided a 
valuable source of income for investment. Here too, however, the 
financial benefits accruing to CEPE were limited by Congressional 
decree, with over two-thirds of the revenue transferred to the 
military and the state budget. Similarly, in the case of the 
income generated from CEPE's Hororiente fields, the company's 
share was marginalised by the decision to use half of the income 
to service the external public sector debt, with smaller 
quantities being channelled to the armed forces and the state 
budget.
There were other risks and costs in turning CEPE round which may 
have served to reduce the willingness of the political elites to 
reform and restructure CEPE. According to Saulniers, substantial
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improvements in the efficiency of a state oil company will 
require major changes to the government-imposed environment 
within which it operates. Not only must a government clearly 
specify company objectives and relate them to financial and other 
constraints, but it must:
'examine the economic cost associated with 
each social goal and be willing to compensate 
the companies for meeting these goals. They 
must guarantee the companies sufficient 
political and economic autonomy to effectively 
insulate management from excess influence and 
interference.13
Such changes would have fundamentally changed the nature of the 
relationship between the state and CEPE, to the detriment of the 
former. The thesis; has argued that the tight political control 
imposed on CEPE enabled the state, almost at will, to siphon 
funds from the company and subordinate its entrepreneurial 
functions to wider political and macroeconomic objectives. This 
suggests that a loosening of this control and a greater respect 
for the company's technical and organisational needs would 
constrain the ability of the state to impose other goals on 
management. Not only would the state find it more difficult to 
continue siponing funds from CEPE almost at will, but it would 
also call into question the continued maintenance of non-market- 
based pricing mechanisms. Viewed from this perspective, one can 
understand why the nature of the relationship between the state 
and CEPE has remained unchanged for the last seventeen years: 
since it has been those groups which wield political clout which 
have benefitted most from this relationship they were hardly 
likely to seek to change it.
Differing Perspectives on CEPE
The secondary importance attached to CEPE's needs may not only 
have reflected the pressing nature of 'other' political 
priorities. A crucial feature of the more successful companies 
has been the existence of a broad consensus on the role of the
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state oil company and the development of state-led petroleum 
growth. Such a consensus has been notable for its absence in 
Ecuador, with the entrance of the state into the oil industry 
sparking off a bitter debate that has still to be resolved. 
Indeed, it proved difficult enough to establish a consensus on 
whether or not the country was facing an oil crisis.
A central feature of the oil debate has been the stance of the 
agro-exporting elites. Their deep attachment to free market 
capitalism and their close links with Texaco have led them to 
adopt an uncompromisingly hostile attitude towards CEPE and the 
state's role in the oil industry generally. Demands for the 
privatisation of CEPE have, however, been confined to the agro- 
exporting elites. Nevertheless, even among those who support the 
continued role of the state in the oil industry, there was no 
consensus on the goals of CEPE, particularly in the area of risk 
investment. Even before the recession of the 1980's and CEPE's 
expensive failure in the Gulf of Guayaquil, there were strong 
doubts, even opposition, to CEPE's involvement in exploration 
work.
The continuous manner in which CEPE's needs have been ignored 
also suggests a lack of emotional and ideological attachment to 
the company. It is possible that CEPE may have benefitted from a 
dramatic, full-scale nationalisation of the type that occurred in 
Mexico or Peru. There was substantial 'emotional capital' 
invested in Petroperu following the nationalisation of IPC,* 
while in Mexico the nationalisation of the oil industry endowed 
the policy of state-led development with a national mystique.5
There was little that CEPE accomplished during its formative 
years that had caught the imagination of the people or generated 
a sense of national pride. Even the transformation of CEPE into 
the majority shareholder in the consortium proved to be a 
hollow victory for nationalists, since effective control remained 
firmly in the hands of Texaco. A costly error was made in the 
construction of the Esmeraldas refinery, and CEPE's attempt to
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create a sense of national pride by making a series of 
'successful' oil finds only served to damage the company's 
reputation further. Periodic fuel shortages also did little to 
enhance CEPE's image among consumers. This might have been 
balanced out by the existence of low domestic oil prices. 
However, CEPE could not even claim credit for these since they 
had been in force some twenty years before it was established. 
There was, in short, little in the country's oil past to grip the 
popular imagination of future generations.
It seems highly unlikely that CEPE's needs would have been so 
consistently ignored if there had been a strong, widespread 
commitment to CEPE - both ideological and emotional - and a 
consensus on its goals and objectives.
The Presence of Texaco
It has been argued that CEPE's needs were secondary to other 
objectives, first because of the political importance attached to 
the other objectives, second because there were costs attached 
to the 'domestic' strategy that the political elites were not 
willing to incur and third, there was little political risk 
involved in ignoring CEPE's demands. One is still left wondering, 
however, why the political elites appeared willing 'to kill the 
goose that lays the golden egg. ' Were they so preoccupied with 
other more pressing political objectiives that they were willing 
to bankrupt the very company on which they depended for existing 
and future oil revenues? That the answer to this is an emphatic 
no reflects not so much to the credit of the political elites, 
but to their perception of the nature of the oil industry in 
Ecuador and, in the upstream sector at least, CEPE's periphery 
role in it.
As they correctly perceived, there was little economic risk 
attached to ignoring CEPE's needs. The striking feature of the 
oil industry in Ecuador and, I would argue, the primary factor 
accounting for CEPE's weakness, was that the continued funding of
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welfare politics (and the military) was not dependent on the 
existence of a financially strong and efficient state enterprise. 
Nor was it dependent on CEPE undertaking a costly and risky 
programme of exploration. It was dependent instead on the 
continuing presence of Texaco. By allowing Texaco to remain in 
the country and operate the country's main oil fields, the state 
faced no overriding necessity to ensure that CEPE was a success
or to respond to its needs.
A number of powerful reasons combined to maintain Texaco's 
dominant role in the upstream sector. Not only did it have the 
expertise required to operate the consortium's fields but, again 
in contrast to CEPE, it had the technical knowledge to undertake 
a programme of secondary recovery work which promised, virtually 
at a stroke, to boost the country's oil reserves by over 500 
million barrels. There were other factors that reduced the 
state's inclination to undermine Texaco's control of the 
consortium. Not only could Texaco count on the country's business 
community mobilising in defence of its interests, but the 
company's relatively high tax, royalty and other payments 
represented a valuable source of income for the state. When set 
against the problems involved in constructing an efficient and 
well-capitalised state oil company and the economic and 
diplomatic implications that conflict with Texaco would entail, 
there seemed little advantage to be gained in upsetting the 
'status quo'. In the minds of the political elites, both military
and civilian, the goose that laid 'the golden eggs' was not CEPE
but Texaco.
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APPENDIX It WORLD ECONOMIC AID PIL INDICATORS.
Table 1; US and World Economic Indicators
IIS. IIS US World2 YqL. .ml Nominal
GDP RPI Dollar1 Commodity.
Prices
Vorld
Trade
Interest 
Rales. (Real)
1977 4.6 6.5 -0.2 26.4 4.7 6.82 (0.32)
1978 5.3 7.7 -8.6 - 7.7 5.7 9. 06 (1.46)
1979 2.5 11. 3 -2.1 15.4 6.5 12.67 (1.37)
1980 -0.2 13.5 0.1 13.4 1.0 15.27 (1.77)
1981 1.9 10. 4 12.7 -15.5 -1.0 18. 87 (8.47)
1982 -2.5 6. 1 11.7 -15. 1 -1.0 14. 86 (8.66)
1983 3.5 3.2 5.8 5. 0 2. 0 10.79 (7.59)
1984
Notes:
6.6 4.3 7.9 1.2 9. 0 12. 04 (7.74)
1. The percentage change in the effective exchange rate of the US 
Dollar.
2. The percentage change in world commodity prices, based on 
UNCTAD's indices of market prices of the principal commodity 
exports of developing countries expressed in current US dollars.
3. Nominal US Prime Rate. The figures in brackets represent the 
real, as opposed to nominal, rates of interest.
Sources: RPI: The Department of Employment Employment Gazette,
(London, January 1987), Table 6.8; Interest rates: Central Bank, 
Xemoria,(Quito, 1986), p 357. Other: National Institute of
Economic and Social Research, National Institute Economic Review, 
(London, Number 117, August 1986), various pages.
Table 2; World Oil Indicators (in million b/d)
Production OECD Demand
OPEC Non-OPEC Total Consumption Stocks Net Oil 
Imports
1974 30. 7 14. 7 45.4 37.3 1.3 25. 4
1979 30.9 17. 7 48.6 40.5 0. 4 26. 5
1980 26.8 18.3 45. 1 37.6 0.4 23.2
1981 22.6 18. 8 41. 4 35.4 -0. 3 20. 1
1982 19. 0 20. 1 39. 1 34.6 -0.5 17. 5
1983 17. 0 21. 0 38. 0 33.9 -0. 5 16.4
1984 16.3 21. 9 38.2 34.6 0. 1 17. 1
Sources: Production figures, which exclude the centrally planned 
economies, are taken from OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 
1984, Table 14, p 15. Figures relating to OECD demand are from 
various issues of the OECD Economic Outlook. '
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APPENDIX 2; KEY DOMESTIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Table 1: The External Debt. 1972-84 ($m)
External % owed to Debt Service Payments
Debt Commercial Interest. Total. ni
Banks Payments Payments Exports
1976 523.9 54.6 20. 0 84.7 7.8
1977 902. 0 58.9 40. 0 111.7 9.6
1978 1977.8 81. 0 95.1 361.9 31.3
1979 2175. 1 81. 4 196.8 978.5 64.5
1980 2607.5 83.4 286.2 789.9 47. 4
1981 3000.1 84. 1 319. 8 1093.4 71.3
1982 2982.6 82.2 369. 7 1278.5 72.6
1983 3115.2 81. 6 327.9 1148.9 32. 4
1984 3107.2 80. 4 381.2 1067.5 35. 4
Sourcei Central Bank, Memoria (1987), table 74 p 278.
Table 2; Oil and Non-Oil Exports FOB <$m)
Crude Oil Euel Oil. Non-Oil. Total Oil as
Exports. Exports Exports % of all
Exports
1972 59. 5 - 266.8 326. 3 18. 0
1973 266. 6 - 236. 2 502. 8 53. 0
1974 601. 9 - 364.2 966. 1 62.3
1975 466. 7 - 307.4 774. 1 60.3
1976 558.8 - 391.7 950.5 58. 8
1977 501.3 -
1978 413.9 59.7 482. 4 956. 0
1979 631.6 89.2 595.4 1316.2 54. 7
1980 731.3 108.0 536.9 1426.2 62.3
1981 797.6 85. 1 418. 0 1300.7 67.9
1982 566. 1 65.7 394.7 1026.5 61.5
1983 698.2 49.3 285.5 1033.0 72.4
1984 727.3 64.5 312.3 1104.1 71. 7
Source: Central Bank, Memoria, various years.
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APPEKPIX 3; KEY DOMESTIC OIL INDICATORS
Table 1; Key Oil Indicators (million barrels per annum)
Output Direct Royalties Total For Domestic
Sales Exports1 Refineries2
1972 28.6 24.9 - 24.9 (87.1) 1.7
1973 76.2 53.6 5. 4 59. 0 (77.4) 16.8
1974 64.6 38.4 5.4 43.8 (67.8) 19.5
1975 58.7 42.8 - 42.8 (72.9) 15.6
1976 68.4 46.7 - 46.7 (68.3) 21.3
1977 67. 0 37.4 - 37.4 (55.8) 27.7
1978 74.2 42.3 - 42.3 (57.0) 32.5
1979 78.8 28.8 11. 1 39.9 (50.6) 36.7
1980 74.8 19.6 13. 8 33. 4 (44.6) 39.9
1981 76.8 30.4 8. 1 38.5 (50.2) 39. 0
1982 77. 7 32.4 - 32. 4 (41.7) 43. 1
1983 86.3 46. 0 4.9 50.9 (59.0) 35.3
1984 94.9 42.3 11.5 53.8 (56.7) 32.2
(1) The figures in brackets represent total crude exports as a
percentage of total output.
(2) Output required for the domestic market covers deliveries to 
the refineries plus compensation exports.
Source: CEPE, Informe Estadlstlco de la Actividad
ffidrocarburifera del Pals, 1972-84, p 174
Table 2: CEPE's Oil Data. 1972-84 (million barrels per annum)
Output Direct Royalties Total For Domestic
Sales. Exports1 Market2
1974 7.2 1.8 - 1.8 ( ) 3. 1
1975 14.6 11.7 - 11.7 (80.1) 3.8
1976 17.6 12. 1 - 12. 1 (68.7) 5.2
1977 42. 1 18. 0 - 18. 0 (43.0) 16.9
1978 46.3 26.7 - 26. 7 (58.3) 19.9
1979 49. 0 20. 1 6.9 27. 0 (55.3) 22.9
1980 46.3 13.8 8.8 22.6 (49.7) 24. 8
1981 47.6 20.6 5. 4 26. 0 (54.6) 24.3
1982 48.8 20.9 - 20.9 (43.0) 27. 0
1983 56.5 30.4 - 30. 4 (53.8) 23. 1
1984 63.2 27.9 - 27.9 (44.3) 26.7
(1) The figures in brackets represent total crude exports as a
percentage of total output.
(2) Output required for the domestic market covers deliveries to 
the refineries plus compensation exports.
Source: CEPE, El Petroleo en el Hundo: CEPE en la Industria
Hidrocarburifera, (Quito, July 1989), p 90-91.
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Table 3; Texaco's Oil Data (in million barrels)
Output Direct For Domestic % of Output
Sales Market Exported
1974 28.3 17. 6 7.5 62.2
1975 21. 7 15. 9 5. 7 73.3
1976 25. 3 17. 4 7. 8 68.8
1977 24.9 19.3 10. 1 77.5
1978 27.3 14.9 11.9 54.6
1979 28.9 8. 3 13.3 28.7
1980 27. 3 5.4 14. 4 19.8
1981 28. 1 9. 4 14. 1 33. 4
1982 27. 9 11.5 15. 5 41.6
1983 28. 7 15. 1 11.7 52.6
1984 30. 5 13. 7 12. 4 44. 9
Source.; CEPE, Informe Estadlstlco de la Actividad
Hidrocarburifera del Pais, 1972-84 various pages.
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APPENDIX 4: DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SECTOR OIL Iff COKE
Table 1: Public Sector Oil Income by Source. 1978-83 ($m)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Crude Exports(CEPE) 155. 0 271. 4 333. 4 236.9 351.4 263.8
Fuel Oil Exports - 89.2 100.2 96.3 65.0 43.6
Royalties 98. 4 157.2 223.8 195.8 152.9 200.2
Income Tax 80.4 85.6 81.5 102. 1 124.9 119.3
Derivative Price 
Increases _ _ 166.7 179.9 172.7
Superficiary Rights 1.8 1.4 1. 1 1. 0 0.8 0.5
Other 7. 7 14. 7 13. 8 14.8 12.9 10.8
TOTAL 343.3 619.5 753.8 813.6 887.8 810.9
Source: Ministry of Finance, Estadlstica de Ingresos Petroleros, 
1978-83, (Quito, June 1984), p 10.
Table 2; Distribution of Public Sector Oil Income. 1978-83 ($m)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
State Budget 64. 7 98. 4 251. 4 313.4 346.4 282.3
JDN 78.2 136. 7 164. 8 140. 8 145.8 175.3
BEDE 71. 0 112. 8 62. 0 63.6 92.6 74.5
CEPE 40. 3 146. 9 108. 9 126. 7 139. 0 102.9
INECEL 50. 7 74. 9 84. 3 73. 7 73.8 84.3
Municipal Councils - - 44. 9 61.3 48.2 31. 5
BEV 5.6 8. 1 4.7 4.9 7. 1 7. 0
Esmeraldas Province 3.2 4.7 5. 4 4.7 4.7 5.2
FONAPAR
National Childrens
10.5 9.5 5.7 6.2 8.6 25.8
Institute 1.5 2. 0 1.2 1.2 1.8 1.6
Health Ministry 3. 1 4.2 2.6 2.7 3.8 3.6
Employment Ministry 4.3 6.0 3.6 3.7 5.3 5.2
State Universities 4.3 6.9 4.7 4.4 5.2 5.8
Other 5. 9 8.4 9.5 6.3 5.5 5.9
Total 343.3 619.5 753. 7 813.6 887.8 810.9
Note: The oil income of the state budget in 1981-83 includes the 
income generated from domestic oil price increases with the 
exception of that accruing to CEPE and the JDN.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Estadistlca de Ingresos Petroleros, 
1978-83, (Quito, June 1984), p 28.
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Table 3; Distribution of Principal Sources of Public Sector Oil
Income by Recipient ($m)
1975 1979 1980 1981 1952. 1983
CRUDE EXPORTS(CEPE) 155,.0 2.7.1,, 4 333.4 238,9 351, A 263,8
State Budget 42. 0 59.9 153.4 120.4 176. 4 77. 7
BEDE 44. 4 85.8 45.5 41.9 65.7 46.2
CEPE 37.6 65. 1 61.5 29.7 62.2 51.9
JDN 15.3 34. 8 57.9 13.0 25.7 23. 8
Municipal Councils - - - 18.2 - 31.6
FONAPAR 4.0 5. 7 3.4 3.1 4.8 17.3
BEV 3.5 6. 0 3.5 3.2 5. 1 4.6
Employment Ministry 2.7 4.5 2.6 2.4 3.8 3. 4
State Universities 2. 1 4. 1 2.4 2.2 3.4 3.2
Health Ministry 1.8 3. 0 1.7 1.6 2.5 2. 3
Other 1.6 2. 5 1.5 1.2 1. 8 1.8
INCOME TAX 80.4 85.6 51,5 102,1 124x9. 119.1.3
State Budget 20.3 20.6 17.8 16.6 21.6 54.3
BEDE 26.6 27. 0 16.4 21.7 27. 0 28.3
JDN 13. 8 24. 4 18.5 9.6 15. 0 16. 3
Municipal Councils - - 20.6 43. 1 48.2 -
FONAPAR 6.5 3.8 2.3 3. 1 3.8 8.5
INECEL 4.4 1.7 1. 1 1.5 1.8 2. 1
BEV 2. 0 2. 1 1.3 1.7 2. 1 2.5
CEPE 1.9 1.2 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.3
Employment Ministry 1.5 1.5 0.9 1.2 1.6 1.9
State Universities 1.4 1.4 0.9 1. 1 0.6 1.8
Other 2. 0 1.9 1. 1 1.6 1.9 2.3
ROYALTIES 98,4 15 Z, 1 223.8 195,8 152.9 200,2
State Budget - - 47. 0 33. 7 16. 1 25.5
JDN 49.2 77,6 88.4 82. 0 60.3 87. 4
INECEL 46.3 72. 9 83. 1 72. 1 71.9 82. 1
Esmeraldas Province 2.9 4.6 5.3 4.6 4.6 5.2
CEPE - 2. 0 - 3.4 - -
FUEL OIL EXPORTS - 89* 2 100.2 96,3 65.0 43,6
State Budget - 15.3 29.8 61.0 38.1 26.5
CEPE - 73.6 46. 1 35.3 26.9 16.8
Municipal Councils - - 24.3 - - -
Other — 0.3 — - - 0.3
DERIVATIVE PRICE
INCREASES. - - - 166.7. 179,9 172,7
State Budget - - - 75. 0 87. 1 93.3
CEPE - - - 53.3 48.2 31.6
JDN - - - 38. 4 44.6 47. 8
Source: Ministry of Finance, Estadistlca de Ingresos Petroleros,
1978-83, (Quito, June 1984), p 22-27.
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Table 4: Percentage Distribution af Principal Sources of Public
Sector Oil Income bv Recipient
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
CRUDE EXPORTS(CEPE)
oo
0 100,0 IQCLD. 100, 0 100, 0 100, 0
State Budget 27. 2 22.1 46.1 50. 8 50. 2 29. 5
BEDE 28.6 31.6 13.7 17.6 18. 7 17.5
CEPE 24. 3 24.0 18. 4 12.5 17. 6 19. 7
JDN 9.9 12.8 17. 4 5.5 7.3 9. 0
Municipal Councils - - 7.7 12. 0
FONAPAR 2.6 2. 1 1.0 1.3 1.3 6.6
BEV 2.3 2.2 1.0 1.4 2. 1 1.7
Employment Ministry 1.8 1.6 0.8 1. 1 1.0 1.3
State Universities 1.4 1.5 0. 7 0.9 0.8 1.2
Health Ministry 1.2 1. 1 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8
Other 1. 1 1.0 0. 4 0.6 0.4 0.7
INCOME TAX 100, 0 100,0 100,0 100, 0 h-» o o 0 100, 0
State Budget 25. 2 24. 1 21.9 16.2 17. 3 45. 5
BEDE 33. 0 31.5 20. 2 21. 3 21. 6 23. 7
JDN 17.2 28.5 22. 7 9.4 12. 0 13. 7
Municipal Councils - 25.3 42. 2 38. 6
FONAPAR 8.2 4.4 2.8 3. 1 3. 0 7. 1
INECEL 5.4 2. 0 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.7
BEV 2.5 2. 4 1.5 1.6 1.7 2. 1
CEPE 2.4 1.4 0. 7 0.9 1.0 1. 1
Employment Ministry 1.9 1.8 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.6
State Universities 1.7 1.6 1.0 1.1 0.5 1.5
Other 2.5 2.3 1.4 1.6 1.4 2. 0
ROYALTIES 100. 0 100. 0 100,0 100, 0 100. 0 100, 0
State Budget - 21. 0 17.2 10. 6 12. 7
JDN 50. 0 49.4 39.5 41. 9 39. 4 43. 7
INECEL 47. 0 46.4 37. 1 36. 8 47. 0 41. 0
Esmeraldas Province 3. 0 2.9 2.4 2.3 3. 0 2.6
CEPE 1.3 - 1.8
FUEL OIL EXPORTS 100.0 100.0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0
State Budget 17. 1 29.8 63. 4 58. 6 60. 8
CEPE 82.5 45.9 36.6 41. 4 38. 4
Municipal Councils - 24. 3
Other 0.4 - 0.8
DERIVATIVE PRICE
INCREASES - - 100, 0 100- 0 100, 0
State Budget - - 45. 0 48. 4 54. 0
CEPE - - 32. 0 26. 8 18.3
JDN - - 23. 0 24. 8 27. 7
Source: Ministry of Finance, Estadlstica de Ingresos Petroleros,
1978-83, (Quito, June 1934), p 22-27.
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Table 5: CEPE’s Share of Public Sector Oil Revenue ($m)
Year Total Oil Income CEPE Oil Income % share of total
1973 116.8 1.1
Oil Income 
0. 9
1974 375.9 3.8 1.0
1975 342. 1 25.2 7.4
1976 338,2 28.1 8,3
1977 270. 0 26.2 9. 7
1978 343.3 40.3 11.7
1979 619.5 146.9 23.7
1980 753. 7 108.9 14.4
1981 813.6 126.7 15.6
1982 887.8 139. 0 15.6
1983 810. 9 101.9 12. 7
Total 5,671.8 749.1 13. 2
Source; Ministry of Finance, Estadistica de Ingresos Petroleros, 
1978-83, (Quito, June 1984), various pages.
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APPENDIX 5; CEPE'S INCOME AND EXPENDITURE. 1973-84
A. 1973-79
Table 1: CEPE's Income. 1973-79 ($m)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Participation
Sales:
1.4 1.3 1.4 5.9 9.9 3.4 2. 0
Crude/Fuel Oil 0.4 3.2 24.9 20.7 15.5 97.9 133. 8
Derivatives 0. 1 
Crude for Domestic
2.6 8.8 26.8 72.0 80.8 95.8
Consumption - - - - 0.3 13.6 15. 1
Other Income 0.9 7. 1 7.2 9.6 11.7 15. 8 61. 9
Loans 2.2 49.9 54.9 34. 1 21. 7 58. 0 34. 5
TOTAL 5. 0 64. 1 97.2 97. 1 131. 1 269.5 343. 1
Note;'Participation* income is composed of CEPE's share of 
superficiary rights, its legal entitlement to $0.20 for each 
barrel of oil exported by Texaco and 1.1154% of the revenue from 
Texaco's income tax payments.
Source: CEPEf Estadisticas Presupuestarlas, 1972-87, Direccion de 
Economia y Presupuesto, (Quito, July 1988), p 12.
Table 2: CEPE's Expenditure ($m)
Operational Investments Debt. Other Total
1973
Costs
1.8 1.6
Servicing
0. 008 3. 4
1974 5.3 26. 9 30. 4 0. 1 62. 8
1975 16.5 62. 4 15. 1 0. 04 94. 1
1976 24.6 52.6 8.9 0.2 86. 3
1977 59. 0 59.2 9.9 0.3 128.5
1978 99.5 65. 7 73.6 0.4 239.2
1979 133. 1 60. 4 45.9 - 239. 4
Sourcei CEPE, Estadistlcas Presupuestarias, 1972-87, Direccion de
Economia y Presupuesto, (Quito, July 1988), p 20.
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Table 3; CEPEfs Investments ($m)
Prod/
Explor
Industrial
Projects
Transport.
Storage
Marketing Other Toti
1973 0.2 l.i 0.2 - 0. 1 1.6
1974 3.3 17.4 3. 1 0. 1 3. 0 26.9
1975 10.6 42.9 3.4 0.5 5. 0 62.4
1976 11.7 27. 1 7.7 1.2 4.9 52.6
1977 25.7 9.9 13.2 0. 2 10.2 59.2
1978 34.5 2.8 22.5 - 5.9 65. 7
1979 12. 0 5.5 41.6 0.7 0.6 60. 4
Source; CEPE, Estadisticas Presupuestarlas, 1972-87, Direccion de 
Economia y Presupuesto, (Quito, July 1988), p 42.
Table 4: Operational Costs ($m)
Operational Transport Marketing Admin. Total
Units. Costs
1973 0. 1 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.8
1974 0. 8 0.8 2.2 1.5 5.3
1975 2. 1 5. 4 4.3 4.7 16.5
1976 5. 9 6.2 4.8 7.7 24. 6
1977 20. 2 8.8 5. 0 25. 0 59. 0
1978 44. 1 23.8
COCO 28. 2 99. 5
1979 83. 3 18.7 23. 1 8.0 133. 1
Source: CEPE, Estadistleas Presupuestarlas, 1972-87, Direccion de 
Economia y Presupuesto, (Quito, July 1988), p 21.
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B. CEPE's Income and Expenditure. 1979-84^ .
Table 5; CEPE's Income. 1979-84 ($m)
1979 1980 1981 1982. 1983 1984
Participation to o 1.2 1.7 1.9 1.9
CO
Sales:
Crude/Fuel Oil 133.8 80.7 59.3 79.6 63. 7 84. 1
Derivatives 95.8 113.6 144. 0 130.9 95. 4 120. 8
Crude for Domestic
Consumption 15. 1 13.2 36.6 41. 1 44. 1 75. 4
Other Income 61.9 132.2 90.4 48. 3 23. 1 4.2
Loans 34.5 25.3 0. 1 0. 0 - 7.5
Total 343. 1 366.2 332. 1 301. 8 228.2 293. 3
Source: CEPE. Estadl sticas Presupuestarlas, 1972-87, Direccion de
Economia y Presupuesto, (Quito, July 1988), p 21.
Table 6: CEPE's Expenditure ($m)
Operational. Investments Debt Total
Costs Servicing
1979 133. 1 60.4 45.9 239.4
1980 172.6 56. 1 25. 0 253. 7
1981 179. 2 101.6 28.2 309. 0
1982 169.9 89.4 28. 0 287.3
1983 156.5 60. 1 9.8 226. 4
1984 196.6 65.4 12.6 274.6
Source; CEPE, Estadisticas Presupuestarlas, 1972-87, Direccion de
Economia y Presupuesto, (Quito, July 1988), p 20.
Table 7; CEPE's Investments ($m)
Prod/ 
Ex.pl or
Industrial 
Pro j ects.
Transport
Storage
Marketing Other Total
1979 12. 0 5.5 41.6 0.7 0.6 60. 4
1980 27.5 2. 1 15. 0 5.7 5. 8 56. 1
1981 84.7 3.5 7.9 3.3 2.2 101.6
1982 76.3 4. 8 7.2 - 1.1 89. 4
1983 51. 2 1.1 5.6 0. 0 2.2 60. 1
1984 44. 8 3. 7 14.9 0. 1 1.9 65. 4
1985 30.6 21. 9 2. 0 2.4 3.3 60. 2
Source: CEPE, Estadlsticas Presupuestarlas, 1972-87, Direccion de 
Economia y Presupuesto, (Quito, July 1988), p 42.
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Table 8; Operational Costs ($m)
Operational Transport 
Units
Marketing Admin.
Costs
Total
1979 83.3 18.7 23. 1 8.0 133. 1
1980 84. 4 36.5 37.7 14. 0 172. 6
1981 92.9 42. 4 29.4 14.5 179. 2
1982 114.3 37.9 2.3 15.4 169.9
1983 112.8 27. 0 0.3 16.4 156.5
1984 149.2 30. 4 1.3 15.7 196. 6
Source: CEPE, Estadi sticas Presupuestarlas, 1972-87, Direccion de 
Economia y Presupuesto, (Quito, July 1988), p 21.
Table 9: CEPE's Investment in Exploration and Production. 1973~84
($m)
Amount % of Total % of Total
Investment Expenditure
1973 0.1 9.0 4.3
1974 3.3 12.3 5.2
1975 10.5 16.9 11.2
1976 11.7 22.2 13.5
1977 25.7 43.4 20.0
1978 34.5 52.5 14.4
1979 12.0 19.9 5.0
1980 27.5 49.0 10.8
1981 84.7 83.3 27.4
1982 76.3 85.3 26.5
1983 51.2 85.2 22.6
1984 44.8 68.5 16.3
Source: CEPE, Estadi sticas Presupuestarlas, 1972-87, Direccion de 
Economia y Presupuesto, (Quito, July 1988), p 42.
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APPEIDIX 6; THE ECUADORIAJ •SERVICE* CQHTRACT
Definition of a Service Contract: Contracts for hiring
hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation services are those where 
juridicial persons, national or foreign, undertake with CEPE to
perforin hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation services in the 
areas designated for this purpose, investing capital, equipment, 
machinery and technology necessary for the fulfillment of the 
contracted services.
Reimbursement of Investments and the Service Fee: Only when the 
provider of services for exploration and exploitation has found 
commercially exploitable hydrocarbons in the designated area, 
will they have rights to reimbursement of their investment, costs 
and expenditure and payment of a Service Fee,
The Service Fee is the annual sum that CEPE agrees to pay, in
monthly installments, to the Contractor as compensation for his
technical, financial and administrative services. Payment can be 
made in cash and/or kind, and is based on the following formula:
TS= PR (IIA) + (R) (P-C) (Q)
Where: TS= annual Service Fee in dollars 
PR= average US prime interest rate 
IITA= non-amortized exploitation investments 
R= the biddable factor 
P= price
C— production and transportation costs, per UOP.
Q= annual production.
The 'R* Factor applies to a weighted, sliding scale average daily 
production. Under the contract signed between CEPE and Conoco for 
instance the following ’ R' Factor was applicable:
R-.Eactor Annual Production Increment (*000 b/d)
Rl= .39 0 - 1 0
R2= .35 10 - 30
R3= .25 30 - 50
R4= . 15 50 - 70
R5= . 10 70 - 100
R6= . 05 Over 100
Forms of Payment: These reimbursements and payments are made by 
CEPE in money from the gross revenue generated by deposits found 
in the contract area. Reimbursements for exploration, development 
and production shall be made in Dollars; reimbursements for 
operating costs and expenses to be made in Dollars or Sucres, 
however they were incurred.
However, if the interests of the State are better served these 
payments can be made in kind or by a combination of cash and 
kind. Where payments are made in kind, or a combination of cash 
and kind, these can only be made on part of the exportable 
balance of the production from the contract area. Where the
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contractor is reimbursed or paid in cash 'he will have a 
preferential option to buy up to 50% of this exportable balance.
Pricing: In the event of payment in kind or the preferential
option purchase scheme the price of the hydrocarbons 'will be 
fixed in accordance with the latest average monthly price for 
overseas sales for equivalent grade oils, as carried out by CEPE.
CnTirmerciality: This is declared by the contractor once CEPE's
Board of Directors and the Ministry of Energy and Mines have 
approved' the development plan proposed by the Contractor. 
Reserves in the contract area must be sufficient to generate 
revenues for CEPE to recover marketing, production and 
transportation costs plus a 15% safety margin. (Article 22 of the 
Regulations covering Law 101 of 28 July 1982).
Contract Area: Each contract covers a maximum of 200,000 hectares 
on land and 400,000 hectares offshore.
Number of Blocks: Any company holding an onshore block in the
Amazon and wishing to tender for a second contract could only do
so for blocks in the coastal and offshore areas. Contractors that 
have signed Service Contracts are able to sign additional 
contracts to exploit free natural gas if they find commercially 
exploitable deposits within the area covered by their contract.
Tprms: The exploration period lasts for up to 4 years and is
extendable for a further 2 years. The exploitation period can 
last up to 20 years though this may be extended 'if it is in the 
interests of the state.' The Contractor will commence the period 
of exploitation when commercially exploitable reserves have been 
found, after obtaining prior authorization from CEPE. During the 
first 3 years of the exploitation period the Contractor is 
obliged to invest not less than $120 and $180 per year and per
acre for the land and sea areas respectively. The investment in
the following years are to be agreed between the parties.
Payments by the Contractor: A minimum, non-reimbursable, annual
payment of $24,000 during the exploration period and $60,000 
during the exploitation period, payable within 30 days of the 
start of each year, for the use of water and natural building 
materials situated within the contract area.
A non-deductible and non-reimbursable contribution, payable from 
the the beginning of the period of exploitation, equivalent to 1% 
of the amount of the Service Fee, after deduction of the 15% 
Labour Participation Fee and income tax payments. This is to be 
used by the Ministry of Energy and Mines to promote research, 
development and scientific and technological services in the 
field of hydrocarbons and mining generally.
The Contractor is required to invest a minimum of 10% of its net 
profits, after taxes, in its own business or those of other 
hydrocarbon industries in Ecuador.
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Tax Regime: The profits obtained by the contractor are subject to 
payment of income tax of 44.4%. The Contractor must also pay a 
siiding-scale production tax of 3% on production of 30,000 b/d, 
plus 1% for every 10,000 barrels in excess of 30,000 barrels up 
to a maximum of 30%.
This tax will apply to the Service Fee and will be deducted for 
purposes of calculating Income Tax. Crude oils of less than 15.0 
API discovered are excluded from this tax.
The Contractor is exempt from the payment of: royalties, entry
premiums, superficiary rights and contributions to any
compensation payments.
Training: The Contractor is required to undertake a technical and 
administrative training programme 'so that when the first five
years of the exploration period have elapsed the entire scope of 
the operations will be carried out by Ecuadorian workers and 
administrative staff and at least 90% of personnel working at the 
technical level will be nationals,
Relinqui shment: On termination of the contract, for whatever
reason, during the exploitation period the Contractor must 
deliver to CEPE free of charge and in good working order the 
wells that are active at that time, together with all the
equipment, machinery and installations acquired for the purpose 
of the contract. If the contract terminates during the
exploration period Contractor shall deliver to CEPE, free of 
charge and in good working order the wells, camps and 
infrastructure work.
Administration Committee: This is composed of two representatives 
from CEPE and two representatives from the Contractor. Its 
function is to coordinate and control relations between CEPE and 
the Contractor and to assess the fulfillment of annual operating 
programmes. Decisions are taken by unanimous vote, with each 
group having one vote.
Bank Guarantees: Prior to the contract being registered the
Contractor is obliged to deposit a guarantee equivalent to 20% of 
the estimated Exploration investment negotiated. In case of non­
fulfillment of obligations the guarantee shall be made effective. 
Otherwise it shall be returned to the Contractor. Similarly, 
within 30 days of the start of the exploitation period a 
guarantee of 20% of the Exploitation investment agreed in the 
first 3 years shall be deposited by the Contractor. This 
guarantee shall be reduced, in direct proportion to the total 
annual programme committed or it shall be returned upon 
termination of the contract due to lack of commercial production.
Assignment: Hone of the Contractor Parties may assign its
interests, except to a related Company, without the consent of 
the Oil Ministry.
Arbitration: Only controversies of a technical and economic
character can be the object of arbitration. The Arbitration
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Committee will consist of three arbiters, one chosen by the 
Contractor, one by CEPE and the third chosen jointly by the other 
two arbiters.
Insurance: The Contractor shall carry all insurance required by 
Ecuadorian Law and consistent with generally accepted 
international oil industry practices through the use of 
worldwide policies. The Contractor shall require subcontractors 
and third parties to provide such insurance as the Contractor 
deems necessary.
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